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Halba City Report

Lebanese Municipalities and Syrian Refugees: Building Capacity and Promoting Agency

Co-Edited by Dima Mahdi and Mona Harb

With Contributions of Mona Fawaz, Daniel Garrote Sánchez, Carla Al Hage, Yara Hamadeh, and Sarah El-Merhebi (in alphabetical order)

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Co-Editors

Dima Mahdi was a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, where she focused on socio-economic and political issues concerning Lebanese, as well as refugees residing in Lebanon. She has conducted research on the protracted displacement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the policy and programmatic levels. She holds a master's degree in Conflict Resolution and Governance from the University of Amsterdam.

Mona Harb is Professor of Urban Studies and Politics at the American University of Beirut where she is also Research Lead at the MSFEA Beirut Urban Lab. Her ongoing research investigates matters of governance in contexts of limited statehood and displacement, configurations of public life in contested cities, and intersections of urban activism and oppositional politics.

Contributors

Mona Fawaz is Professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the American University of Beirut. She is also research lead at the Beirut Urban Lab and a research director at the Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Affairs, both at the American University of Beirut. Mona's research spans across urban history and historiography, social and spatial justice, informality and the law, land, housing, property and space, as well as planning practice, theory and pedagogy. She is the author of over 50 scholarly articles, book sections, and reports in Arabic, French, and English.

Daniel Garrote Sánchez contributed to this project while he was a senior researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. He currently works as a labor market consultant at the World Bank. His areas of work include economic migration, labor markets and the task content of jobs, conflict and forced displacement, and development of lagging regions. Prior to joining LCPS, he served as a labor migration consultant for the World Bank and the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia. He also worked for six years as an economic researcher at the Central Bank of Spain covering a range of macroeconomic topics such as fiscal policy, labor markets, and deleveraging. Garrote Sánchez holds a master's degree in Public Administration and International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

Carla Al Hage is an architect and urbanist, and a researcher at the Beirut Urban Lab. She holds a Master of Philosophy in Architecture and Urban Studies from the University of Cambridge, UK, where her final dissertation was entitled 'Urban Fragmentation and Socio-Economic Interaction in Tyre: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives'. Her work in the lab focuses on the urbanization of forced population displacement in Lebanese secondary cities. The research tackles the process and emergence of new forms of urban settlement in these cities due to the large influx of Syrian refugees over the past decade.

Yara Hamadeh is an architect with a master's degree in Urban Planning and Policy from the American University of Beirut. She has contributed to several urban researches in different Lebanese regions and led others. She has also worked on donor-led local development plans for numerous towns and villages and has garnered vast expertise in working with municipalities across Lebanon. She has also taught urbanism and architectural design courses at the Notre Dame University as a part-time faculty member.

Sarah El-Merhebi is an urban planner and architect with a master's degree in Urban Planning and Policy from the American University of Beirut. She was a research assistant covering Halba during this research project.

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Disclaimer: The primary data collection for this research was held throughout 2017 and 2018. Lebanon is currently facing multiple crises—financial, economic, monetary, political, and social crises—in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic. The implications of these crises on local communities are not reflected in the findings of this report, as data collection and analysis were carried out prior. It is important to note that data collection was carried out when the market exchange rate was equivalent to the Lebanese pound's peg to the US Dollar, i.e. USD 1 was equivalent to LBP 1,507.5. At the time of writing, the LBP 3,900 per USD set by the Central Bank was also valid for certain transactions, while the black market exchange rate surpassed LBP 15,000 per USD.

Executive Summary

In the context of Lebanon being a refugee-hosting country and municipalities placed at the forefront of addressing refugees, this study examines challenges and coping mechanisms pertaining to the unfolding refugee presence faced by local level stakeholders, Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees in Halba, Saida, Zahle, and Hermel. The findings of this report are based on quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. In Halba, the qualitative data collection includes 27 qualitative interviews conducted between September 2017 and January 2018, with local stakeholders, including ten with the former municipality, a UN agency, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and religious institutions, in addition to 15 with Syrian refugees and two with Lebanese residents. Moreover, the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL) survey conducted in 2018 in Saida, Zahle and Halba with a total of 1,556 households (785 Lebanese, 701 Syrian and 70 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) households), out of which 437 are in Halba (210 Lebanese and 227 Syrian households).

Population Profile: Refugee Influx from Neighboring Syrian Governorates and Increased Urbanization in Halba

Situated within the Akkar Governorate in North Lebanon, Halba hosts an estimate of 13,812 inhabitants, namely around 5,833 Lebanese and 7,979 Syrian inhabitants. The Syrian (almost 100%) and Lebanese (90%) population in Halba is predominantly Sunni Muslim, while only 8% of the Lebanese population are Christian.

Registration with UNHCR is almost universal among refugees (98%) residing in Halba, however only 41% of Syrians in Halba have residency permits. Families that arrived to the locality in the early stages of the Syrian war are significantly more likely to have residency permits than those who arrived 2 years prior to the survey. Moreover, higher income families are also more likely to have residency permits.

The vast majority of Syrian refugees in Halba (86%) are originally from the neighboring Syrian governorate of Homs, including its capital and surrounding rural areas, while the rest are from relatively close northern governorates of Hama or Idlib. This indicates the key role of Syrian networks in clustering together, and Halba's role as a border city with strong historical trade, labor, and social ties to Syrian cities. Hence, around 50% of Syrian families report selecting to settle in Halba given its geographical closeness to the border, as well as being located only 80 kilometers away from Homs, while 40% cite the presence of Syrian networks, 27% mention affordable rental prices compared to other cities in Lebanon, and 23% referred to the safety situation in the city.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Halba experienced significant urbanization, which increased with the Syrian refugee influx since 2011. The patterns of urbanization distinguished four zones: (1) the old residential area, (2) a mix of residential structures scattered across the landscape and agricultural land, (3) recent linear urbanization along the Halba-Qobayyat main road consisting of new buildings and building clusters, and (4) agricultural fields.

Stakeholders: Dissolved Municipality and Varying Perceptions on Coordination Efforts

Relevant local stakeholders include the former municipality as the local authority, aid providers, and religious actors. The former mayor as the head of the municipality, which dissolved in June 2018, reported Syrian refugees as a burden, particularly due to the additional garbage collection expenses. Although he reported not imposing restrictions on Syrian refugees, such as evictions or curfews, Syrian respondents reported being prohibited from seeking job opportunities while waiting in the city's central square.

Syrian refugees are targeted with humanitarian assistance provided by aid agencies, such as NGOs, INGOs and UN Agencies. Syrian refugees receive aid within specific sectors under the scope of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, as well as aid provided by local NGOs. Furthermore, Sunni religious institutions in Halba have mobilized in light of the presence of Syrian refugees by setting up charities and providing social services and assistance.

With reference to aid provision and municipal coordination with aid actors, interviews reported varying perspectives. The former mayor reported aid allocated to Halba was insufficient and that aid-providers, i.e. local NGOs and INGOs, were not coordinating with the former municipality. A UN representative also acknowledged the insufficiency of aid.

As for aid coordination, the former mayor expressed indifference as to whether aid providers coordinated with the former municipality and stated that aid allocation is not centralized via the former municipality. Moreover, local NGOs and INGOs shared different perspectives regarding coordinating with the former municipality: some informed the former municipality of aid interventions, while others did not under the perception that the former mayor was indifferent towards aid-related matters. Coordination with religious actors was avoided by INGOs—a religious NGO coalition providing humanitarian assistance in Halba reported to take part in UNHCR-hosted coordination meetings.

Public Perceptions of Institutional Performance: Syrian refugees' moderate stance and Lebanese's disapproval of the municipality

Most Lebanese residents have a negative opinion of local public institutions such as the former Halba municipality, with 75% reporting a very negative and negative opinion, while only 15% expressed a positive one, and 10% expressed a neutral stance. This negative perception is higher than the perception of Lebanese residents in Saida and Zahle on the relevant municipalities. Syrian refugees report a more favorable opinion compared to other localities, with 54% approving and 45% neither approving nor disapproving the former municipality's performance.

Public opinion on other security institutions, such as the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces is more positive, with the positive stance among 60% and 94% of Lebanese, respectively. Syrian refugees report a more moderate stance, which is potentially fear-driven, with 53% and 52% approving of and 43%, and 45% neither approving nor disapproving of the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces, respectively.

On the role of humanitarian agencies in Halba, 36% of Lebanese and 60% of Syrians report positive performance, while 35% of Lebanese and 11% of Syrians reporting dissatisfaction.

Housing: Insecurity and Substandard Conditions More Evident For Syrians

Although Halba experienced a construction boom in response to the refugee influx, Syrian refugees experience more vulnerable housing conditions when compared to Lebanese, as around 66% of Syrians live in individual or shared apartments, 30% in garages and 5% in tents. Moreover, only 14% of Lebanese are tenants, while renting housing is almost universal among Syrian refugees.

Paying rent is one of the highest expenses paid by Syrian refugees, which was around USD 134 per month in 2018. Lebanese tenants paid USD 259 per month for rent in 2018. The rental market works via social networks that act as conduits of information and secure transactions. Rental agreements take place verbally and rent payments are left undocumented. As such, 14% of Syrians and 4% of Lebanese report having received eviction threats. Syrian refugees reported a fear of eviction threat, and that eviction risks are tied to their inability to pay rent on time, as well as accounts of eviction notices, despite refugees being able to cover rent in a timely manner.

Housing conditions are significantly worse for Syrian refugees in Zahle, Saida and Halba. In Halba, three in four Syrian refugees report substandard housing conditions, such as damp walls, leaks in the roof, inadequate heating and darkness. Leaking roofs and damp walls are also evident among half of Lebanese respondents. Overcrowding is also issue in Halba, with 2.2 persons per room among Syrian refugees and 1 person per room among Lebanese.

Urban Services: Lack of Proper Planning and Insufficient Electricity and Water Supply

Electricity provision is complex and cuts are a key concern. Although almost all Lebanese households are formally connected to the electricity grid, more than half supplement it with private generators. On the other hand, 62% of Syrian refugees rely on private generators, while around 30% are informally connected to the grid, a practice that is tolerated by the former municipality and the national electricity utility, EdL. Syrian refugees pay electricity bills depending on the type of connection they have, such as connection to the formal network, private generators or informal connection to the grid, which is unpaid.

Water supply concerns were reported by a few survey respondents, specifically water shortage and low water pressure. About one in four Syrians in Halba rely on NGOs tankers to access drinking water, while is 10% of Lebanese families rely on them as well.

Internet and telecommunication services were reported as essential during interviews with Syrian refugees, who highlighted that mobile phones are required in order to be accessible to and get information from UN agencies and INGOs.

Education: Lower Enrollment Rates Among Syrians

Since 2011, the number of school-age children (3-18 years old) is estimated to have tripled, with twice as many Syrian children as Lebanese at 3,350 and 1,734, respectively. Around half of Lebanese students go to public or free-private schools (41% and 9%, respectively) while the remaining 50% attend private paid schools. As for Syrian families, there is a higher reliance on free education, as 75% of Syrian school-aged children are enrolled in public schools and 5% in non-paid private schools.

Enrollment of compulsory school-age (primary and middle school, 6-15 years old) is almost universal for Lebanese students (97% for girls and 98% for boys), while around 17% of Syrian

children aged 6-15 do not attend compulsory school. Although Syrians' enrollment rates in Halba are higher than the national average (68%), their enrollment rates are lower than the ones observed in Syria before the start of the war (93%).

As for 15-17 year old teenagers, school dropout rates are much higher among Syrian teenagers with 50% of females and 70% of males not attending school. Among Lebanese, 32% of females and 18% of males are not enrolled in school. Financial constraints is the most frequently cited reason behind not attending school, particularly among teenagers. Such constraints include tuition costs of other schools if public schools have reached their enrollment capacity, or transportation or material costs, while the opportunity cost cited is child labor, in order to support the family's livelihood (among 10% of Syrian children between 6-14 years old, and 33% 15-17 years old). Employment is the most cited reason for male dropouts, while marriage is most cited for female dropouts.

Human capital levels among Lebanese adults (25-64 years old) in Halba are lower than other areas in Lebanon, and they are even lower among Syrian adults. Around 21% of Lebanese adults and 7% of Syrian adults have tertiary education, 15% and 16% have finished higher secondary or vocational education, while 64% and 77% have completed middle school education or less.

Health: Affordability as a Key Concern of Lebanese and Syrians

In order to access healthcare, 62% of Lebanese—mostly from the most vulnerable households—use private facilities, compared to 25% public hospitals and 13% NGOs clinics, while Syrian households equally rely on NGO clinics (40%) and public hospitals (40%). Of those who reported requiring healthcare treatment three months prior to the survey, which are 25% of Lebanese and 20% of Syrians, the vast majority of Lebanese (90%) were able to obtain it, while only 28% of Syrians were able to obtain needed healthcare. Affordability is the main barrier for healthcare provision, particularly for the poorest Lebanese and Syrian households. Hence, the poorest Lebanese and Syrians were among those who were unable to access required healthcare.

Employment and Job Opportunities: Underemployment, Informality, Low Labor Earnings, and Complementarity in Sectoral Employment

In 2018, Halba's unemployment rate was 14% for Lebanese adults actively seeking employment. Unemployment in Halba affected 21% of Lebanese female adults and 9% of Lebanese male adults, as well as 47% of Syrian male adults and 63% of Syrian female adults. Unemployment affects 20% of Lebanese youth aged 15-29 years old, while only 36% of Syrian youth were employed at the time of the survey. Moreover, there are 17% of Lebanese and 47% of Syrian households without a single employed member. For every employed individual, there are 2.4 dependents among Lebanese and 3.9 dependents among Syrians. Employment rates are similar among male adults (65% for Lebanese and 63% for Syrians) compared to female adults (24% for Lebanese and 3% for Syrian females).

Halba's labor market is characterized by under-employment (where working-age individuals work less than 40 hours a week), informality and low earnings. Under-employment affects 20% of Lebanese and 46% of Syrians. Informality is evident, as less than 10% of the employed Lebanese population has social security, such as the National Social Security Fund, while barely 1% of Syrian workers have work permits. In 2018, labor earnings for Lebanese in Halba were lower than those in Zahle and Saida, as Lebanese male workers have an average monthly salary of USD 688 and Syrian male adults obtain half the salary of a Lebanese, namely USD 339. The gender pay gap for Lebanese

was 20%, as Lebanese female adults earned USD 551. Syrian female adults earned USD 183 on average. For Syrians, the gender pay gap is 46%. Moreover, the average increase in earnings for an additional year of schooling in Halba is low for Lebanese, and close to zero for Syrians.

As for sectoral employment, 29% of Lebanese male adults work in sales, 28% in social services, and 14% in transport, while 46% of female Lebanese work in education and health, 34% in sales, and 13% in social services. Syrians mostly find jobs in the construction sector (45%) and sales (31%), and less than 2% reported to work in agriculture. Analyzing sectoral employment shows that Lebanese and Syrians tend to work in different sectors, which shows that they are mostly complements, while competition is limited to the sales sector. The labor market demands, driven by the restrictions pertaining to Syrian employment, has led to a "skill waste" in the local economy.

Income and Poverty: Syrians Have Lower Incomes and Higher Poverty Rates

The average monthly income per capita was USD 345 among Lebanese and USD 90 among Syrians in 2018. Labor earnings are the main source of income for 56% of Lebanese and 54% of Syrians. While both Lebanese and Syrian families rely on credit (25% and 22%, respectively), 14% of Lebanese rely on pensions and 22% of Syrians on humanitarian assistance.

Both Lebanese and Syrian families face high levels of indebtedness. Household expenditure was higher among Lebanese at USD 302 per person on average in 2018, while USD 94 per person was spent on average by Syrians. Out of the total expenditure, Lebanese and Syrians respectively spend 30% and 43% on food, 20% and 34% on housing and utilities, 12% and 4% on transportation, 11% and 1% on education, 6% and 4% on health respectively.

Poverty rates among Lebanese and Syrians in Halba were higher than other Lebanese cities in 2018. Among Lebanese, 30% were poor (lived below USD 6 per person per day) and 13% were extremely poor (below USD 3.75 per person per day). Poverty rates among Syrians are higher when compared to Lebanese (96% below USD 6 per person per day and 75% below USD 3.75 per person per day). Therefore, one in three Lebanese families and three in four Syrian families in Halba resort to negative coping mechanisms to adapt to insufficient income to secure food. Negative coping mechanisms include lowering the quality of food at least once in the week prior to the survey (28% of Lebanese and 72% of Syrians), and borrowed money to secure food for their families (26% of Lebanese and 80% of Syrians). In addition, 14% of Lebanese had fewer meals and 17% of Lebanese had smaller meals, while around 66% of Syrians reduced the size and number of meals. Poverty affects families living in non-permanent structures disproportionately, and the likelihood of extreme poverty increases with the size of household.

Mobility Difficulties Faced by Syrians Disproportionately and Different Safety Perceptions Expressed By Both Communities

Mobility restrictions differ for Lebanese and Syrians. While around 90% of Lebanese report easily or very easily using transportation, only 54% of Syrians find it easy. Mostly affecting poorer households, 15% of Lebanese respondents report that they sometimes face mobility-related difficulties. However, 80% of Syrian households report facing mobility-related difficulties sometimes, with official checkpoints being the most cited restriction (85% of those who report facing restrictions), and harassment from Lebanese (10%).

Safety perceptions differ as 16% of Syrians compared to 92% of Lebanese report feeling very safe. Perceptions of unsafety among Syrian refugees are tied to the overall environment, fear of being detained or suffering as an outcome of violence, as well as fear of being deported or evicted from their residence. Among Syrians in Halba, safety perceptions and mobility restrictions are linked, as those who face mobility restrictions report lower safety perceptions by 15%. Moreover, Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR cited slightly higher safety perceptions. In terms of the type of crimes faced by both communities, Lebanese report incidents of theft, while Syrians report incidents of harassment, physical aggression and arrest.

Social Interactions: Varying Levels of Inter-Group Interaction

Intergroup interactions are absent among 54% of Lebanese and 25% of Syrians. Syrians report more interaction with Lebanese due to economic transactions such as renting apartments and purchasing or selling goods. The presence of economic interactions does not increase the likelihood of social interactions, such as social visits and religious events, which are low for both groups. However, urban and socio-economic factors affect the likelihood of intergroup exposure, particularly among the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese and the better-off Syrians. Factors that increase the likelihood of interaction is residential proximity to the city and children's enrollment in school.

Lebanese and Syrian respondents tend to report having good relations with the other community, and particularly those that interact with the other community have better attitudes towards the other community. Although social visits are associated with more positive feelings between the two communities, economic interactions do not improve attitudes towards the out-group and may potentially worsen them.

As for interaction within the Syrian community, interviews cited a sense of security and stability, as well as the importance of Syrian networks for sharing information, and providing mental and physical support.

Conflict Resolution: Low Availability of Mechanisms to Settle Tensions

In the case of intergroup tensions, the availability of formal and informal mechanisms to settle inter-communal tensions is strikingly low, available among 57% of Lebanese and 23% of Syrians. Formal institutions include the security institutions or courts, while informal channels include the locally elected *mukhtar*.

Introduction

Lebanon has been hosting Syrian refugees since 2011, and has the highest refugee per capita rate in the world, as refugees make up around 30% of its total population.[1] In September 2020, Lebanon hosted 879,529[2] Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Lebanese government estimates hosting more than 1.5 million Syrians.[3] In 2021, Syrian displacement entered its eleventh year.

In the absence of an administrative and legal governance framework for refugees in Lebanon, the government's approach shifted from a laissez-faire approach in the early years of the Syrian conflict to adopting restrictive policies in 2014. Early on, the government maintained an open border and announced the policy of dissociation from the Syrian conflict, as well as the policy of non-encampment of Syrian refugees.[4] As the number of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees exceeded one million in 2014, the government adopted restrictive measures towards Syrians that aimed to reduce their number and promote their return.[5] These measures included border restrictions, municipal censuses and policing, employment restrictions and sponsorship. In addition, the government requested that UNHCR stop registering Syrians in 2015, hence those who hadn't registered with UNHCR and those who entered Lebanon after the suspension of registration are not included in the official number of UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees. In 2019, the government implemented a series of additional restrictive policies on Syrian refugees' employment, shelter, and residency. The government's restrictive stance has generally affected refugees' protection space,[6] access to human rights, as well as social services. In light of the government's unwillingness to address the presence of Syrian refugees, refugee governance was left in the hands of the municipalities and security agencies.

This report presents the findings of a joint research conducted from April 2017 to December 2020, which examines local governance and service provision dynamics pertaining to the refugee presence in four selected mid-size cities: Halba, Saida, Zahle and Hermel. The research adopted a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative tools of inquiry. Twenty-seven qualitative interviews were conducted with local stakeholders in Halba between September 2017 and January 2018, including with fifteen Syrian households and two with Lebanese resident, as well as ten with representatives of the former municipality, a UN agency, international non-

[1] European Commission. 2019. 'European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/lebanon_2019-08-28.pdf

[2] UNHCR. 2020. "Syria Refugee Response Lebanon Syrian Refugees Registered – 30 September 2020." https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82685

[3] UNHCR. 2019. 'Lebanon Fact Sheet.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR-Lebanon-Operational-fact-sheet-January-2019.pdf

[4] Atallah, S. and D. Mahdi. 2017, 'Law and Politics of "Safe Zones" and Forced Return to Syria: Refugee Politics in Lebanon.' The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1515749841-lcps_report_-_online.pdf

[5] UNHCR. 2015. 'Refugee Response in Lebanon Briefing Documents.' http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/95_finalbriefingkit_/95_finalbriefingkit_en.pdf

[6] Measures introduced by the government in 2015 have impacted Syrian refugees' entry and halted refugees' UNHCR registration in the country. The latter is crucial for return support when the circumstances for safe and dignified returns are met, as well as resettlement. See UNHCR. "Protection." https://www.unhcr.org/lb/protection

governmental organizations (INGOs), local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and religious institutions. The interviews were carried out with ethical considerations and the respondents' consent. The quantitative data is based on the results of the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL) conducted for the project in 2018, which covers 7,208 individuals, i.e. 1,556 households (785 Lebanese, 701 Syrian and 70 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) households) and is representative of the population in three municipalities: Saida, Zahle and Halba (annex 2).

This city report entails seven sections. The first section presents findings pertaining to the population in Halba, Syrian refugees' legal status and displacement, as well as the city's population growth and urban structure. The second section provides an overview of local stakeholders, their perceptions of aid and coordination efforts, as well as Syrian refugees' and Lebanese inhabitants' perceptions of various institutions. The third section covers housing and urban services for Lebanese and Syrians in Halba, which entails housing insecurity, housing conditions, urban services and the informal provision of services. The fourth section addresses social services, namely Syrian refugees' and Lebanese communities' access to education and healthcare services. The fifth section discusses Lebanese residents' and Syrian refugees' employment and job opportunities. The sixth section examines income and poverty among both communities. The final section addresses access to transportation and mobility, and safety perceptions among Lebanese and Syrians in Halba, as well as social interactions, intergroup perceptions and conflict resolution mechanisms. This report has four annexes: the first lists the interviewees who participated in the qualitative data collection, the second provides information pertaining to the LCSRHCL survey, the third presents a map of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Halba as of 30 September 2020, and the fourth shows a list of UNHCR implementing partners actively providing assistance in the district.

Population Profile

This section presents the profile of Halba's population, Syrian refugees' legal status and displacement, as well as Halba's population growth and urban structure.

Halba is the capital city of the Akkar Governorate in North Lebanon. The population in Akkar was estimated at around 400,000 inhabitants in 2016, with a population density of around 500 people/km^2, the latter being one of the lowest densities among all governorates in Lebanon.[7]

Population

According to the LCSRHCL, the total population of Halba is estimated at about 13,812 inhabitants, with 5,833 Lebanese and 7,979 Syrian. In an interview, the former mayor of Halba estimated that 17,000 refugees reside in Halba in 2018. This figure is, however, substantially higher than the 6,934 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees residing in Halba by September 2020 or the figure estimated by the LCSRHCL.[8] Findings of the LCSRHCL survey show that registration with UNHCR is almost universal (98%) among refugees residing in Halba.[9]

Halba's population is predominantly Sunni Muslim as 90% of Lebanese inhabitants and almost 100% of Syrian inhabitants are Sunni Muslim, however 8% of Halba's Lebanese inhabitants are Christian (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Legal Status of Syrian Refugees

Prior to 2015, Syrian refugees' residency and employment in Lebanon was permitted by the 1993 bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between Lebanon and Syria.[10] As such, Syrians were permitted to enter and work in Lebanon for a renewable period of 6 months. Among the border restrictions adopted in 2014, Syrians needed to prove they belong to one of the following seven categories to enter the country: (1) "travelling for tourism, work, trade, and ownership or rent of real-estate"; (2) study; (3) transiting via airport or maritime port; (4) Syrians with 'displaced' status based on the Minister of Social Affairs' decision; (5) medical reasons; (6) access to embassies; and (7) have the sponsorship of a Lebanese national.[11] In 2015, alongside halting UNHCR registration, the government adopted restrictive and costly residency regulations, making it difficult for Syrians to attain and sustain legal status. The government waived residency renewal costs for UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees, while Syrians sponsored by Lebanese

[7] IDAL. 2018. 'Investment Opportunities in Akkar.' https://investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/SideBlock/180606110132198~Akkar%20Region%20Presentation%202018.pdf

[8] UNHCR. 2020. 'Syria Refugee Response Lebanon, Akkar Governorate, Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82686

[9] This statistic, however, might be biased as some respondents might fear recognizing a lack of documentation. Also, despite the strong efforts to generate a survey sample representative of all the population in the municipality, certain vulnerable groups of refugees might have been hard to reach in the outskirts of the city.

[10] Janmyr, M. 2016. 'Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' Oxford Refugee Survey Quarterly. https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/35/4/58/2609281

[11] Dionigi, F. 2016. 'The Syrian Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience.' http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65565/

nationals with residency permits pay hefty fees, and Syrians who are neither registered with UNHCR nor have a sponsor or a residency on the basis of one of the categories thus have an illegal status.

Syrian employment is regulated within the framework of the sponsorship system. Largely criminalized for their work and presence, Syrian refugees are pushed into the category of laborers and are required to pay prohibitive costs for work permits, eventually falling in an illegal status, which traps a vast majority of refugees today.[12] Many Syrian refugees caught at checkpoints without legal residency are detained by security institutions for a period and eventually released.[13] This was also validated during interviews with Syrian refugees. Also, Syrian men are perceived to be more targeted at checkpoints than Syrian women, although both are perceived to be in a precarious situation.[14] The lack of access to legal residency impedes Syrians' mobility, access to services and employment opportunities.

The share of the refugee population with residency permits drastically varies across municipalities, from a large coverage in Saida (76%) and Halba (41%), while only 14% of the Syrian population in Zahle has residency permits (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The likelihood of Syrian refugees having residency permits depends on various factors. Families who arrived in the country less than 2 years prior to the 2018 survey are significantly less likely to have residency permits than those who arrived in the early stages of the Syrian war (these are less than 15% and more than 40% respectively, LCSRHCL, 2018). This indicates that Syrian refugees who arrived prior to 2015 are more likely to have residency permits, potentially due to UNHCR registration or to stronger employment networks, while those who entered after 2015 have found it difficult to obtain a sponsor and may have entered Lebanon's porous border illegally. Similarly, families with higher income are more prone to have legal residency. Overall, financial constraints and other barriers to navigate the bureaucratic permitting process—which are more acute for newcomers—seem to limit obtaining legal documents. Within families, mid-aged males who are employed have a disproportionately higher share of permits. It seems that when not all household members can have residency permits, Syrian families begin by registering those who are primary breadwinners—often older males.

An interviews with a Syrian *shaweesh*[15] reported that during residency renewal, refugees reported the risk of submitting a Syrian ID to the General Security Office during residency renewal, and not getting it back.

[12] Fawaz, M., A. Gharbieh, M. Harb, and D. Salame. 2018. 'Refugees as City Makers.' Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs. https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/research_reports/2018-2019/20180910_refugees_as_city_makers.pdf

[13] Human Rights Watch. 2016. '"I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person." How Lebanon's Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugee.' https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse

[14] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.' Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. https://www.dsp-syria.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/DSP-LCPS%20report.pdf

[15] The *shaweesh* is often a male ITS resident, either selected by ITS residents or is self-imposed, and represents the ITS when dealing with external parties, such as the landlord, municipal representatives, NGOs, aid-providers, and potential employers, in addition to resolving conflicts within the camp.

Displacement of Syrian Refugees

Syrian refugees have fled their country escaping conflict and violence and sought refuge in neighboring countries. In Lebanon, Syrian families chose to settle in different cities across the country depending on their background and individual characteristics. In Halba, the vast majority of the Syrian community, namely 86% of the families, are originally from the neighboring Syrian governorate of Homs, both from the capital of the governorate and other surrounding rural areas (LCSRHCL, 2018). Most of the remainder of Syrian families come from other relatively close northern governorates of Hama or Idlib in Syria (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The high concentration of Syrians from neighboring governorates in Syria highlight the important role of networks of Syrians that cluster together as well as the role of Halba as a city close to the border with Syria and with strong historical ties with these Syrian cities with respect to trade, labor and social connections. Centered between Tripoli and Homs, Halba has economic importance in terms of trade and to surrounding villages in Akkar.[16] Prior to the Syrian war, Syrian workers supplied Lebanon with unskilled labor for the gardening, construction, cleaning, and agriculture sectors.[17] Labor-related ties emerged as Syrians who came to Akkar prior to the Syrian crisis were mostly young or middle-aged males who worked as seasonal laborers, going back and forth between Halba and Syria.[18] Social connections such as familial ties due to intermarriages and old family relations were also reported during an interview with a Syrian *shaweesh*.

Given these trade and historical ties between the city of Halba and neighboring Syrian governorates, about half of Syrian families report selecting to settle in Halba given its geographical closeness to the border as well as being located only 80 kilometers away from Homs, where most Syrians come from (LCSRHCL, 2018). The second most cited reason to reside in Halba is the presence of Syrian networks among 40% of families in the city (LCSRHCL, 2018). This reason is more relevant in the city given the historical mobility and ties between the city and Syria. Besides those main reasons, 27% of Syrian families also mentioned having selected Halba due to the affordable rental prices compared to other cities in Lebanon, and 23% considered the safety situation in the city as a strong argument to settle there. Other factors, such as access to social services, humanitarian aid or job availability seem to be of secondary nature in the decision of Syrian refugees to settle in Halba (figure 1).

[16] Carpi. E. 2017. 'Learning and Earning in Constrained Labour Markets: The Politics of Livelihoods in Lebanon's Halba.' https://www.academia.edu/35326937/Learning_and_Earning_in_Constrained_Labour_Markets_The_Politics_of_Livelihoods_in_Lebanons_Halba_in_Fiori_J._and_Rigon_A._eds._Making_lives._Refugee_Self-Reliance_and_Humanitarian_Action_in_Cities_London_Save_the_Children_Press

[17] Battistin, F. 2015. 'IRC Cash and Livelihoods Support Programme in Lebanon.' https://www.ennonline.net/fex/48/irclebanon

[18] Chalcraft, J. 2009. 'The Invisible Cage Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon.' Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures.

Figure 1: Reasons for selecting to settle in Halba



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Halba's Population Growth and Urban Structure

Halba's administrative boundaries extend over 500 hectares. The city is located at an altitude of 120m, at a distance of 112km north of Beirut. Halba underwent significant urbanization in the 1990s and 2000s, which was further intensified after 2011, with the influx of Syrian refugees (figure 2). This urbanization is mostly linear, expanding along the main roads, especially towards the west and the north. One could distinguish four zones in the city,[19] depending on the patterns of urbanization:

1. Zone A is the old residential area: This area is characterized by its old houses and villas with red tile roofs. It is the most densely populated area of the city. Most of Halba's original dwellers reside in this zone, including its oldest families and landlords. Streets are relatively narrow and have steep slopes. Very few Syrians live in this part of the city.
2. Zone B is a mix of residential structures (e.g. villas, apartment buildings) scattered across the landscape and agricultural lands. Many (unauthorized) houses were built in the fields in Halba during the 1980s, with some nowadays being rented out to Syrian refugees at unregulated and often fluctuating prices.[20] Still, very few Syrians live in this section of the city.
3. Zone C is the recently urbanized area of Halba, which has developed in a linear fashion along Halba-Qobeiyyat's main road. In this zone, urbanization boomed since 2012, in the aftermath of the war in Syria. The zone forms 18% of the whole area of Halba, of which about

[19] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.' Master of Urban Planning and Policy, Department of Architecture and Design, American University of Beirut.

[20] Carpi, E. 2018. 'Humanitarianism in an Urban Lebanese Setting: Missed Opportunities.' The Legal Agenda. https://www.legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=4211

13% is occupied by new buildings and building clusters. The latter are mainly inhabited by low- to middle-income Syrian families who rent out the units from individual Lebanese property owners. Most of these buildings have 3-4 floors and have the same typology of plain façades and balconies, often painted in dark orange (figure 3). They are physically dilapidated and suffer from extremely poor infrastructure.

4. Zone D includes agricultural fields (crops include vegetables, cereals, olives, and some citruses,[21] and includes a number of farm houses, most of which are inhabited by Syrians who came to work in Halba prior to the 2011 conflict.

Figure 2: Schematic Map of Halba



Source: Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.' Master of Urban Planning and Policy, Department of Architecture and Design, American University of Beirut.

[21] IDAL. 2018. 'Investment Opportunities in Akkar.'

Figure 3: New Building Compounds for Syrian Refugees in Halba

Source: Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'

Stakeholders and their Perceptions on Aid and Coordination

This section presents an overview of the relevant local stakeholders in Halba, their perceptions and coordination efforts, as well as Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of various institutions. Stakeholders include the municipality, other public institutions, aid providers and religious actors.

Stakeholders

Municipality

After being elected in May 2016, the municipality of Halba dissolved in June 2018 after 10 out of the 18 municipal council members submitted their resignation.[22] As such, Halba doesn't currently have an elected municipal council, and its affairs are being managed by the governor, as it awaits municipal elections.

Prior to its dissolution, an interview with the former mayor reported that the municipality had 15 full-time employees and 30 daily laborers, and 17 municipal police officers. The mayor complained about his municipality not receiving enough financial transfers, and stated that around half of the revenues are spent as salaries of municipal employees.

[22] Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation. 2018. 'Ten Members of Halba's Municipal Council Resign.' https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/d/breaking-news/383165/ten-members-from-halba-municipal-council-resign/en?utm_source=News-383165&utm_medium=website&utm_term=ten-members-from-halba-municipal-council-resign&utm_campaign=RelatedArticle; Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'

Interviews with the former mayor, a representative of a religious institution as well as a Syrian refugee confirmed that the municipal police in Halba recorded the number of Syrians residing in the city. The former mayor perceived Syrians as a "huge burden" to the municipality, which had to deal with additional garbage collection costs as an unforeseen expense. The former mayor reported that the municipality did not adopt measures to limit the number of Syrian refugees in the municipality through evictions or setting quotas on the number of Syrians permitted to reside in Halba. However, interviews with Syrian refugees living in Halba reported that the municipality prohibited Syrian daily workers from waiting for job opportunities in Halba's central square, and confirmed that the municipality had not implemented curfews. Moreover, Syrian refugees referred to the municipality as an inactive actor, since it did not address residents' complaints and needs pertaining to employment opportunities, street cleaning, electricity, and infrastructure.

Other Public Agencies

The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) has an office in the city of Halba that covers the governorate of Akkar. Based on an interview with an INGO representative, the MoSA office has carried out several studies pertaining to the needs of the Lebanese community and is vocal regarding the imperative of sharing aid and relief services with Lebanese host communities. Another INGO representative stated that MoSA was more active during the beginning of the crisis, and was supported by foreign funding. MoSA's work is limited by constrained financial and human resources. An interview with a representative of a UN agency reported that MoSA has a Social Development Center in Halba which provides social and health services, and includes a kindergarten and a dental clinic, in addition to a support project that was implemented in the SDC within the framework of the Lebanon Host Communities Support Program, and was identified by the local community and municipal members as a key need.

The Electricite du Liban (EdL) has provided Halba and its newly developed area with the electricity network and infrastructure,[23] although generally in some areas in Akkar the network is old and requires repairs and maintenance.[24] Access to EdL supplied electricity depends on refugees' shelter conditions, such as connected rented apartments, or shelter that is not officially connected to EdL's network, such as rented apartments or makeshift and informal tented settlements (ITSs).[25] Fieldwork showed that Syrian refugees living in compounds that are not officially connected to EdL access electricity through illegal connections or through private generator providers.[26] EdL treats these hookups as illegal and carries out raids throughout the year to cut the cables or disconnect them.

[23] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'
[24] Mouchref, A. 2008. 'Forgotten Akkar: Socio-economic Reality of the Akkar region.' Mada Association.
[25] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'
[26] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'

The North Lebanon Water Establishment (NLWE) is a public entity providing water to the governorates of North Lebanon and Akkar. NLWE extracts around 170,000 cubic meters of water per day from artesian wells and springs.[27] Research shows that, prior to 2012, one in three households do not have access to the network's water, and that the NLWE shows weakness in non-revenue water and bill collection, as well as weaker overall performance in comparison to other establishments such as the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment.[28]

Aid Agencies: NGOs, INGOs, and UN Agencies

In the absence of a state-led response to Syrian refugees, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan—jointly led by the UNHCR, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and MoSA—has been responding to humanitarian needs in various sectors, including basic assistance, education, energy, food security and agriculture, health, livelihoods, protection, shelter, social stability, and water. Basic assistance entails cash-based assistance to economically vulnerable families, including both Syrian refugees and Lebanese. The education sector covers access to and the quality of formal and informal education opportunities, as well as the governance of the education system. Energy assistance aims to increase energy efficiency and renewable energy, support the rehabilitation and reinforcement of electricity networks, and improve the capacity of implementing partners. The food security and agriculture sector seeks to improve food availability via in-kind food assistance and sustainable food and agriculture value chains, food access via cash-based food assistance, promote food safety and nutrition practices, and strengthen food security by building the capacity of national public institutions. Health assistance entails improving access to comprehensive primary healthcare and hospitals, as well as improve adolescent and youth health and the control of outbreaks and infectious diseases.

In light of the employment restrictions imposed on Syrian refugees, livelihood interventions include vocational training that is not tied to job opportunities, short-term labor-intensive interventions, and financial and business development support. The protection sector aims to ensure access to refugee protection, and the creation of a safe protective environment, reduction of sexual and gender-based violence, and protection against neglect, violence, abuse, and exploitation. Shelter interventions seek to address immediate protection-related shelter needs of most vulnerable communities, upgrade disadvantaged areas, and improve national institutions' contribution to the housing situation in the country. Social stability's objectives are to strengthen municipalities, national and local institutions' capability in easing resource pressure, fostering dialogue, and addressing sources of tension and conflict, as well as monitoring tensions and

[27] North Lebanon Water Establishment. NA. 'General Information.' http://www.eeln.gov.lb/en/about-us/general-information; North Lebanon Water Establishment. 2018. 'مؤسسة مياه لبنان الشمالي خدمات وبدلات مياه الشرب.' https://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/etablissement_des_eaux_du_liban_nord_noth_lebanon_water_establishment_services_brochure_2018.pdf

[28] World Bank. 2012. 'Lebanon Water Sector Assistance Strategy 2012-2016.' Sustainable Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/401211468088175955/pdf/683130ESW0P1220C0disclosed070300120.pdf

conflict sensitivity. Water sector interventions seek to improve access to safe drinking water, sanitation services, and quality of water.[29]

UN agencies and their implementing partners, including international and local NGOs, have been providing assistance to Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese communities at the national level. The list of partners active in Akkar district is presented in Annex 4. Within Akkar district, Halba serves as the core for the regional relief operations and hosts offices of several INGOs, while others are located in Qobayyat. However, the anecdotal evidence reports that it is not receiving its due share of support from INGOs and NGOs.

Fieldwork reported that the number of local NGOs providing assistance in Halba is unclear, as a centralized mapping is unavailable. Local NGOs also address basic needs, including shelter, training and employment, healthcare, to both Syrian and Lebanese families. Local NGOs struggle to receive funding and are funded by international donor countries or INGOs.

Religious Actors

Halba is characterized by the strong activity of Sunni religious groups, which seem to have become galvanized by the influx of Syrian refugees, and the resources they mobilized. Among those, Sandouq al-Zaqat stands out as a key actor, active in the philanthropic, social, developmental and relief fields. It is closely linked to political leaders. In addition, a network of Sunni religious institutions operates independently. Competition for aid was evident among aid providers during the beginning of the Syrian crisis, which led to the mobilization of religious institutions that captured some of it. Aid provided by religious institutions include food and financial assistance.

Stakeholders' Perceptions and Coordination Efforts

There are varying perspectives on the coordination between the NGOs and the local authorities. An interview with the former mayor revealed that aid allocated to Halba was perceived as insufficient, and that peripheral localities were receiving most of INGOs' assistance. A UN representative shared the perception that Halba was not receiving its due share of aid in light of the number of refugees the city hosts. The mayor reported that aid allocated to Halba was not centralized via the municipality, and expressed indifference regarding whether the aid providers coordinate with the municipality or not.

Aid providers shared differing experiences when asked whether they coordinate with the municipality. Representatives of an INGO and an NGO, in addition to a religious actor, reported not coordinating with the municipality on aid-related matters. Some perceived that the municipality adopted a policy of dissociation from refugee-related issues, and that the municipality shows indifference towards aid providers' work. However, other INGO and NGO representatives reported

[29] Government of Lebanon and United Nations. 2020. 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 2020 update.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/76461

informing the mayor of aid interventions and the mayor's cooperation in aid-related matters. Furthermore, interviews reported that INGOs prefer not to coordinate with religious actors in order to avoid being stigmatized. However, a religious institution providing humanitarian assistance in Halba took part in UNHCR-hosted coordination meetings. According to an INGO representative, Halba's mayor also attended UNHCR coordination meetings and showed good intentions, although the mayor is perceived to believe that aid providers did not coordinate with the municipality and that areas hosting a lower number of refugees were benefitting from more assistance.

Syrian Refugees' and Lebanese Host Community's Perceptions of Various Institutions

Trust in institutions is important for the success of government policies and regulations, both at the central and local level, that depend on cooperation and compliance of citizens. Citizens' trust is also a subjective measure of the quality of institutions and public sector delivery, as well as how they follow their constituents' priorities and wishes and tackle their concerns. In democratic societies, low trust in an elected institution can reflect a need for reforms and, ultimately, a desire to change the institution. Figure 4 below presents the perceptions of Syrian and Lebanese respondents towards various public institutions.

Figure 4: Public perception of various institutions



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

According to the LCSRHCL survey, Lebanese residents in Halba tend to have a negative opinion of the local institutions in the municipality. Around 54% reports a very negative opinion, and a further 21% have a negative one (LCSRHCL, 2018). In light of the dissolution of the municipality of Halba prior to the survey, three in four constituents disapprove of the local government's performance. On the other hand, only 15% of the population has positive views, and 10% neither approves nor disapprove it (LCSRHCL, 2018). Lebanese public opinion on the local government in Halba is also lower than in other municipalities in the country (49% in Zahle and 67% in Saida), while Syrian public opinion is higher than other localities (28% in Zahle and 26% in Saida).

Discontent is widespread across socio-economic groups, although it is higher for either the poorest or the richest groups, while the middle class is the most lenient. In turn, Syrian refugees are significantly more favorable (or at least they report so), with 54% approving the local government's performance and 45% having a more neutral stance (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Public opinion regarding other institutions in charge of providing security are more positive. 60% of Lebanese in Halba have a positive opinion about the role of the police, also known as the Internal Security Forces, compared to only 14% disapproving of it (LCSRHCL, 2018). The support for the Lebanese Armed Forces is even stronger, with 94% of Lebanese having a positive or very positive view of the institution, compared to only 2% disapproving of it (LCSRHCL, 2018). Although security institutions set up checkpoints and detain Syrian refugees without legal residency, Syrian families have a more moderate stance vis-à-vis the security institutions. This could be driven by fear, as they are still mildly favorable of the work of security institutions, with about half of respondents having a neutral opinion and the other half having positive ones.

There is significant division over the role of humanitarian agencies in Halba. 36% of Lebanese have positive views on these institutions, compared to 35% that have negative perceptions, and 29% who are neutral (LCSRHCL, 2018). The difference in opinion could be linked to the perception that vulnerable Lebanese communities are not allocated assistance, or vice versa. Across socio-economic groups, poorer Lebanese households tend to have more positive views, which hints to potentially vulnerable communities who have been allocated with assistance. Furthermore, Lebanese employed in the social sector, which has been positively affected by the creation of job opportunities by NGOs since the arrival of Syrian refugees, have significantly better perceptions of these institutions. Therefore, it is more vulnerable groups—of those that benefited from the new employment opportunities in social services—that have a larger support for humanitarian institutions. Syrian refugees, who are the main beneficiaries of these organizations, tend to approve of their work, with 60% stating that they have a positive performance. Still, there are more than 10% of Syrian households dissatisfied with the work of humanitarian agencies (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrians that are more integrated in the economic structure of the Halba economy with jobs and residency permits, which have less reliance on humanitarian aid, tend to have fewer positive opinions about humanitarian institutions.

Housing and Urban Services

This section covers housing and urban services for Lebanese and Syrians in Halba. It is divided into three subsections: housing insecurity, housing conditions, and urban services.

Housing Insecurity

Halba differs from other cities in that the presence of refugees engendered a booming of an actual building industry, with around 27 residential buildings or compounds built largely to respond to the needs of refugees since 2011, while the usual response in other cities is epitomized through a more scattered expansion of existing buildings. This expansion seems to have been facilitated by revisions to the zoning regulations that intensified exploitation ratios in the region (Zoning Law, 2012/13). Based on this decree, developers were encouraged to build larger compounds but also to add floors to existing buildings. Developed with construction permits without strictly following regulations, these building complexes are not necessarily licensed, and are lacking in services such as electricity, water and sewage. The most prominent informal service providers in Halba are the real-estate developers who have been providing housing compounds to Syrians, as well as commercial spaces for rent. In addition, an array of service providers ensure access to water and electricity to the Syrian dwellers in those compounds.

Housing arrangements show more vulnerable conditions for Syrians compared to Lebanese. Close to two thirds of Syrian families in Halba live in individual or shared apartments (LCSRHCL, 2018). However, more than one third live in more precarious accommodations, such as 30% in garages and 5% in tents (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, almost all Syrian households in Halba are tenants, compared to only 14% of Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018).

In 2018, an average Syrian family spent USD 134 per month in housing rent, while among Lebanese families that rent, the average price was USD 259 (LCSRHCL, 2018). In line with other research,[30] interviews showed that rent is one of the highest expenses paid by refugees, and is a concern. It is also evident that refugees are left with very little disposable income once they pay the rent, with about 75% of the refugee population in Akkar borrowing money or receiving credit in order to cover rent, health services, or food.[31] Qualitative interviews support this as well, as an interviewee stated: "I borrow money in order to pay him [the landlord] so that he wouldn't say I was late on paying the rent." According to interviews, negotiating rent prices did not lead to reduction in rent prices, while incidents pertaining to landlords deliberately limiting access to services in order to increase the rent, or simply raising the rental fees for ITSs were reported.

[30] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2018. 'Housing Land and Property Issues of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon from Homs City.' https://www.un.org.lb/library/assets/UNHABITAT-UNHCR_HLP%20ISSUES%20OF%20SYRIAN%20REFUGEES%20IN%20LEBANON%20FROM%20HOMS_NOV%202018_web-093805.pdf; UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and Inter-Agency Coordination. 2018. 'Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/12/VASyR-2018.pdf

[31] UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/73118.pdf; UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and Inter-Agency Coordination. 2018. 'Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.'

How does the rental market work? Research suggests that social networks act as the most powerful determinants of the organization of housing markets.[32] They, first, act as conduits of information in markets where they are deployed, and also provide security for transactions. They, in some instances, also allow refugees to access housing for free on the basis of family relations or friendships.

Unlike most localities in Lebanon, where rental agreements generally take place directly between landlords and tenants,[33] interviews indicated the presence of a number of mediators who arrange the housing transaction, collect rent and service costs regularly, and carry out evictions in case of default.

In addition, renting out property from an employer was also reported in the qualitative interviews. While this may reduce the burden of shelter cost, as employers would deduct rent directly from employees' salaries, it increases dependence on the same people, meaning that refugees are more vulnerable vis-à-vis the employer.

Syrian refugees' anecdotal accounts state that rent contracts between refugees and owners or developers were done verbally and payments were left undocumented in contrast to their Lebanese tenant neighbors who generally relied on written contracts—although not registered with the municipality, as registration requires a certain fee. This is perceived by refugees as part of the typical prevalent informality of the processes that govern their presence and practices in Lebanon. Thus, one interviewee who was asked whether he has a written contract replied: "All agreements happen verbally, for even the *moujammaa'* [compound] isn't registered or licensed. We are living in chaos. Living, working, buying… everything we do takes place without an official contract that can protect one's rights."

According to the LCRHCL survey, about 14% of Syrians and 4% of Lebanese report having received eviction threats (2018). Anecdotal findings demonstrate that Syrian refugees prioritize paying rent on time in order to avoid eviction threats. Despite the volatility of the rent process, interviews also revealed a few complaints about sudden evictions or impatient owners. Although landlords were reported to be patient at times, this prioritization is tied to the fear of being evicted by landlords. In spite of refugees paying rent on time, the risk of eviction remains although refugees reported to expect a month notice. An interviewee stated: "When the house owner asks you to leave, you have to leave. There is no other choice." Recent studies indicate leniency with rent is likely because of the stabilization of the market, which reduces demand and encourages landlords to show more patience.[34]

[32] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2018. 'Housing Land and Property Issues of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon from Homs City.'
[33] Fawaz et al. 2018. 'Refugees as City Makers.'
[34] Ibid.

Housing Conditions

The rapid building process and the lucrative prospects of renting out units to Syrians has meant that building quality was often sacrificed in all recent developments. In fact, many of the buildings developed over the past decade are visibly unfinished, with raw unpainted concrete and no finishing materials.

Compared to Lebanese, Housing conditions are significantly worse for Syrian refugees in Zahle, Saida and Halba. In Halba, housing conditions are also generally substandard with three in four Syrian households citing having substandard conditions, including damp walls, leaks in the roof, inadequate heating and darkness (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrians residing in ITSs also often rely on the provisions of materials such as metal poles and nylon sheets from humanitarian organizations, which generates shelters with very low insulation levels and no privacy.[35] Poor conditions also affect half of the Lebanese families, in particular leaking roofs and damp walls (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Overcrowding was also highlighted as one of the prominent problems in most residential units in Halba. Syrian families live in more crowded shelters with an average of 2.2 persons per room compared to 1 per room among Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018). During interviews, Syrian refugees complained from overcrowded shelter and overcrowded neighborhoods.

Urban Services

Halba was not planned or developed as a city, despite its importance as an economic magnet due to its market in terms of retail and trade, and its location. Consequently, infrastructure and services are insufficient, poor, and lack proper planning. Residential buildings require securing proper permits in order to access public water and electricity networks. Apart from the high-quality frame buildings under construction, recent residential buildings—both legal and illegal compounds rented out to Syrian refugees—have opted out of officially connecting them to urban services and illegally accessing them, impeding on their quality.

The electricity network in Halba is complex. Almost all Lebanese households are formally connected to the electricity grid, but more than half supplement it with private generators (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families rely more on private generators (62%), and about 30% have informal connection to the grid (LCSRHCL, 2018). Interviews and field visits revealed that power cuts are a major concern in Halba, and that electricity is supplied either via EdL, or through informal connection to the grid, in addition to supply via private generator owners or providers who have become unquestionable strongmen in the area.[36] Interviews reported that electricity fees were not part of Syrians' rent. Interviews noted apartments or units either had an electric meter, and they thus paid according to how much the household consumed, or that the electricity service was "free," referring to the illegal

[35] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2014. 'Housing Land and Property Issues in Lebanon: Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis.' https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/41590

[36] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'

hookups on power lines. Syrian refugees living in compounds that do not have electricity meters installed reported not having another choice than to hook up to the network, as an interviewee describes "it is deliberate to keep them [access to electricity for Syrians] illegal, they [authorities] don't want to give Syrians [access to] electricity." The informal hookups are tolerated by the municipality and EdL. Although EdL treats hookups as illegal, it also enables them unofficially—as evidenced through this anecdote with a refugee in Halba: "EdL told me it was going to take so much time for them to install a circuit breaker that it's easier for me to hook up, as it is cheaper and less time consuming." Informal connection to the grid resulted in frequent power cuts and noticeable tensions between the Syrian and Lebanese populations in Akkar.

The accelerated urbanization of Halba resulted in the proliferation of generator owners along the main road of Halba-Qobeiyyat, as of in 2012.[37] Halba has around 10 generator providers who have divided the area into zones, with each zone being managed by one provider. Research reveals generator operators unanimously described as a "mafia," while Lebanese or Syrian competitors reported not to even try to interfere or compete with their business.[38] A largely hybrid system of service provision is set in place, one that intimately connects the formal and informal, and reflects the blurred boundaries of both.

As for water supply, interviews noted that water is provided via wells and water tanks, while drinkable bottled water is resorted to in some cases as well. Wells accessed by apartments or units were reported to either provide drinkable water or not. Water costs were either included as part of the rent or paid for separately. For instance, an interview respondent living in a compound stated that a Syrian man from Homs collected LBP 15,000 from each household on monthly basis to fill the water tanks (LBP 10,000 for him to fill the water tank, and LBP 5,000 for the subscription of the service). A few respondents complained about water shortage and low water pressure (LCSRHCL, 2018). About one in four Syrians in Halba rely on NGOs tankers to access drinking water, while is 10% of Lebanese families rely on them as well (LCSRHCL, 2018). An interview with a Syrian *shaweesh* also reported NGO dependence for access to potable water at an ITS.

Solid waste collection is the municipality's responsibility, while the treatment of solid wastes lies under the government's responsibilities.[39] According to the former mayor, Syrians were considered a huge burden on the municipality, particularly in the added costs of solid waste collection. In addition, the former mayor reported that the municipality contracted a private company to collect the solid waste, as well as hired twenty-five municipal workers for the sweeping process.

[37] Merhebi, S. 2017. 'Actors, Governance and Modalities of Electricity Supply: The Case of Low-income Neighborhoods and Refugee Compounds in Halba.'
[38] Ibid.
[39] Yazigi, S., R. Khoury, R. Zbeidy, R. Haidar, J. Stephan, F. Doumani, C. Atallah, A. Clutchier, P. Varese, R. Ghanem, J. Eid, N. Antoun, and N. Medawar. 2014. 'Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for Akkar.' Council for Development and Reconstruction. http://www.cdr-adelnord.org/6/0/9/7/8/5/Akkar_SSRDP_20141214_rev07_Web_for_review_2.pdf

Internet and telecommunication services were also reported as essential to Syrian refugees. Interviews reported the need for Syrian refugees to have mobile phones in order to be accessible to and get information from UN agencies and INGOs, although it was described as expensive. An interviewee stated: "It is undeniable that owning a cellphone is expensive, but we cannot live without it, it is a lifeline for us, providing us with the means to give and receive vital information, especially from the UN." Moreover, internet was reported to be accessed either via mobile service or wifi. Wifi subscription was either reported as expensive or as cheaper than mobile data. During interviews, one household that had managed to ensure free service stated: "The person who is providing it for us is considerate, and connects us for free, and sometimes when he buys cigarettes or coffee from my husband's cart, my husband does not charge him for it."

Social services

This section covers the Lebanese community's and Syrian refugees' access to education and healthcare. The arrival of a large number of Syrian refugees has added pressure on the provision of public services in the municipality of Halba, namely education and healthcare. At the national level, Syrian refugees have been permitted to access public schools, hospitals, and primary health care centers, however challenges pertaining to access and quality of services persist.

Education

Based on the Ministry of Education and Higher Education's (MEHE) memorandum in 2012, Lebanese public schools early on enrolled school-aged Syrians without requiring documentation and legal status.[40] The three-year "Reaching All Children with Education (RACE)" strategy to improve access to and quality of education opportunities for Syrian refugees was announced in 2014, and was extended via the RACE II strategy in 2017 until 2021.[41] The education opportunities include formal education, as well as non-formal programs that are certified by MEHE and aim to bridge out-of-school children to formal education or remain as standalone programs. Interviews revealed the presence of foreign-funded schools that provide the Syrian curriculum, as well as informal gatherings of Syrian school-aged children with a former Syrian teacher once a week, as a means for education. However, this section covers formal education.

According to the Center for Educational Research and Development, Akkar included a total of 314 schools in the academic year 2018-2019, 172 public schools with 48,563 students, 38 free private schools with 13,490 students, 97 paid private schools with 38,002 students, and 7 United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools with 6,094 students.[42] The number of non-Lebanese students enrolled in public schools in Akkar that provide the second shift are 8,094 in primary education (cycle 1), 6,060 in intermediate education (cycle 2), and 1,265 in secondary education (cycle 3).[43]

Based on the LCSRHCL survey, the number of school-age children (3-18 years old) is estimated to have tripled since 2011, with twice as many Syrian children as Lebanese at 3,350 and 1,734, respectively. This is due not only to the large number of Syrians that settled in Halba, but also to their younger population structure, with more children per family at 3.3 for Syrians versus 2.9 for Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018). About half of Lebanese students go to public or free-private schools (41% and 9%, respectively), while the other half attend private paid schools (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families rely more on free education, with 75% enrolled in public schools and 5% in non-paid private schools (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Despite pressures on the supply of education, there is an almost universal enrollment of compulsory school-age (primary and middle school 6-15 years old) for Lebanese students in Halba at 97% for

[40] Ministry of Education and Higher Education. 2014. 'Reaching All Children with Education.' https://www.mehe.gov.lb/ar/Projects/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf

[41] Ministry of Education and Higher Education. NA. 'Reaching All Children With Education – Lebanon.' http://racepmulebanon.com/index.php/features-mainmenu-47/race2-article

[42] CERD. 2019. '2019 - 2018 النشرة الإحصائية للعام الدراسي.' http://www.crdp.org/files/201908300826465.pdf

[43] Ibid.

girls and 98% for boys (figure 5) (LCSRHCL, 2018). However, 17% of Syrian children aged 6-15 do not attend compulsory school (LCSRHCL, 2018). Research shows that the enrollment of Syrians in formal education is associated with challenges pertaining to schools' enrollment capacity, distance to the school, fees associated with school enrollment such as transportation and learning materials, limited future opportunities, an enabling learning environment, as well as the opportunity cost of education, i.e. employment.[44] Although enrollment rates of this group are higher than the average of Syrians in Lebanon, which is 68%, these rates are still lower than the ones observed in Syria before the start of the war, which was 93% (LCSRHCL, 2018).

School dropout rates are higher among teenagers 15-17, with 18% of male and 32% of female Lebanese not enrolled in high school (figure 5) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Dropout rates, in particular among females, are higher than the average in the country. Among Syrian teenagers, enrollment is a much more severe challenge, with around 50% of females and 70% of males not attending any formal education.

Figure 5: School Enrollment





Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Most families in Halba are close to an elementary or secondary school. The average driving distance to the nearest school is five minutes for Lebanese families and fifteen minutes for Syrian families (LCSRHCL, 2018). Even in the case of Syrian households, when asked about the main reasons behind their children dropping out of school, supply contraints—although present—do not seem

[44] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.'

to be binding in most instances.[45] Anecdotal evidence also points to school-aged Syrians not having command in English or French and facing difficulties in the difference in curriculum.

The most frequently cited reasons for not sending children to school among Syrian families relate to financial constraints, in particular for teenagers. This was reported as due to the cost of education, such as tuition of other schools, if there is no space in public schools, or the costs of transportation or education materials, and the high opportunity cost given the need of many under-age children to work to support their family's livelihood. Moreover, child labor is a relevant challenge in the Syrian community in Halba, as 10% of Syrian children aged 6 to 14 and 33% of those aged 15-17 are not enrolled in school, because they have to work to support their families (LCSRHCL, 2018). By gender, the need to work is more frequently mentioned among males, in line with traditional gender roles. On the other hand, the most cited factor for dropping out among female teenagers is marriage, with the consequent increase in household responsibilities. This was validated during interviews as a respondent stated: "If my son doesn't work, we will be broke. We have bills to pay and expenses to cover, if he goes back to school we wouldn't be able to go on."

The overall levels of human capital of the adult Lebanese population (25-64) in Halba is somewhat lower than in other areas of Lebanon (LCSRHCL, 2018). About 21% have tertiary education, 15% have finished higher secondary or vocational education, while the majority (64%) have middle school education or less (LCSRHCL, 2018). Female Lebanese in the municipality tend to be more educated than men, with 28% having tertiary education compared to 13% (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among adult Syrians education levels are lower, with 7% having tertiary education, 16% reaching higher secondary or vocational education, 29% middle school, and 48% primary or no education (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Health

At the district level, Akkar hosts three private hospitals, namely Akkar Rahal Hospital, El Youssef Hospital Center, and Hopital Notre Dame de la Paix.[46] Halba counts one public hospital, namely the Halba Governmental Hospital,[47] which is open to refugees, and provides a limited number of health services. Within the LCRP response, Syrian refugees are provided with hospital care and primary healthcare. According to the LCSRHCL, 62% of Lebanese use private facilities, while 25% use public hospitals and 13% use NGOs clinics who are generally the most vulnerable families (2018). Syrian households rely equally on NGO clinics and public hospitals at 40% each (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Close to one in four Lebanese in Halba needed treatment during the three months prior to the survey in 2018 (LCSRHCL, 2018). In spite of the increase in the demand for healthcare as a result of the influx of refugees, the vast majority of Lebanese, around 90%, who needed treatment were able to obtain it (LCSRHCL, 2018). Health needs increase with age, and close to half of adults 60 or

[45] Supply factors are related to the availability of schools where school-age children live, including not only the physical distance to the closest school, but also if they have available spaces, or if they are allowed to enroll a particular child in that school.
[46] Ministry of Public Health. NA. 'Health Facility Locator – Private Hospitals Akkar.' https://www.moph.gov.lb/HealthFacilities/index/3/188/8?facility_type=8&district=Zahle&name=
[47] Ministry of Public Health. NA. 'Health Facility Locator.' https://www.moph.gov.lb/HealthFacilities/index/3/188/1?facility_type=1&district=&name=

above required treatment. Among the 10% that could not obtain the necessary treatment, the vast majority were from the lowest economic background and cited inability to pay as the main reason why they didn't receive the required treatment (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among Lebanese, the affordability of health care is strongly correlated with having health insurance. Among the 45% of Lebanese in Halba have insurance, only 3% report not accessing the needed treatment, a ratio that increases to 18% for the more than half of the population that doesn't have any insurance (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Syrian refugees are slightly less likely to report needing health treatment (20%). However, only 28% of those received the needed healthcare (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, there are large gaps in health provision for the Syrian community in Halba. The inability to access healthcare, while it's widespread across Syrian families, is particularly acute for the poorest groups, and nearly all families cite the cost as the main barrier to obtain treatment.

Overall, the main barrier for healthcare provision seems to be affordability, in particular for the poorest Lebanese households and the Syrian population. Although healthcare services may be covered, additional costs such as transportation, doctor fees and treatment costs are key barriers.[48] Health costs were reported as a main concern during interviews with Syrian refugees. Medical expenses were described as expensive and unaffordable by Syrian and Lebanese interviewees, and attempts to negotiate the reduction of medical costs were reported. Moreover, close to 90% of Lebanese in Halba have access to a hospital, health center or doctors within walking distance of five to fifteen minutes (LCSRHCL, 2018). Distances are higher for the Syrian population who generally live on the outskirts, with the average distance by car around fourteen minutes (LCSRHCL, 2018).

[48] UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/73118.pdf

Employment and Job Opportunities

This section covers employment and job opportunities pertaining to Lebanese and Syrians in Halba.

Akkar is classified as "relatively under-developed" compared to other districts in Lebanon.[49] The locality of Halba is traditionally an important economic magnet in Akkar where its intermediary location between Homs and Tripoli is a clear asset. Trade in Akkar was confined to Halba and Al-Aabdeh, and employed around 14.3% of its working population in 2008.[50] This trade however is limited to small local shops, with only a few larger stores located in strategic locations along the international roads in Halba.[51] Retail and trade were composed of mainly two markets: vegetables and livestock. In Halba, the industrial sector is historically less thriving than its trade, which mainly includes food and car mechanic services.

The labor market in Halba faces severe structural challenges. The unemployment rate has historically been higher in Akkar than the national average. In 2009, it reached 8% in the governorate, compared to 6% in Lebanon.[52] By 2016, it was estimated that 9% of the population was unemployed in North Lebanon and Akkar.[53] In 2019, the unemployment rate remained stable at 9.3% in Akkar, compared to 11.4% at the national level.[54] Given that unemployment has not significantly increased in Akkar in the last years, the key challenges in the labor market seem to be structural and pre-existing to the arrival of refugees.

In Halba, LCSRHCL estimates show that 14% of Lebanese adults actively seeking employment in 2018 are unemployed (figure 6). Unemployment rates are larger for Lebanese women at 21%, versus 9% for men, and rates are also higher for youth at 20% for youth aged 15-29 years old, versus 9% for adults aged 30-64 (LCSRHCL, 2018). Unemployment affects Syrian families even more, with 47% males and 63% females that are actively searching for and not finding a job (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among the most vulnerable, there are 17% of Lebanese families and 47% of Syrian families that have no single member employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). On average, there are 2.4 dependents for every Lebanese employed and 3.9 for every Syrian employed (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Similarly, employment rates are low, limiting the supply of labor in the local economy, with less than half of working-age Lebanese adults having a job.[55] This is driven by the particularly low participation of women in the labor market, perhaps due to early marriages, being stay-at-home mothers, and the patriarchal social order.[56] Among Syrians, only 22% of adults have a job, with almost no women being employed at 3%, versus 43% of men employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). The youth

[49] Yazigi, S. et al. 2014. 'Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for Akkar.'
[50] Ibid. and IDAL. 2018. 'Investment Opportunities in Akkar.'
[51] Yazigi, S. et al. 2014. 'Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for Akkar.'
[52] Yaacoub, N. and L. Badre. 2011. 'The Labour Market in Lebanon.' Central Administration of Statistics. http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/pdfs/sif/cas_labour_market_in_lebanon_sif1.pdf
[53] World Bank Group. 2017. 'Jobs for North Lebanon.' http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/800821506102645484/pdf/119940-WP-PUBLIC-sept-27-3am-v2-Leb-Jobs-for-North-Full-report.pdf
[54] Central Administration of Statistics and International Labour Organization. 2019. 'Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73718
[55] The working-age population can be either employed, unemployed (not employed, but actively searching for jobs) or inactive (not employed and not looking for jobs).
[56] Only one in four female Lebanese aged 15 to 64 are employed compared to 68% of men.

is another vulnerable group, with only 36% of those aged 15-29 employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). While many are still enrolled in education, there is a significant portion of Lebanese youth that are neither in education nor employed: 16% of males and 45% of females (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Figure 6: Employment and Unemployment Rates among Syrians and Lebanese in Halba



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Halba's labor market characteristics also include under-employment, informality and low labor earnings. Employed working-age individuals in Halba are often under-employed by working less than 40 hours a week; this is applicable to 20% of Lebanese and 46% of Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018). Anecdotal evidence points to Syrians working as daily workers in the construction sector for instance, which means that the availability of work is not guaranteed, and remuneration is based on the number of days worked and a daily rate.

Another characteristic is the high degree of informality, a characteristic that echoes the presence of informality at the national level as well. Less than 10% of the employed Lebanese population has social security, such as the National Social Security Fund (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, alongside the residency restrictions imposed in 2014-2015, Syrian employment also became constrained by the sponsorship system, i.e. the work permit Syrians need to secure via a Lebanese sponsor. In this context, barely 1% of Syrian workers have work permits, which is a much lower number than in other municipalities like Saida (40%), where Syrian refugees are better integrated in the local labor market (LCSRHCL, 2018). Acquiring a work permit was reported as difficult during interviews with Syrian refugees, as work permits are within the framework of the sponsorship system. Challenges faced include the difficulty to find a sponsor willing to sponsor them, particularly for daily workers who change employers regularly. Interviews also reported difficulties pertaining to finding a sponsor who meets the perceived eligibility requirements, such as a having bank account, owning a business or land. The sponsorship system puts Syrian refugees under precarious conditions and

increases risks of exploitation. As one Syrian refugee reported: "I am not willing to ask my employer [for a work permit] because this puts me under his mercy. I will become his slave. If I do anything wrong, he will use my residency permit against me and threaten me with it. As such, every once in a while I get caught [without a residency permit] and thrown in jail for 3 to 4 days."

Not only employment opportunities are scarcer and more informal in Halba, but they provide lower labor earnings. In 2018, Lebanese male workers in the city had an average monthly salary of USD 688, 30% lower than in other Lebanese cities such as Zahle or Saida (LCSRHCL, 2018). On average, the gender pay gap for Lebanese women is 20%, i.e. women earn 20% less than men, namely USD 551 (LCSRCL, 2018). On the other hand, earning capacity for Syrian male adults is even lower, as when they find a job, they obtain half the salary of a Lebanese, namely USD 339 (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian female adults earned USD 183 on average, and the gender pay gap among Syrians is 46%. During interviews, Syrian respondents complained about unfair salaries and difficult work conditions and exploitation. In case of payment default, in the absence of contracts or written agreements that secure refugees' rights, Syrian refugees reported avoiding any form of litigation because of their illegal status.

Job opportunities are concentrated in few sectors (figure 7), with limited jobs in industries and manufacturing. Most Lebanese men, 29%, work in sales, 28% in social services, and 14% in transport (LCSRHCL, 2018). The sectoral composition of jobs for female Lebanese is even larger, with 46% working in education and health, 34% in sales, and 13% in social services (LCSRHCL, 2018). Research shows that 20% of Lebanese in North Lebanon, including Akkar, are employed in the public sector, which is higher than the national average.[57] Moreover, public sector jobs, such as joining the army, is perceived to provide reliable and long-term security in light of the public sector insurance schemes.[58] The high percentage of Lebanese working in social services may include those working in the public sector and the army, in addition to those working with INGOs and NGOs, as the LCSRHCL survey did not inquire about that specifically.

In 2015, the Ministry of Labor adopted decision number 218 that limited the sectors Syrians are permitted to work in, which became restricted to agriculture, construction and environmental services—meaning cleaning services.[59] Given the legal restrictions to work and the limited economic opportunities, Syrians mostly find jobs in the construction sector (45%) and sales (31%) , while less than 2% reported working in agriculture (LCSRHCL, 2018). Compared to the sector of work they were in when living in Syria, many had to switch sectors. A large part of those working in sales were working in other sectors, and some of those working in construction used to be farmers

[57] World Bank Group. 2017. 'Jobs for North Lebanon.'
[58] Yassin, N. and M. El-Solh. 2017. 'Allure of the Army? Recruiting Rural Youth.' In 'Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon: Conflict, Cohesion and Confessionalism.' https://books.google.fr/books?id=eaUzDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA58&lpg=PA58&dq=akkar+security+sector+jobs&source=bl&ots=ElvkyDqq4Z&sig=ACfU3U3PqiJbuMkUegPTLwfPxjQmKGogzQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjhgdHKhZPpAhV85-AKHQqmBlkQ6AEwAnoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=akkar%20security%20sector%20jobs&f=false
[59] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.' Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

(LCSRHCL, 2018). The legal restrictions and the lack of adequate matching between the skills that Syrians have and what the labor market demands thus lead to a "skill waste" in the local economy. An interviewee with a Lebanese woman married to a Syrian and displaced from Syria stated: "I know Syrians who were engineers and doctors who are now working in construction and agriculture because they have to."

As for returns on education, the average increase in earnings for an additional year of schooling in Halba is low for Lebanese, and close to zero for Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018). This indicates that high-skilled workers are not in high demand given the economic structure of the municipality.

Figure 7: Sectors of Employment in Halba



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Overall, while the arrival of Syrian refugees since 2011 has more than doubled the size of the working-age population in Halba, but the low employment rates of this group has limited the actual increase in the labor supply. A sectoral analysis shows that Lebanese and Syrians tend to work in different sectors, so they are complementary rather than substitutes, which greatly nuances the negative impact of refugees on labor market outcomes vis-à-vis the local population. Perhaps the sector where there might be more competition is in sales. Refugees have also generated new employment opportunities within the large group of NGOs and international organizations that came to the locality to address their presence. Approximately one in four Lebanese in Halba have

jobs in the social services sector (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, other groups that have potentially benefitted from the refugee presence include landlords, employers, and business owners.

Furthermore, the positive effects of the refugee presence in Halba firstly include the increased economic activity through the increase in the demand for and consumption of housing (via rent), utilities, food, etc. Secondly, the indirect consumption through aid distribution also benefited the local economy, as NGOs and INGOs intensified the demand on basic assistance goods (such as blankets and clothing). Third, in spite of the unemployment outcry caused by the presence of Syrian refugees in cities, one cannot overlook the fact that their presence has also been a job generator, as Lebanese employers hire Lebanese and Syrian employees. In addition, INGO and local NGOs reported hiring locally, increasing labor demand for Lebanese as well as Syrians.

Income and Poverty

This section examines income and poverty among Lebanese and Syrians in Halba.

Traditionally, the northern Lebanese region is considered the poorest part of the country, as well as its most marginalized, neglected, and overlooked region.[60] Given that the labor market in Halba entails less earning opportunities, with low employment rates, high unemployment and moderate wages, there were low levels of household incomes. Among Lebanese residents, the average monthly income per capita was about USD 345 in 2018 (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families lived with only one fourth of the income of Lebanese, with less than USD 90 per month per household member (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The main sources of income are labor earnings, although families also rely on other forms of revenues. Among Lebanese families, the three main sources of income are wages (56%), credit (25%) and pensions (14%, either contributory or non-contributory) (LCSRHCL, 2018). For Syrians, labor income represents 54% of total income, followed by credit (22%) and humanitarian assistance (22%). There are, thus, high levels of indebtedness among both groups (LCSRHCL, 2018). Anecdotal evidence points to Syrian refugees borrowing money from Lebanese, such as the pharmacy or supermarket owner, or their Syrian acquaintances or relatives. Moreover, interviews also reported cases of Syrians not having anyone to borrow from, as poverty is widespread. An interviewee stated: "I recognize that while my Syrian neighbors may want to help, I know they cannot… and the dead does not ask [for anything] from the dead." In addition, refugees largely rely on aid to sustain their income. On the other hand, there is a marginal role of remittances as a source of income, 1% in both communities (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Looking at household expenditures in 2018 (figure 8), Lebanese families in Halba spend an average of USD 302 per person, more than three times what Syrian families can afford to spend, which is USD 94 (LCSRHCL, 2018). By type of expenditure, Lebanese families spend the largest share on food, which is 30% of their total expenditure (LCSRHCL, 2018). Lebanese also spend a sizable share on rent and utilities (20%), transportation (12%), education (11%) and health (6%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families have a less diversified range of spending given their limited income. On average, they spend 43% on food and 34% on housing and utilities (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, more than three fourths of their spending goes to just those two rubrics. In addition, Syrian families spend a lower share on transportation (4%), health (4%), and education (1%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, the limited spending on education is particularly salient in spite of having a larger number of school-age children, and it is due to the high dropout rates and the high reliance on free public schooling. As for healthcare, interviews reported that health is an expense Syrians are worried about among those who require healthcare, while the LCSRHCL survey demonstrates that less than 30% of Syrians who required healthcare received the care they need (2018).

[60] Volk, L. 2009. 'Martyrs at the Margins: The Politics of Neglect in Lebanon's Borderlands.' https://www.jstor.org/stable/40262661?seq=1

Figure 8: Monthly Spending in Halba



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

The most recent poverty study[61] on Lebanese in Lebanon was published in 2007, with data from the 2004/05 National Survey of Expenditures. This study established a lower poverty line of USD 2.40 per person per day and an upper poverty line of USD 4.00 per person per day for Lebanon. Updating those lines to account for inflation leads to a USD 3.75 per person per day, i.e. in extreme poverty, and USD 6 per person per day thresholds, i.e. in poverty.[62]

Poverty in 2018 was quite prevalent among the residents of Halba (figure 9). According to the LCSRHCL (2018), 30% of Lebanese were poor, having less than USD 6 per person per day, and 13% were suffering from extreme poverty, i.e. below USD 3.75 per person per day. These numbers are significantly higher than Zahle and Saida where poverty rates for Lebanese are 3% and 7%, and extreme poverty is 13% and 1%, respectively. Poverty among Syrian households is widespread, with 96% living under USD 6 per person per day, and 75% under USD 3.75 (LCSRHCL, 2018).

[61] ' United Nations Development Programme. 2007. 'Poverty, Growth & Inequality in Lebanon.' http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Poverty/Publications/Poverty,%20Growth%20and%20Inequality%20in%20Lebanon.pdf

[62] The lower poverty line (USD 3.75) is very similar to the one proposed by the World Bank in 2013 (USD 3.84), which is also used in the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASYR) Survey.

Figure 9: Poverty Rates in Halba



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

In the context of low income and high incidence of monetary poverty, one in three Lebanese families and three in four Syrian families in Halba resort to negative coping mechanisms to adapt to insufficient income to secure food (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among the type of coping measures, 28% Lebanese households resorted to lowering the quality of food at least once in the week before the survey, 26% got indebted to pay for food, 17% reduced the size of meals, and 14% reduced the number of meals (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among Syrians, about 80% paid food on credit, 72% lowered the quality of food, and about two thirds reduced the number and size of meals (LCSRHCL, 2018). The intensity of these coping measures is large, as it was reported to occur on an average of three times per week for Lebanese and close to five times per week for Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The incidence of poverty is heterogeneous across different urban and socio-economic characteristics. According to regression analysis, the share of households living in poverty varies by shelter type, disproportionately affecting families with lower housing tenure, in particular those living in non-permanent structures such as tents or garages (LCSRHCL, 2018). The probability of being extremely poor increases with the size of the household (LCSRHCL, 2018). This is mostly due to the higher dependency ratio, that is, the share of dependents over working-age members.

Although poverty is widespread, tension and aid-related perceptions were expressed during interviews. Fieldwork reported a perception that aid allocation targets Syrian refugees only, and not vulnerable Lebanese—with an expression of injustice. Furthermore, interviews reported a perceptions that Syrian refugees who lived in ITSs or make-shift homes had increased chances of being targeted with assistance by INGOs and NGOs, such as fuel, blankets, furniture, cash-based assistance, and rent coverage. However, this perception was anecdotally opposed during an interview with a Syrian *shaweesh* at an ITS in Halba, who reported that assistance was declining, and is allocated in an ad hoc manner.

The employment status and, in particular, the share of household members that are employed, drastically reduce the probability of being poor. Hence, the more household members are employed, the less their chances of drowning in poverty. Research points to the importance of livelihood opportunities in promoting self-reliance.[63] Although this means a higher household income, more household members working may be also linked to cases of child labor.

Families with higher education levels have higher income capacity and are less likely to remain below the poverty line (LCSRHCL, 2018), although LCSRHCL findings also pointed out that returns on education were low, as discussed in the social services section.

[63] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.'

Mobility, Safety, and Conflict Resolution

This section is divided into two subsections. The first covers Syrian refugee and Lebanese access to transportation, mobility and safety perceptions. The second addresses social interactions, intergroup perceptions and conflict resolution between the two communities in Halba.

Access to Transportation, Mobility Restrictions, and Safety Perceptions

Mobility restrictions in Halba are different for Lebanese and Syrians (figure 10). Lebanese residents do not generally find difficulties in accessing needed transportation, whether public or private, in order to move between places. About 90% report using transportation easily or very easily (LCSRHCL, 2018). However, 8% of the Lebanese population report they have a hard time securing the necessary transportation (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian households are more likely to report issues pertaining to securing transportation, with only 54% of them finding it easy (LCSRHCL, 2018).

While the vast majority of the Lebanese community in Halba report never facing mobility restrictions (figure 10), with 15% of households facing difficulties at least sometimes (LCSRHCL, 2018). These restrictions mostly affect the poorer families. On the other hand, restrictions are more widespread across Syrian households, with 80% of families affected at least sometimes (LCSRHCL, 2018). The main barriers to mobility for Syrians are the official checkpoints, as reported by 85% of the population that find it difficult to move (LCSRHCL, 2018). This is due to difficulties pertaining to accessing and sustaining legal status. Moving without legal residency limited the distance of Syrian refugees' movement outside Halba, as reported by interviews with Syrian households. Another constraint, significant to close to 10% of Syrians, is the harassment faced from Lebanese residents (LCSRHCL, 2018). During interviews, Syrians reported incidents of verbal and physical assault. Although a curfew was not enforced, interviews reported Syrians not leaving the house after sunset.

Figure 10: Mobility Restrictions



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

There is a similar nationality divide in terms of how safe residents in Halba feel (figure 11). While 92% of Lebanese families feel very safe, only 16% of Syrians have similar perceptions (LCSRHC, 2018). The main reasons behind the feeling of unsafety among the Syrian community are the overall environment and, more specifically, fear of detention or violence. Although of a smaller order of magnitude, some Syrians also fear deportation and eviction from their residences. During interviews, Syrians reported uncertainty pertaining to evictions, specifically by landlords.

Figure 11: Safety Perceptions among Lebanese and Syrians in Halba

Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Legal, housing and mobility uncertainties affect the perceptions of safety among Syrian families. There is a clear association between mobility restrictions and safety perceptions in Halba, in particular for the Syrian community that is the one most severely affected. Compared to families that report restrictions to move, those that face mobility impediments report safety levels 15% lower (LCSRHCL, 2018). Safety is also shaped by the vulnerability of the house tenure, as families that receive eviction threats, they report lower levels of safety. Finally, those registered with UNHCR report slightly higher levels of safety. Income and education levels of the population do not clearly correlate with safety.

Beyond safety perceptions, the type of crime that each community report as the more prevalent is also different, according to LCSRHCL findings. Syrian families mostly report incidents of harassment, but also physical aggressions and arrests. In turn, Lebanese report mostly facing theft.

Social Interactions, Intergroup Perceptions, and Conflict Resolution

Despite of the large presence of refugees in Halba, a sizable part of the population in each of the two communities, but particularly among Lebanese, report not interacting with each other (54% of Lebanese families, compared to 25% of Syrians) (LCSRHCL, 2018). The larger out-group exposure of Syrians compared to Lebanese is related to economic transactions, such as renting apartments and purchasing or selling goods, while those interactions are almost non-existent among Lebanese families. This might be due to a small fraction of Lebanese, who are either owners, sellers or

employers that interact with the majority of Syrians. Social interactions, such as social visits and religious events, are similarly low for both groups. In general, those who have economic interactions with the other group are not more likely to socially interact with them.

Urban and socio-economic factors influence the likelihood of exposure and interaction between the two communities. Higher income and more educated Lebanese families engage less with the Syrian community, while the opposite is true for Syrians. It is thus the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese and the better-off Syrians that are more prone to interact with each other. Halba spatially integrates Syrian refugees better than other cities in Lebanon, with an average distance to the closest Lebanese family of less than 100 meters, and those living further away interacting less with the other community. Beyond these differences, Syrian families who send their children to school are more likely to report interacting with Lebanese, highlighting the opportunity the education system provides for facilitating social networks.

In general, both Lebanese and Syrian families tend to report having good relations with the other community. This reflects the historically strong links between Halba and Syrian towns, due to labor ties and mixed marriages. Importantly, families that interact with the other community have, on average, significantly better attitudes towards each other, in line with the contact theory that stipulates that inter-group contact potentially improve trust and a positive attitude between the two groups.[64] However, not all types of interactions lead to more positive views. Social visits are associated with more positive feelings for both Lebanese and Syrians. However, not all types of interactions lead to more positive views. Economic interactions, such as engaging in purchases and selling of goods or rent-based interactions, do not improve attitudes towards the out-group and, in certain cases, can even make them worse. Such interactions may be associated with perceptions of competition and threat, as reported anecdotally by aid providers and a religious actors. In addition, the former mayor spoke of widespread early marriages among older Lebanese men with young Syrian girls, causing abusive relations and generating tensions between the two communities.

Within the Syrian community, interviews reported that social networks act as the most powerful resources for refugees in providing information, guidance, and a sense of security and stability. These include networks connecting Syrians with members of a similar national group, which provide support, such as emotional and physical, as well as financial, and help secure information regarding work, housing, health services, schooling, and assistance. Interviewees specifically noted they received financial support, particularly when it comes to healthcare-related bills. Moreover, intragroup networks with neighbors, acquaintances or employers that were reported during interviews were also cited as sources of information and support. Property owners, however,

[64] Schmid, K., M. Hewstone, and A. Al Ramiah. 2015. 'Diversities, Trust, and Intergroup Attitudes: Underlying processes and mechanisms.' In Social Cohesion and Immigration in Europe and North America: Mechanisms.' Routeledge. https://books.google.fr/books?id=FEaLBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA143&lpg=PA143&dq=contact+theory+2007and+social+cohesion&source=bl&ots=3yQH7TGwFF&sig=ACfU3U2vPJhGCW16C9zfp4pBKXWIPDSLuQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjakaunjo7pAhXgA2MBHQdXD0wQ6AEwAXoECA0QAQ#v=onepage&q=contact%20theory&f=false

were not perceived as members of Syrian social networks across interviews--this may be due to the formality of renting apartments and fear of eviction.

The availability of dispute resolution mechanisms for both communities is an essential component for social cohesion. However, there is a strikingly low availability of formal and informal mechanisms to settle inter-communal tensions. Only 23% of Syrian households say they have proper mechanisms of dispute resolution, compared to 57% of Lebanese families (LCSRHCL, 2018). The larger availability among Lebanese is obviously due to their better access to formal institutions, like the General Security Office and courts. Furthermore, informal institutions such as *mukhtars* seem to be prevalent among a sizable minority of families from both groups (15%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). During interviews, a group of Syrians were reported to meet regularly to discuss contentious issues, such as evictions in Akkar, as well as engage in dialogue with relevant Lebanese counterparts, in order to resolve problems faced by Syrians.

Conclusion

This report has examined qualitative and quantitative findings across various themes, such as legal status, aid and coordination, housing and urban services, social services, employment and job opportunities, income and poverty, and mobility, safety and conflict resolution. It also brings together the perspectives of local stakeholders regarding the local governance of the Syrian refugees. Both LCSRHCL survey findings and qualitative interviews provide representative insights that can inform local policy challenges, assuming a clear breakdown of the local population's characteristics is provided.

The report unpacks the interaction of local communities with stakeholders and access to services, as well as their coping mechanisms. It also highlights the plight of Syrian refugees under challenging conditions of governance and management, demonstrating the precarious situation of Syrian refugees with regard to their legal status by providing examples whereby legal status affects access to services and mobility, for instance. Findings also examine the reasons behind Syrian refugees choosing to settle in a particular locality.

The report investigates the perspectives of local stakeholders, namely the municipality, public agencies, aid providers, and religious actors, vis-à-vis their role in the governance of service provision, as well as in coordination and aid. Lebanese resident and Syrian refugee perspectives on the performance of various institutions, such as the municipality, security agencies and aid providers, is also studied. The report additionally identifies and analyzes the challenges that local communities face with regard to access to housing and urban and social services.

The LCSRHCL survey estimates the unemployment rate, type of job opportunities and employment in the locality, as well as income and poverty faced by both communities in 2018. Research findings provide information relating to mobility, perceptions of safety, inter- and intra-group interactions, and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Although Lebanon's political, economic, financial and social conditions have tremendously deteriorated since the data was collected in 2018, the report still provides a rich analysis of the local governance of Syrian refugees in the locality of Halba. The findings of this report can inform policy decisions and agendas of local stakeholders and international organizations in ways that will hopefully advance the integration of Syrians in Lebanese cities and towns.

Annex 1: List of Interviewees

Interviews were held with meso- and local-level actors in Halba between September 2017 and January 2018. Semi-structured interviews were held in Saida, Zahle, Halba and Hermel, and were carried out in accordance with ethical research protocols. Interviewees confirmed their verbal consent in order to be mentioned and quoted in the research outputs. Interview findings reflect the accounts of interviewees based on their experiences, and do not reflect their affiliated institutions' official positions.

Meso-Level Interviews Active in Halba

	Interviewee	Institution	Type of Actor
1	Abdel Hamid el-Halabi	Former Halba Municipality	Local public institution
2	Ayman el-Hariri	International Humanitarian Relief	INGO
3	Lama Srour	UNDP	UN Agency
4	Asma El Moustapha	Center of the Working Women Union in Halba	NGO
5	El Hajja Saa'dya	Center of Women Association	NGO
6	Ahlam Chalabi	American Near East Refugee Aid	INGO
7	Anonymous	International Rescue Committee	INGO
8	Anonymous	Sandouq el-Zaqat	Religious Institution
9	Lokman el-Khodr	NGOs Coalition	Religious Institution
10	Ahmad Toufaily	Danish Refugee Council	INGO

Local-Level Interviews with Lebanese and Syrian Households Residing in Halba

	Nationality	Gender	Occupation
1	Lebanese	F	Housewife
2	Lebanese Displaced from Syria	F	Housewife
3	Syrian	F	NGO Employee
4	Syrian	M	Construction worker
5	Syrian	F	Housewife
6	Syrian	F	Housewife
7	Syrian	M & F	Unemployed/Agriculture workers
8	Syrian	M	Unemployed
9	Syrian	F	Unemployed
10	Syrian	F	Housewife
11	Syrian	M	Construction worker
12	Syrian	F	Housewife
13	Syrian	M & F	Construction worker & Unemployed
14	Syrian	F	Housewife

15	Syrian	F	Housewife
16	Syrian	M	*Shaweesh* & Taxi driver
17	Syrian	M & F	Taxi Driver & Unemployed

Annex 2: Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon Survey

The scope of the survey was limited in order to cover a representative sample of the population in each municipality and provide meaningful results at the local level, thus prioritizing depth at the expense of breadth. The three selected municipalities host a large number of refugees, while having different characteristics in terms of location, level of development, religious composition, institutional structure and stance vis-à-vis refugees.

Geographical Distribution of Halba Sample

Figure 1: Heat map



Figure 2: Pointed map

Figure 3: Household Sample Size



Figure 4: Population Size by Nationality



Figure 5: Halba's Age structure



Figure 6: Gender structure



Figure 7: Marital status



Figure 8: Confessional Breakdown



Annex 3: Distribution of UNHCR Registered Syrian Refugees in Akkar, as of 30 September 2020



Source: UNHCR. 2020. 'Syria Refugee Response Lebanon, Akkar Governorate, Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82686

Annex 4: List of UNHCR's Implementing Partners Actively Providing Assistance in Akkar

Sector	Implementing Partners
Basic Assistance	Basme & Zeytoune, Caritas Lebanon, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Gruppo di Volontariato Civile, International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Committee of the Red Cross, Lebanese Red Cross (LRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Relief International, Save the Children International (SCI), Solidarites, UNHCR, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program[65]
Education	American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), Concern Worldwide, First Step Together Association (FISTA), Humanity & Inclusion, International Refugee Council (IRC), Mouvement Social, NRC, SCI, War Child Holland (WCH), World Vision International (WVI), Makassed, UNHCR, UNICEF[66]
Energy	NRC, UNDP[67]
Food Security & Agriculture	ABAAD, ACTED, Association for Forests, Development and Cooperation, AVSI, CONCERN, Care (CIL), Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative, DRC, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Islamic Relief, LRC, Lebanon Reforestation Initiative, Lebanese Relief Council, Mercy-USA, MoSA, Muslim Aid, PCPM, Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI), SCI, United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Union of Relief and Development Associations (URDA)[68]
Health	ANERA, Caritas Lebanon, International Medical Corps, IOCC Lebanon, Mercy USA, Order of Malta, Heartland, Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM), PU-AMI, UNICEF, UNRWA[69]
Livelihoods	CONCERN, IOM, IRC, Leb Relief, Lebanese Developers, NRC, UNDP[70]

[65] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Basic Assistance 2020 Quarter 3 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83431
[66] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Education 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71755
[67] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Energy 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71756
[68] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Food Security and Agriculture Jan-Dec 2018 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68330
[69] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Health Q3 2020 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82880
[70] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Livelihoods Q3 2020 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83521

Protection	ABAAD, Arcenciel, Akkar Network for Development, Caritas Lebanon, Centre Libanais des Droits Humains, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center, CONCERN, DRC, Danish Red Cross/Lebanese Red Cross, FISTA, Gruppo Di Volontariato Civile (GVC), Handicap International, Heartland, Himaya, IMC, IRC, Intersos International Relief and Development, KAFA, Mouvement Social, Near East Foundation, NRC, PU-AMI, SCI, Terre des Hommes Lebanon (TdH - L), UNHCR, UNRWA, URDA, Université Saint-Joseph, WCH, World Rehabilitation Fund, WVI[71]
Shelter	CONCERN, GVC, IOM, Leb Relief, NRC, PCPM, PU-AMI, SCI, Solidarités, UNHCR[72]
Social Stability	ACTED, COOPI, IOM, RMF[73]
Water	ArchiNova, NRC, CWW, LRC, RMF Save the Children, Solidarités, UNICEF[74]

[71] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Protection (including SGBV and Child Protection) Q3 2020 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83454
[72] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Shelter 2020 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83271
[73] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Social Stability 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71575
[74] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Water 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71576