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Saida City Report

Lebanese Municipalities and Syrian Refugees: Building Capacity and Promoting Agency

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Disclaimer: The primary data collection for this research was held throughout 2017 and 2018. Lebanon is currently facing multiple crises—financial, economic, monetary, political, and social crises—in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic. The implications of these crises on local communities are not reflected in the findings of this report, as data collection and analysis were carried out prior. It is important to note that data collection was carried out when the market exchange rate was equivalent to the Lebanese pound's peg to the US Dollar, i.e. USD 1 was equivalent to LBP 1,507.5. At the time of writing, the LBP 3,900 per USD set by the Central Bank was also valid for certain transactions, while the black market exchange rate surpassed LBP 15,000 per USD.

Executive Summary

In the context of Lebanon being a refugee-hosting country and municipalities placed at the forefront of addressing refugees, this study examines challenges and coping mechanisms pertaining to the unfolding refugee presence faced by local level stakeholders and Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees in Halba, Saida, Zahle, and Hermel. The findings of this report are based on quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. In Saida, the qualitative data collection includes thirty-four qualitative interviews[1] conducted between June and July 2017, with eleven with representatives of the municipality, Ministry of Social Affairs, United Nations (UN) agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), a local non-governmental organization (NGO) and a religious institution, and fifteen with Syrian, two with Palestinian, and six with Lebanese respondents. In addition, the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL)[2] conducted in 2018 in Saida, Zahle and Halba with a total of 1,556 households (785 Lebanese, 701 Syrian and 70 Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) households), out of which 593 are in Saida (290 Lebanese, 233 Syrian, and 70 PRS).

Population Profile: Refugee Influx from Diverse Syrian Governorates and Scattered Zoning throughout the city

As the South Lebanon Governorate's administrative center, Saida hosts an estimate of 90,692 inhabitants, namely around 78,450 Lebanese and 12,242 Syrian inhabitants. The Syrian (almost 100%) and Lebanese (90%) populations in Saida are predominantly Sunni Muslim, while 10% of Lebanese in Saida are Shia Muslim.

Registration with UNHCR is high among refugees (92%) residing in Saida, while 76% of Syrians in Saida have residency permits. Families that arrived to the locality in the early stages of the Syrian war are significantly more likely to have residency permits than those who arrived 2 years prior to the survey. Contrary to other cities, lower income families are more likely to have residency permits.

More than half of Syrian refugees in Saida (57%) are originally from Damascus, while the rest are from the center, i.e. Homs (10%) and Hama (6%), the north, such as Aleppo (9%),

[1] Qualitative interviews were co-designed by Mona Harb and Mona Fawaz, co-directors of the Beirut Urban Lab (BUL), at the American University of Beirut. They also co-coordinated data collection and analysis, which was conducted by a team of researchers affiliated to BUL. For more information on the results of the qualitative data analysis, check:

- Fawaz M., El-Hage C., and Harb M., "Unplanned Links, Unanticipated Outcomes: Urban Refugees in Halba (Lebanon)," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 40(3): 486-507 (2022).
- Fawaz M., Harb M., El-Hage C., "Spatial Patterns, Gray Spacing and Planning Policy Implications: The Urbanization of Forced Population Displacement in Lebanon" in Al-Harithy H. (ed.) Urban Recovery: Intersecting Displacement with Post-War Reconstruction, London: Routledge (2021).
- Fawaz M., Harb M., and Al-Hage C., "Bring the Planners Back: Displacement-Triggered Patterns of Urbanization and City Responses." LCPS Policy Brief, no.58, May 2021.

[2] The Living Conditions Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL) is a survey that was co-developed in 2018 by Sami Atallah, former director of LCPS, and Rabie Nasr, co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR).

and the south, such as Qunaitra (5%) and Daraa (4%). Almost half of Syrian families (47%) report selecting to settle in Saida due to the availability of jobs, while 40% cite the presence of Syrian networks, 34% mention safety, 25% cite health services, 19% closeness to the border, and 17% cite education services among other reasons.

Saida is composed of the old city and urban expansion outside the city wall the old city wall, as well as the Wastani agricultural plain and the hills, which have been experiencing urban expansion. Urbanization along major streets and boulevards left inner blocks vacant, while fragmenting former agricultural lands. The city underwent scattered zoning, including residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural zones, which reflects the lack of a unified morphology. Saida hosts two Palestinian refugee camps, Ain El-Helweh and Mieh Mieh, where Palestinians and Syrians reside in the camp and in adjoining areas.

Stakeholders: Proactive Municipality and Common Perceptions on Coordination Efforts

Relevant local stakeholders include the municipality as the local authority, aid providers, and religious actors. Interviews with municipal representatives reported that the municipality adopted a proactive role in order to govern the presence of Syrian refugees in Saida, by collecting data on Syrian refugees and their residency address, which is also used to coordinate and allocate assistance. Syrian respondents confirmed that the municipality did not enforce restrictive policies, such as curfews, evictions or socio-economic restrictions.

Syrian refugees are targeted with humanitarian assistance provided by aid agencies, such as NGOs, INGOs and UN agencies. Syrian refugees receive aid within specific sectors under the scope of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, as well as aid provided by local NGOs. Furthermore, religious actors in Saida, Sunni religious groups specifically, provide humanitarian assistance to Lebanese as well as Syrian refugees.

With reference to aid provision and municipal coordination with aid actors, the different actors share a common perspective. Aid providers recognize the municipality's proactive stance towards Syrian refugees in the locality. Coordination between the municipality, aid providers and religious organizations take place via the latter, which also engage with Syrian refugees.

Public Perceptions of Institutional Performance: Syrian refugees' moderate stance and positive perceptions among Lebanese

Two in three Lebanese residents (67%) have a positive opinion of the municipality, while 17% report a neutral perception and 16% a negative opinion. This positive perception is the higher compared to Zahle and Halba. Syrian refugees report a more neutral opinion (64%), with 26% approving and 9% disapproving the municipality's performance.

Public opinion on other security institutions, such as the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces is more positive, registering 78% and 98% of Lebanese, respectively. Syrian refugees report a moderate stance, which is potentially fear-driven, with 20% and 28% approving, and 70% and 68% neither approving nor disapproving of the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces, respectively.

On the role of humanitarian agencies in Saida, 88% of Lebanese and 26% of Syrians report positive performance, while almost 1% of Lebanese and 9% of Syrians report dissatisfaction. Moreover, 11% of Lebanese and 64% of Syrians share a neutral stance. Contrary to perceptions of humanitarian agencies in other localities, Lebanese are more satisfied with their performance in Saida, while refugees are less satisfied.

Housing: Substandard Conditions Faced By Both Communities

Syrian refugees in Saida experience more vulnerable housing conditions when compared to Lebanese, as around 80% of Syrians live in individual or shared apartments, while 12% live in garages and 7% in temporary shelters, such as shacks or barracks. Fieldwork also revealed that Syrian refugees resided in collective shelters in Saida, where rental fees were covered by aid providers. Moreover, only 23% of Lebanese are tenants, while renting housing is almost universal among Syrian refugees.

In 2018, Syrian refugees paid an average of USD 195 for rent per month, while Lebanese paid USD 207. The rental market works via social networks that act as conduits of information and secure transactions. Reports of verbal and written rental agreements were cited by Syrian refugees. Around 9% of Syrians and 2% of Lebanese report having received eviction threats.

Housing conditions are significantly worse for Syrian refugees in Zahle, Saida and Halba. In Saida, 55% of Syrian refugees report substandard housing conditions, such as damp walls, leaks in the roof, inadequate heating and darkness. Damp walls were cited by 40% of Lebanese respondents. Overcrowding is also issue in Saida, with 2 persons per room among Syrian refugees and 0.8 per room among Lebanese.

Urban Services: Electricity and Water Cuts

Connection to the formal electricity grid in Saida is almost universal among Lebanese households and widespread among Syrian households, however 20% of Syrians and 7% of Lebanese supplement with generators, due to long electricity cuts.

Interviews with Syrians reported that Syrian households faced cuts in water supply, as well as paying water bills separately from their rent. Fieldwork in a collective shelter revealed that aid providers provided the residents of the shelter with access to water.

In reference to internet and telecommunication services, Syrian households reported varying experiences, with some having access to wifi and others not, as well as some using mobile services.

Education: Lower Enrollment Rates Among Syrians

Since 2011, the number of school-age children (3-18 years old) is estimated to have increased by 25% with 15,560 Lebanese, 4,043 Syrians and 856 PRS, respectively. Around half of Lebanese students go to public or free-private schools (42% and 7% respectively), while the remaining 50% attend private paid schools. As for Syrian families, there is a higher reliance on free education, as 94% of Syrian school-aged children are enrolled in public schools and 1% in non-paid private schools.

Enrollment of compulsory school-age (primary and middle school 6-15 years old) is almost universal for Lebanese students (99% for girls and boys), while around 24% of Syrian

children aged 6-15 do not attend compulsory school. Although Syrian enrollment rates are higher than the national average (68%), their enrollment rates are lower than the ones observed in Syria before the start of the war (93%).

As for 15-17 year old teenagers, school dropout rates are more prevalent among Syrian teenagers with 45% of females and 54% of males not attending school. Among Lebanese, 1% of females and 4% of males are not enrolled in school. Financial constraints is the most frequently cited reason behind not attending school, particularly among teenagers. Such constraints include tuition costs of other schools if public schools have reached their enrollment capacity, or transportation or material costs, while the opportunity cost cited is child labor, in order to support the family's livelihood (among 20% of Syrian children between 6-14 years old, and 34% 15-17 years old). Employment is the most cited reason for male dropouts, while marriage is most cited for female dropouts.

Human capital levels among Lebanese adults (25-64 years old) in Saida are higher than other areas in Lebanon—these levels are even lower among Syrian adults. Around 26% of Lebanese adults and 5% of Syrian adults have tertiary education, 26% and 14% have finished higher secondary or vocational education, while 44% and 81% have completed middle school education or less.

Health: Affordability as a Key Concern of Lebanese and Syrians

In order to access healthcare, 54% of Lebanese use private facilities, compared to 42% public hospitals and 4% NGOs clinics who are generally the most vulnerable families, while Syrian households rely on NGO clinics (57%) and public hospitals (35%). Of those who reported requiring healthcare treatment three months prior to the survey, which are 17% of Lebanese and 15% of Syrians, the vast majority of Lebanese (94%) were able to obtain it, compared to only 43% of Syrians. Affordability is the main barrier for healthcare provision, particularly for the poorest Lebanese and Syrian households. Moreover, 71% of PRS received needed healthcare. Hence, the poorest Lebanese and Syrians were among those who were unable to access required healthcare.

Employment and Job Opportunities: Underemployment, Informality, Low Labor Earnings, and Complementarity in Sectoral Employment

In 2018, Saida's unemployment rate was 9.6% for Lebanese adults actively seeking employment. Unemployment in Saida affected 12% of Lebanese female adults and 8% of Lebanese male adults, as well as 19% of Syrian and 8% of PRS female adults and 6% of Syrian and 23% of PRS male adults. Unemployment affected 23% of Lebanese youth aged 15-29 years old, while 42% of Syrian youth were employed at the time of the survey. Moreover, there are 14% of Lebanese and 13% of Syrian households without a single employed member. For every employed individual, there are 1.4 dependents among Lebanese and 3 dependents among Syrians. Employment rates are higher for males (80% for Syrians, 73% for Lebanese and 59% for PRS) compared to females (44% for Lebanese, 14% for PRS and 8% for Syrians).

Saida's labor market is characterized by under-employment (where working-age individuals work less than 40 hours a week), informality and low labor earnings. Under-employment affects 12% of Lebanese and 25% of Syrians. Informality is evident as less than 20% of the employed Lebanese population has social security, such as the National Social Security

Fund, while 40% of Syrian workers have work permits. The number of Syrian refugees with work permits in Saida is much higher than those in Zahle and Halba (barely 1%). In Saida, Lebanese male workers had an average monthly salary of USD 1,061, and Syrian male adults obtain around half the salary of a Lebanese in 2018. The gender pay gap for Lebanese was 36%, as Lebanese female adults earned USD 679. On average, Syrians earned lower wages than Lebanese (males earned USD 384 and females earned USD 291), while PRS's wages were even lower (males earned USD 346 and females earned USD 207). For Syrians, the gender pay gap is 24%. Moreover, the average increase in earnings for an additional year of schooling in Saida are low for Lebanese and close to zero for Syrians.

As for sectoral employment, 27% of Lebanese male adults work in sales, 12% in construction, 11% in social services, 10% in manufacturing, 10% in transportation, and 9% in electricity and water supply. As for employed Lebanese females, 36% work in education, 20% in sales, 15% in health, and 12% in social services. Syrians mostly find jobs in the construction sector (36%) and sales (48%). Analyzing sectoral employment shows that Lebanese and Syrians tend to work in different sectors, which shows that they are mostly complements, while competition limited to the sales sector. The labor market demands, driven by the restrictions pertaining to Syrian employment, has led to a "skill waste" in the local economy.

Income and Poverty: Syrians Have Lower Incomes and Higher Poverty Rates

In 2018, the average monthly income per capita was USD 451 among Lebanese, USD 131 among Syrians, and USD 150 among PRS. Labor earnings are the main source of income for 70% of Lebanese and 83% of Syrians. While both Lebanese and Syrian families rely on credit (19% and 9%, respectively), 8% of Lebanese, 3% of Syrians and 2% of PRS rely on remittances, while 4% of Syrians on humanitarian assistance.

Both Lebanese and Syrian families face high levels of indebtedness. In 2018, household expenditure was higher among Lebanese at USD 414 per person on average, while USD 155 and USD 169 per person is spent on average among Syrians and PRS respectively. Out of the total expenditure, Lebanese and Syrians respectively spend 24% and 33% on food, 25% and 43% on housing and utilities, 11% and 5% on transportation, 8% and 3% on health, and 6% and 2% on education, respectively.

Compared to other localities, poverty rates were lower among Lebanese and Syrians in Saida in 2018. Among Lebanese, 7% were poor (lived below USD 6 per person per day) and 1% were extremely poor (below USD 3.75 per person per day). Poverty rates among Syrians and PRS are higher compared to Lebanese, as 75% and 65% lived below USD 6 per person per day, and 32% and 22% below USD 3.75 per person per day, respectively. Therefore, Lebanese and Syrian families in Saida resort to negative coping mechanisms to adapt to insufficient income to secure food. Negative coping mechanisms include lowering the quality of food at least once in the week prior to the survey (63% of Lebanese and 44% of Syrians), and borrowing money to secure food for their families (17% of Lebanese and 52% of Syrians). In addition, these mechanism also include having fewer meals (16% of Lebanese and 38% of Syrians), and reducing the size of the meal (35% of Lebanese and 47% of Syrians). Poverty affects families living in non-permanent structures disproportionately, and the likelihood of extreme poverty increases with the size of household.

Mobility Difficulties Faced by Syrians Disproportionately and Different Safety Perceptions Expressed By Both Communities

Mobility restrictions differ for Lebanese and Syrians. Only 1% of Lebanese and 3% of Syrians in Saida report facing difficulties in accessing transportation. Yet, 5% of Lebanese and 35% of Syrian respondents report that they sometimes face mobility-related difficulties. Around 51% of Syrians who find it difficult to move report harassment from Lebanese residents as a main mobility constraint, as well as unofficial curfews imposed by the community (15%) and official checkpoints (15%).

Safety perceptions differ, as 35% of Syrians compared to 52% of Lebanese report feeling very safe, and 26% and 8% respectively report feeling unsafe. Perceptions of unsafety among Syrian refugees are mainly tied to the overall environment, and to a lesser extent fear of being deported or evicted from their residence. Among Syrians in Saida, safety perceptions and mobility restrictions are linked, as those who face mobility restrictions report lower safety perceptions by 35%. Moreover, Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR or holding residency permits cited higher safety perceptions. In terms of the type of crimes faced by both communities, Lebanese report incidents of shootings and harassment, while Syrians report incidents of harassment, physical aggression and curfews.

Social Interactions: Spatial Integration of Syrians and Similar Levels of Intergroup Interaction

Intergroup interactions are absent among 58% of Lebanese and 40% of Syrians. Syrians report more interaction with Lebanese due to economic transactions, such as renting apartments and purchasing or selling goods. The presence of economic interactions does not increase the likelihood of social interactions, such as social visits and religious events, which are low for both groups. However, urban and socio-economic factors affect the likelihood of intergroup exposure, particularly among the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese and the better-off Syrians. Saida spatially integrates Syrians, and Syrians residing farther away are less likely to interact with the Lebanese community. Children's enrollment in school increases the likelihood of interaction.

Lebanese and Syrian respondents tend to report having good or neutral relations with the other community, and particularly those that interact with the other community have better attitudes towards the other community. Although social visits are associated with more positive feelings between the two communities, economic interactions do not improve attitudes towards the out-group, and may potentially worsen them.

As for interaction within the Syrian community, interviews cited a sense of security, as well as the importance of Syrian networks for sharing information and providing financial support.

Conflict Resolution: Syrians Report Higher Availability of Mechanisms to Settle Tension

Among Syrians, social networks are a powerful resource for the provision of information, guidance, and security and stability. In the case of intergroup conflict, the availability of formal and informal mechanisms to settle inter-communal tension is low, available among 16% of Lebanese and 40% of Syrians. In Saida, the higher affirmation of Syrians in this

regard is tied to their access to formal institutions such as the General Security Office and courts.

Introduction

Lebanon has been hosting Syrian refugees since 2011, and has the highest refugee per capita rate in the world, as refugees make up around 30% of its total population.[3] In September 2020, Lebanon hosted 879,529[4] Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Lebanese government estimates hosting more than 1.5 million Syrians.[5] In 2021, Syrian displacement entered its eleventh year.

In the absence of an administrative and legal governance framework for refugees in Lebanon, the government's approach shifted from a laissez-faire approach in the early years of the Syrian conflict to adopting restrictive policies in 2014. Early on, the government maintained an open border and announced the policy of dissociation from the Syrian conflict, as well as the policy of non-encampment of Syrian refugees.[6] As the number of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees exceeded one million in 2014, the government adopted restrictive measures towards Syrians that aimed to reduce their number and promote their return.[7] These measures included border restrictions, municipal censuses and policing, employment restrictions and sponsorship. In addition, the government requested that UNHCR stop registering Syrians in 2015, hence those who hadn't registered with UNHCR and those who entered Lebanon after the suspension of registration are not included in the official number of UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees. In 2019, the government implemented a series of additional restrictive policies on Syrian refugees' employment, shelter, and residency. The government's restrictive stance has generally affected refugees' protection space,[8] access to human rights, as well as social services. In light of the government's unwillingness to address the presence of Syrian refugees, refugee governance was left in the hands of the municipalities and security agencies.

This report presents the findings of a joint research conducted from April 2017 to December 2020, which examines local governance and service provision dynamics pertaining to the refugee presence in four selected mid-size cities: Halba, Saida, Zahle and Hermel. The research adopted a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative tools of inquiry. Thirty-four qualitative interviews were conducted with local stakeholders in Saida between June and July 2017, including with fifteen Syrian, six Lebanese, and two Palestinian households, as well as eleven with representatives of the municipality, Ministry

[3] European Commission. 2019. 'European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/lebanon_2019-08-28.pdf

[4] UNHCR. 2020. "Syria Refugee Response Lebanon Syrian Refugees Registered – 30 September 2020." https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82685

[5] UNHCR. 2019. 'Lebanon Fact Sheet.' https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR-Lebanon-Operational-fact-sheet-January-2019.pdf

[6] Atallah, S. and D. Mahdi. 2017, 'Law and Politics of "Safe Zones" and Forced Return to Syria: Refugee Politics in Lebanon.' The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1515749841-lcps_report_-_online.pdf

[7] UNHCR. 2015. 'Refugee Response in Lebanon Briefing Documents.' http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/95_finalbriefingkit_/95_finalbriefingkit_en.pdf

[8] Measures introduced by the government in 2015 have impacted Syrian refugees' entry and halted refugees' UNHCR registration in the country. The latter is crucial for return support when the circumstances for safe and dignified returns are met, as well as resettlement. See UNHCR. "Protection." https://www.unhcr.org/lb/protection

of Social Affairs, United Nations (UN) agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), a local non-governmental organization (NGO) and a religious institution (annex 1). The interviews were carried out with ethical considerations and the respondents' consent. The quantitative data is based on the results of the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL) conducted for the project in 2018, which covers 7,208 individuals, i.e. 1,556 households (785 Lebanese, 701 Syrian and 70 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) households) and is representative of the population in three municipalities: Saida, Zahle and Halba (annex 2).

This city report entails seven sections. The first section presents findings pertaining to the population in Saida, Syrian refugees' legal status and displacement, as well as the city's population growth and urban structure. The second section provides an overview of local stakeholders, their perceptions of aid and coordination efforts, as well as Syrian refugees' and Lebanese inhabitants' perceptions of various institutions. The third section covers housing and urban services for Lebanese and Syrians in Saida, which entails housing insecurity, housing conditions, urban services and the informal provision of services. The fourth section addresses social services, namely Syrian refugees' and Lebanese communities' access to education and healthcare services. The fifth section discusses Lebanese residents' and Syrian refugees' employment and job opportunities. The sixth section examines income and poverty among both communities. The final section addresses access to transportation and mobility, and safety perceptions among Lebanese and Syrians in Saida, as well as social interactions, intergroup perceptions and conflict resolution mechanisms. This report has four annexes: the first lists the interviewees who participated in the qualitative data collection, the second provides information pertaining to the LCSRHCL survey, the third presents a map of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Saida as of 30 September 2020, and the fourth shows a list of UNHCR implementing partners actively providing assistance in the district.

Population Profile

This section presents the profile of Saida's population, Syrian refugees' legal status and displacement, as well as Saida's population growth and urban structure.

Saida is the third largest city in Lebanon located in the district of Saida, an administrative division of South Lebanon Governorate.[9] The city is a member of a union of municipalities, the Federation of Municipalities of Saida - El Zahrani.[10] The South Governorate, which includes the Saida and Tyre districts, counted 686,000 residents in 2019, of whom 109,000 were Syrian refugees and 105,000 Palestinian refugees.[11]

Based on a Population and Housing census carried out in 2017, 59,201 Palestinian refugees were counted in Saida district, which amounts to 35.8% of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.[12] Moreover, out of 17,706 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS), the census counted 5,550 in Saida, namely Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA in Syria who fled the Syrian war and sought refuge in Lebanon.[13]

Population

According to the LCSRHCL, the total population of Saida is estimated at about 90,692 inhabitants, namely 78,450 Lebanese and 12,242 Syrians. In an interview with the mayor of Saida, he estimated that the Saida municipality was hosting around 25,000 Syrian refugees in 2017, a number perceived to have dropped from around 60,000 prior to 2017. This figure is, however, more than double the number found by the LCSRHCL and the 10,919 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees reported by UNHCR as of September 2020, namely in Saida El-Qadime, Saida Ed-Dekermane, Haret Saida, Saida El-Ouastani, Hlayliye, and Miye ou Miye. [14]

Findings of the LCSRHCL survey show that registration with UNHCR is almost universal (92%) among Syrian refugees residing in Saida.[15] Similarly, 99% of PRS reported to be registered with the United Nations Refugee and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (LCSRHCL, 2018), as research shows that PRS are under UNRWA's mandate and "qualify for pre-existing benefit structures for Palestinian refugees".

[9] UN Habitat and UNICEF. 2019. Old Saida: Neighborhood profile. https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-area-based-assessment-targeted-neighbourhoods-saida
[10] Ibid.
[11] UNOCHA. 2019. 'Lebanon South Governorate Profile.' https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-south-governorate-profile-26-april-2019
[12] Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Central Administration of Statistics, and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 2018. 'The Population and Housing Census in Palestinian Camps and Gatherings - 2017, Key Findings Report.' http://www.lpdc.gov.lb/DocumentFiles/Key%20Findings%20report%20En-636566196639789418.pdf
[13] Ibid.
[14] UNHCR. 2020. 'Syria Refugee Response Lebanon, South and El Nabatieh Governorates, Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82689
[15] This statistic, however, might be biased as some respondents might fear recognizing a lack of documentation. Also, despite the strong efforts to generate a survey sample representative of all the population in the municipality, certain vulnerable groups of refugees might have been hard to reach in the outskirts of the city. Moreover, in 2015, UNHCR was requested to stop registering Syrians by the Lebanese government. As of May 2015, Syrians stopped being registered. This means that the number above does not account for Syrians who hadn't registered with UNCHR or Syrians who have entered Lebanon afterwards.

Moreover, research argues that this existing international structure separates PRS from others fleeing the Syrian conflict and highlights the importance PRS's access to protection having faced multiple displacements.[16]

Saida's Lebanese population is predominantly Sunni (89.7%), with 9.9% Shia, while most Syrian refugees are Sunni Muslim at 99.8% (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Legal Status of Syrian Refugees

Prior to 2015, Syrian refugees' residency and employment in Lebanon was permitted by the 1993 bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between Lebanon and Syria.[17] As such, Syrians were permitted to enter and work in Lebanon for a renewable period of 6 months. Among the border restrictions adopted in 2014, Syrians needed to prove they belong to one of the following seven categories to enter the country: (1) "travelling for tourism, work, trade, and ownership or rent of real-estate"; (2) study; (3) transiting via airport or maritime port; (4) Syrians with 'displaced' status based on the Minister of Social Affairs' decision; (5) medical reasons; (6) access to embassies; and (7) have the sponsorship of a Lebanese national.[18] In 2015, alongside halting UNHCR registration, the government adopted restrictive and costly residency regulations, making it difficult for Syrians to attain and sustain legal status. The government waived residency renewal costs for UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees, while Syrians sponsored by Lebanese nationals with residency permits pay hefty fees, and Syrians who are neither registered with UNHCR nor have a sponsor or a residency on the basis of one of the categories thus have an illegal status.

Syrian employment is regulated within the framework of the sponsorship system. Largely criminalized for their work and presence, Syrian refugees are pushed into the category of laborers and are required to pay prohibitive costs for work permits, eventually falling in an illegal status, which traps a vast majority of refugees today.[19] Many Syrian refugees caught at checkpoints without legal residency are detained by security institutions for a period and eventually released.[20] Also, Syrian men are perceived to be more targeted at checkpoints than Syrian women, although both are perceived to be in a precarious

[16] Badil Resource Center. 2014. 'Palestinian Refugees from Syria: Ongoing Nakba, Ongoing Discrimination.' al-Majdal magazine. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/al-majdal-56.pdf
[17] Janmyr, M. 2016. 'Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' Oxford Refugee Survey Quarterly. https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/35/4/58/2609281
[18] Dionigi, F. 2016. 'The Syrian Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience.' http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65565/
[19] Fawaz, M., A. Gharbieh, M. Harb, and D. Salame. 2018. 'Refugees as City Makers.' Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs. https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/research_reports/2018-2019/20180910_refugees_as_city_makers.pdf
[20] Human Rights Watch. 2016. '"I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person" How Lebanon's Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugee.' https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse

situation.[21] The lack of access to legal residency impedes Syrians' mobility, access to services and employment opportunities.

The share of the refugee population with residency permits drastically varies across municipalities, from a large coverage in Saida (76%) and Halba (41%), while only 14% of the Syrian population in Zahle has residency permits (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The likelihood of Syrian refugees having residency permits depends on various factors. Families who arrived in the country less than 2 years prior to the 2018 survey are significantly less likely to have residency permits than those who arrived in the early stages of the Syrian war (these are less than 20% and more than 70% respectively, LCSRHCL, 2018). This indicates that Syrian refugees who arrived prior to 2015 are more likely to have residency permits, potentially due to UNHCR registration or to stronger employment networks, while those who entered after 2015 have found it difficult to obtain a sponsor and may have entered Lebanon's porous border illegally. Contrary to other cities, poorer families in Saida are more likely to obtain legal residency than families that are better-off, which shows that permits are not only quite widespread, but also financial constraints are less binding. Overall, barriers to navigate the bureaucratic permitting process—which are more acute for newcomers—seem to limit obtaining legal documents. Within families, mid-aged males who are employed have a disproportionately higher share of permits. It seems that when not all household members can have residency permits, Syrian families begin by registering those who are primary breadwinners—often older males.

Interviews with Syrian refugees reported difficulties in acquiring residency permits for their children due to the need for documents from Syria and fear of persecution if the parents were to return, as well as the costly process of acquiring Syrian identification documents at the Syrian embassy. With cost-related constraints reported during interviews, Syrian respondents also reported that security forces have conducted searches in the collective shelter specifically checking for residency permits and one respondent stated: "Those who don't have papers are taken away for a short while and then released."

Displacement of Syrian Refugees

Syrian refugees have fled their country escaping conflict and violence and sought refuge in neighboring countries. In Lebanon, Syrian families chose to settle in different cities across the country depending on their background and individual characteristics. In Saida, more than half of the Syrian community is originally from rural areas surrounding Damascus (57%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). There are also other smaller communities originally from the center, such as Homs (10%) and Hama (6%), the north, such as Aleppo (9%), and the south, including Qunaitra (5%) and Daraa (4%) (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Given the higher distance between Saida and the Syrian border, there is a more diverse pool of Syrians that chose to settle in the city for various reasons. Job availability was the

[21] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.' Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. https://www.dsp-syria.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/DSP-LCPS%20report.pdf

most prevalent pull factor mentioned among Syrian families in the municipality, with close to half of respondents mentioning that factor as a main driver of their decision to choose Saida (LCSRHCL, 2018). While the presence of social networks, in particular of other Syrians, also shaped the selection of Saida for 40% of Syrians, this reliance and importance of networks is less widespread in the municipality than in other cities closer to the border (LCSRHCL, 2018). Other factors also included access to safety (34%) and social services, such as health (25%) and education (17%) (LCSRHCL, 2018) (figure 1).

Figure 1: Reasons for selecting to settle in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Two interviews with Syrian households reported instances whereby respondents had worked in Saida prior to the war, and resettled with their families in Saida once they fled the conflict. One respondent stated "Saida is a Sunni city, and it is cheap. Also, its people are with the Syrian people; the majority is almost like us." Moreover, another respondent reported: "Some of us came here by complete chance: the bus drivers bringing us to Lebanon would take us to wherever there are Syrian gatherings. When it became known that people from our region [in Syria] were here, they would bring whoever is from the same region here too."

Saida's Population Growth and Urban Structure

Saida is divided into an ancient "Old City" and the "Saida City" of today. It covers less than 8 kilometers and does not contain large farming land. The city does not house informal tented settlements (ITSs), however it hosts four collective shelters for Syrian refugees, three of which are: Al-Naddaf, Al-Iman, Ouzai.[22]

Until the 1940's, Saida city was cramped within its walls and surrounded by the orchard landscape. The city's urban growth beyond its historic walls started through the establishment of the road network outside the old city that connected the city to the hills and its hinterlands, as well as the subsequent development of a mix-use commercial center.

[22] The fourth collective shelter was not named during the interview.

This expansion coincides roughly with Lebanon's independence in 1943 and the gradual establishment of modern planning tools—particularly the Ecochard Plan (1956) and the 1967 Master Plan.[23]

In the 1970's, the city's rapid residential development occurred outside Municipal Saida on the adjacent foothills of the eastern municipalities (figure 2). This development can be explained by the fact that the 1967 plan gave the zones of Wastani and Dekerman low exploitation factors compared to that of the Abra and Hilalieh municipalities, encouraging the sprawl outside the city boundaries.

Figure 2: Saida City Urban Sprawl

Source: Paquet, J. 2005. 'Saida Entre Mer et Colline.' Universite de Montreal. Modified in Al-Sabbagh, 2015 to show the urban sprawl before the 1980s

Consequently, the prices of land increased in the eastern municipalities, pushing citizens who couldn't afford a house in the hills to build in the Wastani plain. Violation of urban building regulations became common due to the absence of state supervision, particularly during the years of civil war (1975 -1990).[24]

In 1979, in an effort to modernize the city and to reaffirm its position as the center of the Saida district and the South of Lebanon governorate, the municipality decided to implement infrastructure, public services and amenities projects. Such projects included roads, infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings as part of the amendments of the Saida 1967 Master Plan, which was approved by the decree 9016/1967.[25]

Saida counts a number of Palestinian refugees, who live in two camps within the Saida Urban Area, namely Ain El-Helweh and Mieh Mieh. Many Palestinian and Syrian refugees live in 'out of camp' contexts, in adjoining areas close to the Palestinian refugee camps, and throughout poorer neighborhoods in Saida where service provision is already stretched. Ain El-Helweh is the biggest of Lebanon's twelve official camps in terms of population, with the adjacent areas geographically intertwined within the camp fabric. These create spatially defined 'gatherings' that are considered as parts of the camp. The administrative supervision of these areas is unclear, as they are not part of UNRWA's mandate, and municipal service coverage is inadequate. The majority of refugees are concentrated in

[23] Al-Sabbagh, S. 2015. 'Rethinking planning tools through the ecological landscape design approach: Saida Case Study.' Master of Urban Design, Department of Architecture and Design, American University of Beirut. https://scholarworks.aub.edu.lb/handle/10938/10932?show=full

[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

Saida El-Dekerman, due to its proximity to the Ain El-Helweh camp and the availability of affordable accommodation and economic activities.[26]

The Saida region today hosts two main poverty pockets: the old historic center, inhabited by lower income Lebanese and Palestinians, and the camps, hosting mainly Palestinians and recently PRS. Research shows that these two areas account for 40% of the population.[27] Added to that is the influx of refugees, where Saida alone accounts for 18 out of 69 vulnerable cadasters in South and Nabatieh Governorates, four of which are most vulnerable: Saida El Ouastani, Mieh Mieh, Darb es Sim and Ghaziye.[28]

Urbanization in the city has taken place along major streets and boulevards, leaving several inner blocks vacant, while also fragmenting agricultural lands.[29] Figure 3 below shows the scattered land use within Saida, with regard to residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural functions, demonstrating the impacts of urban sprawl and the resulting fragmented landscape. [30]

[26] Area-Based Assessment of Targeted Neighbourhoods in Saida – AGORA: https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-area-based-assessment-targeted-neighbourhoods-saida
[27] Cited in Al-Sabbagh, S. 2015. 'Rethinking planning tools through the ecological landscape design approach: Saida Case Study.', See Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Local Economic Development.' Medcities. http://www.medcities.org/documents/22116/135803/6.+Saida_Diagnosis_Local+Economic+Development.pdf/c2e1a9ad-9ee9-41a7-a226-c33e140e0c6a
[28] Identifying Income Generating Opportunities in Agro-Food & Environment
Saida – LEBANON – July 2018: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/66805.pdf
[29] Al-Sabbagh, S. 2015. 'Rethinking planning tools through the ecological landscape design approach: Saida Case Study.'
[30] Ibid.

Figure 3: Saida Zoning and Plot Functions



	Surface (Ha)	%
Residential	48.98	6.6%
Mixed total	112.88	15.2%
Commercial total	48.48	6.5%
Industry total	17.34	2.3%
Education total	20.97	2.8%
Health	3.05	0.4%
Tourism	7.59	1.0%
Recreation/ culture	14.15	1.9%
Park	3.62	0.5%
Administration	7.16	1.0%
Religious	8.35	1.1%
Parking	12.69	1.7%
Total surveyed plots	305.26	41%
Street	186.25	25%
Agricultural	233.40	31%
Empty Plots	20.09	2.7%
Total Municipal Saida	745.00	100%

Source: Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Local Economic Development.'

Stakeholders and their Perceptions on Aid and Coordination

This section presents an overview of the relevant local stakeholders in Saida, their perceptions and coordination efforts, as well as Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of various institutions. Stakeholders include the municipality, other public institutions, aid providers and religious actors.

Stakeholders

Municipality

With regard to Syrian displacement in Saida, interviews with two municipal representatives reported that the municipality has set up a committee designated for Syrian displacement in Saida. Municipal personnel reported to have developed plans early on once Syrian displacement started in Saida, in order to control the situation. For instance, the municipality gave out Lebanese phone lines to Syrians arriving to Saida and contacting them via SMS in order to keep track of their residency address. For the municipality, it is mandatory for Syrians to register their address at the municipality and inform the municipality if they relocate to another address. The municipality has its own dataset on Syrians residing in the city, and conducts census around every 5 months. In addition, it was important for the municipality early on that Syrians do not live in ITSs or schools, while the municipality has permitted Syrians to be housed in collective shelters.

In light of the lack of guidance and financial assistance from the central government, the municipality reports that its strong coordination with a network of NGOs providing assistance to Syrians has allowed them to address Syrian displacement. As such, assistance not provided by the municipality, but rather by a network of NGOs who the municipality reports as crucial. The municipality's dataset on Syrians is used to direct and coordinate assistance from actors interested in providing assistance, and the municipality stresses that 5-20% of the assistance should also be extended to vulnerable Lebanese. Fieldwork did not report curfews, evictions and socio-economic policies imposed by the municipality in Saida.

Other Public Agencies

When the crisis began, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) launched the "response to the Syrian crisis" plan and contracted a team of around 250 fieldworkers throughout the country, according to a MoSA representative. This has allowed the quick formation of a team, bypassing the bureaucratic hurdles. According to the interview, some of the main obstacles the ministry faces are the instability caused by the perpetual changes in ministers and plans, as well as the presence of unqualified and uncooperative employees within the ministry. MoSA's office in Saida conducts fieldwork, seeks to ensure that assistance is not

duplicated, and acts as a facilitator for NGOs providing guidance in the relevance of assistance provided.[31]

The Electricite du Liban (EdL) is responsible for providing the city with electricity.[32]

The South Lebanon Water Establishment (SLWE) is a public entity providing water to the governorates of South Lebanon and Nabatieh. SLWE extracts water from artesian wells and springs.[33] Research reports that, alongside the other water establishment, the SLWE shows weakness in non-revenue water and bill collection, as well as weaker overall performance in comparison to other establishments such as the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment.[34]

Aid Agencies: NGOs, INGOs, and UN Agencies

In the absence of a state-led response to Syrian refugees, the LCRP—jointly led by the UNHCR, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and MoSA—has been responding to humanitarian needs in various sectors, including basic assistance, education, energy, food security and agriculture, health, livelihoods, protection, shelter, social stability, and water. Basic assistance entails cash-based assistance to economically vulnerable families, including both Syrian refugees and Lebanese. The education sector covers access to and the quality of formal and informal education opportunities, as well as the governance of the education system. Energy assistance aims to increase energy efficiency and renewable energy, support the rehabilitation and reinforcement of electricity networks, and improve the capacity of implementing partners. The food security and agriculture sector seeks to improve food availability via in-kind food assistance and sustainable food and agriculture value chains, food access via cash-based food assistance, promote food safety and nutrition practices, and strengthen food security by building the capacity of national public institutions. Health assistance entails improving access to comprehensive primary healthcare and hospitals, as well as improve adolescent and youth health, and the control of outbreaks and infectious diseases.

In light of the employment restrictions imposed on Syrian refugees, livelihood interventions include vocational training that is not tied to job opportunities, short-term labor-intensive interventions, and financial and business development support. The protection sector aims to ensure access to refugee protection, and the creation of a safe protective environment, reduction of sexual and gender-based violence, and protection

[31] Ibid.
[32] Electricity of Lebanon. "Message of Chairman – General Manager Engineer Kamal Hayek. http://www.edl.gov.lb/page.php?pid=1&lang=en
[33] South Lebanon Water Establishment. 2018. 'مؤسسة مياه لبنان الجنوب.' https://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/etablissement_des_eaux_du_liban_sud_south_lebanon_water_establishment_mandate_brochure_2018.pdf
[34] World Bank. 2012. 'Lebanon Water Sector Assistance Strategy 2012-2016.' Sustainable Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/401211468088175955/pdf/683130ESW0P1220C0disclosed070300120.pdf

against neglect, violence, abuse, and exploitation. Shelter interventions seek to address immediate protection-related shelter needs of most vulnerable communities, upgrade disadvantaged areas, and improve national institutions' contribution to the housing situation in the country. Social stability's objectives are to strengthen municipalities, national and local institutions' capability in easing resource pressure, foster dialogue, and address sources of tension and conflict, as well as monitor tensions and conflict sensitivity. Water sector interventions seek to improve access to safe drinking water and sanitation services, and quality of water.[35]

UN agencies and their implementing partners, including international and local NGOs, have been providing assistance to Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese communities at the national level. The list of partners active in Saida district is presented in Annex 4.

Religious Actors

Religious actors providing assistance to Syrian refugees in Saida include the Al Riaya Islamic Foundation, which based on an interview with the organization, is an Islamic institution established in 1985 originally addressing orphans, and its work has expanded through time. The foundation bases its expertise on its experience during the 2006 war in Lebanon, whereby it established a response coalition to the war's repercussions, and this coalition was relaunched during the start of Syrian displacement in Lebanon. Its work has expanded to addressing orphans, students, Syrian refugees, as well as conducting relief, developmental and micro-finance interventions. The foundation has its own dataset on Syrian refugees in Saida, which it uses to distribute assistance.

Stakeholders' Perceptions and Coordination Efforts

Fieldwork reported that the municipality, aid providers and religious actors coordinate in Saida. Interviews with municipal and INGO representatives revealed that local NGOs and INGOs operate in close coordination with the municipality as well as UNHCR targeting vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian beneficiaries. The municipality is perceived as cooperative towards aid agencies by attending meetings and not imposing restrictive measures according to an INGO representative. Although Islamic NGOs providing assistance in Saida are not included in the LCRP response, and their work is not assessed and monitored, fieldwork reported that religious institutions providing aid act as key interlocutors between the municipality and other actors, as well as among NGOs and INGOs.

Syrian Refugees' and Lebanese Host Community's Perceptions of Various Institutions

Trust in institutions is important for the success of government policies and regulations, both at the central and local level, that depend on cooperation and compliance of citizens. Citizens' trust is also a subjective measure of the quality of institutions and public sector delivery, as well as how they follow their constituents' priorities and wishes and tackle their concerns. In democratic societies, low trust in an elected institution can reflect a

[35] Government of Lebanon and United Nations. 2020. 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 2020 update.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/76461

need for reforms and, ultimately, a desire to change the institution. Figure 4 below presents the perceptions of Syrian and Lebanese respondents in Saida towards various public institutions.

Figure 4: Public perception of various institutions



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

According to the LCSRHCL survey, Lebanese residents in Saida tend to have a positive opinion of the local institutions in the municipality. 67% of Lebanese residents report a positive opinion compared to 16% negative and 17% neutral (LCSRHCL, 2018). Lebanese public opinion on the local government in Saida is also higher than in other municipalities in the country. Approval rates are higher for middle- and upper-income Lebanese households compared to the poorest ones (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, Syrian residents report similarly favorable views on the local institutions, with 26% approving the local government's performance, 65% having a more neutral stance, and 9% having a negative stance (LCSRHCL, 2018). For Syrians, approval rates are higher for the lowest income group.

Public opinion regarding other institutions in charge of providing security are more positive among Lebanese. 78% of Lebanese in Saida have a positive opinion on the role of the police, also known as the Internal Security Forces (ISF), compared to only 5% disapproving of it (LCSRHCL, 2018). The support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is even stronger, with 98% of Lebanese having a positive or very positive view of the institution compared to only 1% disapproving of it (LCSRHCL, 2018). As security institutions set up checkpoints and detain Syrian refugees without legal residency, Syrian respondents' responses may be fear driven as they have a more moderate stance vis-à-vis the ISF and LAF, with around 70% having a neutral opinion regarding security institutions and between 20% and 28% having positive views (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The role of humanitarian agencies in Saida is also largely approved by residents. 88% of Lebanese have a positive perception, while 11% have neutral views, compared to 11% who have negative perceptions (LCSRHCL, 2018). Although 64% of Syrian refugees, who are the main beneficiaries of these organizations, report a neutral stance, 26% of Syrians approve

of their work by stating that humanitarian agencies have a positive performance (LCSRHCL, 2018). Still, there are more than 9% of Syrian households dissatisfied with the work of humanitarian agencies (64% neutral) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Poorer Syrians are the ones more favorable to the work of UNHCR and other humanitarian institutions.

Housing and Urban Services

This section covers housing and urban services for Lebanese and Syrians in Saida. It is divided into three subsections: housing insecurity, housing conditions, and urban services.

Housing Insecurity

Housing arrangements in Saida show more vulnerable conditions for Syrians when compared to Lebanese. Almost all (99%) Lebanese in Saida reside in individual apartments. About 80% of Syrian families in Saida live in individual or shared apartments (LCSRHCL, 2018). However, more than one in five live in more precarious accommodations, as 12% live in garages and 7% in temporary shelters, shacks or barracks (LCSRHCL, 2018). Almost all Syrian households in Saida are tenants at 99%, compared to only 23% of Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018). Fieldwork reported that Syrians in Saida also live in one of the four collective shelters hosted in Saida, namely shelters that have 6 or more households living in the same structure.[36]

In 2018, an average Syrian family spent USD 195 per month on housing rent, which is only slightly below the average rental price among Lebanese families at USD 207 (LCSRHCL, 2018). The perception that overall rental prices have increased in light of Syrian displacement and increased demand was shared during fieldwork. In line with other research,[37] interviews showed that Syrian households prioritize securing rent. Anecdotal evidence pointed towards cases of Syrians working two jobs in order to be able to secure rent and living expenses, or borrowing money to pay rent. Moreover, interviews with Syrian households residing in a collective shelter reported that rent is covered by aid providers, as residents are provided with shelter coverage as well as access to water and sanitation. At the time we conducted the fieldwork, aid was decreasing, and many Syrians reported being on the verge of eviction. They said they resorted to kin networks to borrow money and to delay this predicament.

How does the rental market work? Research suggests that social networks act as the most powerful determinants in the organization of housing markets.[38] They, first, act as conduits of information in markets where they are deployed, but also provide security for transactions. They, in some instances, also allow refugees to access housing for free on the basis of family relations or friendships. For instance, interviews revealed that social networks with Lebanese also allow refugees to access housing for free in unused space such as an office apartment, or in exchange for employment. While this may reduce the burden of shelter cost as employers would deduct rent directly from employees' salaries, it

[36] UNHCR. 2018. 'Shelter Typologies.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62289

[37] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2018. 'Housing Land and Property Issues of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon from Homs City.' https://www.un.org.lb/library/assets/UNHABITAT-UNHCR_HLP%20ISSUES%20OF%20SYRIAN%20REFUGEES%20IN%20LEBANON%20FROM%20HOMS_NOV%202018_web-093805.pdf; UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and Inter-Agency Coordination. 2018. 'Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.' https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/12/VASyR-2018.pdf

[38] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2018. 'Housing Land and Property Issues of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon from Homs City.'

increases dependence on the same people, meaning that refugees are more vulnerable vis-à-vis the employer.

Rental agreements in Saida generally take place between landlords and tenants.[39] However, in some instances, contracts were done orally and payments were left undocumented. Fieldwork reported that three-year rent contracts were signed in some cases in Taamir and the Old City, while others reported not having rental contracts.

According to the LCSRHCL survey, about 9% of Syrians in Saida report having received eviction threats, compared to only 2% of Lebanese, highlighting a further problem of shelter insecurity (LCSRHCL, 2018). Interviews with Syrians residing in collective shelters reported fear of evictions in light of rumors of making the collective shelters for widows specifically.

Housing Conditions

Compared to Lebanese, housing conditions are significantly worse for Syrian refugees in Zahle, Saida and Halba. In Saida, housing conditions are also generally substandard, as 55% of Syrian households cite having substandard conditions, mostly including damp walls, leaks in the roof, inadequate heating and darkness (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrians residing in ITSs also often rely on the provisions of materials such as metal poles and nylon sheets from humanitarian organizations, which generates shelters with very low insulation levels and no privacy.[40] Poor conditions also affect 40% of the Lebanese families, in particular dealing with damp walls (LCSRHCL, 2018). Interviews reported cases where Syrian households lived in a small room next to a residential building's electricity room.

Overcrowding was also highlighted as one of the prominent factors in residential units in Saida. Syrian families live in more crowded shelters with an average of 2 persons per room compared to 0.8 per room among Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018). During interviews, Syrian refugees reported living in overcrowded shelters, including several households living in apartments, or in the cases of collective shelters. A resident of a collective shelter reported: "One of the biggest problems is the complete lack of privacy: between you and your neighbor there is a wooden board. What is a wooden board? It [living in this space] counts as one big family but this is annoying. Whatever you say, he hears."

The Ouzai Complex is one of the collective shelters hosted in Saida (figure 5). It was originally built for the Ouzai University in Saida, however as funds ran out, it was deserted mid-way during construction and throughout 2011 and 2012. In an interview with a representative of the Al Riaya Islamic Foundation, it was reported that they agreed to complete construction as per the construction plan set by the university and host Syrians in the complex initially for three years. In 2015, the building owners demanded that the building be returned and took a decision to return the building, however with nowhere to go, Syrian refugees remained in the complex until the time of the research's fieldwork in

[39] Fawaz et al. 2018. 'Refugees as City Makers.'
[40] UN Habitat and UNHCR. 2014. 'Housing Land and Property Issues in Lebanon: Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis.' https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/41590

2017. The shelter is reported as overcrowded with an average of 8-10 household members residing in a small room, shared facilities such as bathrooms, and a broken sewerage system.

Figure 5: Ouzai Complex

Urban Services

The provision of urban services in Saida maneuvers through formal and informal service providers. Electricity and water are provided by relevant public institutions, namely the EdL and the SLWE, as well as via private generator and water tankers informally. Moreover, the municipality collects solid waste.

There is almost universal access to formal connection to the electricity grid among Lebanese families, but 7% still need to supplement it with private generators (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families have similarly widespread access to the formal electricity system, but they rely more heavily on private generators at 20% and suffer from longer hours of electricity cuts (LCSRHCL, 2018). Similar to the national level electricity-related challenges, Saida faces poor distribution, the presence of high voltage power lines in urban areas which present a security risk, low voltage networks in poorer areas such as the Old City and Palestinian camps, and shortages in electricity supply.[41]

Interviews with Lebanese and Syrians living in Saida confirmed reliance on formal electricity networks and generators to access electricity. While a Syrian refugee living in

[41] Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Urban Infrastructure.' Medcities. http://www.usuds.org/documents/10192/56283/1.+Saida_Diagnosis_Urban+Infrastructure.pdf/817f05a5-07e4-4c27-ac82-e76c3c163aa3

Saida's Old City reported not having access to electricity for over a year, as the household's neighbor would not allow them access via their electricity network. As for Syrians residing in collective shelters, interviews reported cases where access to electricity was either provided by aid providers, such as the case of the Ouzai complex, or via private generators, such as the case of the Naddaf collective shelter.

Research shows that Saida is at risk of water scarcity and in light of surface water drainage, gradual depletion of underground water, and "rapid urbanization of the city that has hindered the recharging of aquifers in the hills."[42] Moreover, water leakage signs in the main water network were reported, as well as water cuts in order to reduce the leakage, as formal recording of the inputs and outputs of water are absent.[43] Fieldwork with Syrians in Saida confirmed water cuts and paying for additional water bills. With regards to water supply specifically in the Ouzai collective shelter, interviews noted that access to water is secured and covered by aid providers.

Solid waste collection is the municipality's responsibility while the treatment of solid wastes lies under the government's responsibilities.[44] As the municipality of Saida is a member of a municipal union encompassing around 16 municipalities to the east and south of the city's center, the solid waste treatment plant operated through a public-private partnership in Saida also caters to most municipalities within the union.[45]

Interviews reported Syrians households having mobile phones, some with access to wifi, whether individually or shared with neighbors, others without access to wifi.

[42] Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Urban Infrastructure.'
[43] Ibid
[44] Yazigi, S., R. Khoury, R. Zbeidy, R. Haidar, J. Stephan, F. Doumani, C. Atallah, A. Clutchier, P. Varese, R. Ghanem, J. Eid, N. Antoun, and N. Medawar. 2014. 'Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for Akkar.' Council for Development and Reconstruction. http://www.cdr-adelnord.org/6/0/9/7/8/5/Akkar_SSRDP_20141214_rev07_Web_for_review_2.pdf
[45] Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Urban Infrastructure.'

Social services

This section covers the Lebanese community's and Syrian refugees' access to education and healthcare. The arrival of a large number of Syrian refugees has added pressure on the provision of public services in the municipality of Saida, namely education and healthcare. At the national level, Syrian refugees have been permitted to access public schools, hospitals, and primary health care centers, however challenges pertaining to access and quality of services persist.

Education

Based on the Ministry of Education and Higher Education's (MEHE) memorandum in 2012, Lebanese public schools early on enrolled school-aged Syrians without requiring documentation and legal status.[46] The three-year "Reaching All Children with Education (RACE)" strategy to improve access to and quality of education opportunities for Syrian refugees was announced in 2014 and was extended via the RACE II strategy in 2017 until 2021.[47] The education opportunities include formal education as well as non-formal programs that are certified by MEHE and aim to bridge out-of-school children to formal education or remain as standalone programs. However, this section covers formal education.

According to the Center for Educational Research and Development, the South governorate included a total of 304 schools in the academic year 2018-2019, 147 public schools with 50,047 students, 28 free private schools with 13,551 students, 98 paid private schools with 48,303 students, and 31 United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools with 15,731 students.[48] The number of non-Lebanese students enrolled in public schools in South Lebanon that provide the second shift are 7,362 in primary education (cycle 1), 4,172 in intermediate education (cycle 2), and 727 in secondary education (cycle 3).[49]

Based on the LCSRHCL survey, the number of school-age children (3-18 years old) is estimated to have increased by 25% since 2011, with 15,560 Lebanese, 4,043 Syrians and 856 PRS. This is due not only to the large number of Syrians that settled in Saida, but also to their younger population structure, with more children per family at 2.4 for Syrians versus 1.4 for Lebanese (LCSRHCL, 2018). In Saida, about half of Lebanese students go to public (42%) or free-private schools (7%), while the other half attend private paid schools (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families rely more on free education, with 94% enrolled in public schools and 1% in non-paid private schools (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Despite pressures on the supply of education, there is an almost universal enrollment of compulsory school-age (primary and middle school 6-15 years old) Lebanese students in Saida at 99% of girls and boys (figure 6) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, the outreach of the supply of education for Lebanese children in Saida does not seem to have been affected.

[46] Ministry of Education and Higher Education. 2014. 'Reaching All Children with Education.' https://www.mehe.gov.lb/ar/Projects/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85/RACEfinalEnglish2.pdf

[47] Ministry of Education and Higher Education. NA. 'Reaching All Children With Education – Lebanon.' http://racepmulebanon.com/index.php/features-mainmenu-47/race2-article

[48] CERD. 2019. '2019 - 2018 النشرة الإحصائية للعام الدراسي .' http://www.crdp.org/files/201908300826465.pdf

[49] Ibid.

On the other hand, 24% of Syrian children aged 6-15 do not attend compulsory school (LCSRHCL, 2018). Although enrollment rates of this group are higher than the average of Syrians in Lebanon, which is 68%, these rates are still lower than the 93% observed in Syria before the start of the war (LCSRHCL, 2018). Fieldwork reported immediate enrollment as crucial for Syrian refugees, as a respondent put it: "We have a problem with the children who did not enroll in schools immediately when they came [to Lebanon]. Now, they are too old to enroll, as they are too old for their grade levels."

School dropout rates are higher among Lebanese teenagers 15-17, although still very contained at 4% for males and 1% for females (figure 6) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Within this age group, enrollment rates of Lebanese are higher than the average in the country. Among Syrian teenagers, enrollment is a much more severe challenge, with 45% of females and 54% of males not attending any formal education (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Figure 6: School Enrollment





Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Most families in Saida are close to an elementary or secondary school. The average driving distance to the nearest school is four minutes for Lebanese families, thirteen minutes for Syrian families, and seven minutes for PRS families (LCSRHCL, 2018). Even in the case of Syrian households, when asked about the main reasons behind their children dropping out of school, supply contraints—although present—do not seem to be binding in most instances.[50] Anecdotal evidence reported that Syrians enrolled in the first shift were doing well in school.

[50] Supply factors are related to the availability of schools where school-age children live, including not only the physical distance to the closest school, but also if they have available spaces, or if they are allowed to enroll a particular child in that school.

The quality of education was perceived as poor during interviews, particularly for students enrolled in the second shift, as a respondent explained: "School is pointless, it is chaotic in the afternoon, where kids learn nothing. The teacher sits and the children play. The class is turned upside down in front of the teacher's eyes and nothing is done." Moreover, language barriers were also reported as a challenge for Syrian students, which led to cases of Syrians failing their classes.

The most frequently cited reasons for not sending children to school among Syrian families relate to financial constraints, in particular for teenagers. This was reported as due to the cost of education, such as tuition, if there is no space in public schools, and transportation or education materials, and the high opportunity cost given the need of many under-age children to work to support their family's livelihood. Moreover, child labor is a relevant challenge in the Syrian community in Saida, as 20% of Syrian children aged 6 to 14 and 34% of those aged 15-17 are not enrolled in school, because they have to work to support their families (LCSRHCL, 2018). By gender, the need to work is more frequently mentioned among males, in line with traditional gender roles. On the other hand, the most cited factor for dropping out among female teenagers is marriage, with the consequent increase in household responsibilities.

The overall levels of human capital of the adult Lebanese population (25-64) in Saida is somewhat higher than in other areas of Lebanon (LCSRHCL, 2018). About 26% have tertiary education, 26% have finished higher secondary or vocational education, while 44% have middle school education or less (LCSRHCL, 2018). Both male and female Lebanese are similarly likely to have reached tertiary education. The main differences is the higher share of males that have vocational education, which is 21% compared to 10% for females, while females are more likely to have higher secondary education at 16% versus 5% for males (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among adult Syrians, education levels are lower, with 5% having tertiary education, 14% reaching higher secondary or vocational education, 30% middle school, and 51% primary or no education (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Health

Saida district hosts ten private hospitals, namely Al Hamshari Hospital, Alaa El Dine Hospital, Al Janoub Hospital, Al Raai Hospital, Dalaa Hospital, Hammoud Hospital, Osseiran Hospital, Kassab Hospital, Kharroubi Hospital, and Labib Medical Center.[51] Moreover, Saida counts one public hospital, namely the Saida Governmental Hospital,[52] which is open to refugees, and provides a limited number of health services. Within the LCRP response, Syrian refugees are provided with hospital care and primary healthcare. According to the LCSRHCL, 54% of Lebanese use private facilities, while 42% use public hospitals and 4% use NGO clinics (2018). Syrian households rely more on NGO clinics and public hospitals at 57% and 35% respectively (LCSRHCL, 2018).

[51] Ministry of Public Health. NA. 'Health Facility Locator – Private Hospitals Saida.' https://www.moph.gov.lb/HealthFacilities/index/3/188/1?facility_type=1&district=&name=
[52] Ministry of Public Health. NA. 'Health Facility Locator.' https://www.moph.gov.lb/HealthFacilities/index/3/188/1?facility_type=1&district=&name=

About 17% of Lebanese in Saida needed treatment during the three months prior to the survey in 2018 (LCSRHCL, 2018). In spite of the increase in the demand for healthcare as a result of the influx of refugees, the vast majority of Lebanese, around 94%, who needed treatment were able to obtain it (LCSRHCL, 2018). Health needs increase with age, and 57% of adults 60 or above required treatment (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among the 6% who could not obtain the necessary treatment, the vast majority were from the lowest economic background and cited inability to pay as the main reason why they didn't receive the required treatment (LCSRHCL, 2018). The affordability of health care is strongly correlated with having health insurance. Among the 47% of Lebanese in Saida that have insurance, less than 1% report not accessing the needed treatment, a ratio that increases to 10% for more than half of the population that doesn't have any insurance (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Syrian refugees are slightly less likely to report needing health treatment at 15% (LCSRHCL, 2018). However, only 43% of Syrians and 71% of PRS, who needed treatment, received the needed healthcare (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, there are important gaps in health provision for the Syrian community in Saida. The inability to access healthcare is particularly acute for the poorest groups, and nearly all families cite the cost as the main barrier to obtain treatment.

Overall, the main barrier for healthcare provision seems to be affordability, in particular for the poorest Lebanese households and the Syrian population. Interviews reported that healthcare assistance does not cover all of the Syrian refugees' medical treatments, and that Syrian refugees struggled in covering their expenses, whether it is the difference in hospitalization fees or medication. An interviewee reported requiring hospitalization, however, he preferred not to be hospitalized due to his inability to cover the costs. Another interviewee explained: "If there is an emergency, we wait for the UNHCR's approval; those who are dying would be dead before the approval arrives." In addition, the quality of healthcare was also reported as weak, as one respondent stated: "Healthcare is impossible here, and that it is not of great quality to begin with."

Moreover, close to 90% of Lebanese in Saida have access to a hospital, health center or doctors within walking distance of five to fifteen minutes (LCSRHCL, 2018). Distances are higher for the Syrian population who generally live on the outskirts, with the average distance by car around eleven minutes (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Employment and Job Opportunities

This section covers employment and job opportunities pertaining to Lebanese and Syrians in Saida.

As the center of both the Southern governorate and Saida district, the city of Saida's historical role as an administrative center changed with the separation of the Southern governorate into two governorates, namely the South governorate and the Nabatieh governorate in 1995.[53] Consequently, more investment fled to other regions in the south rather than the city and its surroundings, making Saida slide further, lagging behind economic development.[54] The area has witnessed considerable investment in the last decade, mainly in the retail sector and real estate development: shopping centers, education, and healthcare centers.[55] The main economy of the region is based on the trade and services sector, with industry and agriculture accounting for a small portion.[56] Research shows that the majority of investments into the city are supportive of real-estate deals with little economic impact on the city and limited job creation potential, and are not equitably distributed or capitalized upon to reduce urban poverty.[57] Moreover, investments are not diversified, and small and medium sized businesses face structural difficulties in reaching adequate funding and support.[58]

The unemployment rate has historically been moderate in the South governorate, in line with the national average. In 2009, it reached 5% in the governorate, compared to 6% nationally.[59] In 2019, the unemployment rate in Saida district was 14.3%, compared to 11.4% at the national level.[60]

In Saida, LCSRHCL estimates show that 9.6% of Lebanese adults actively seeking employment in 2018 are unemployed (figure 7). Unemployment rates are higher for Lebanese women at 12%, versus 8% for men, and rates are also higher for youth at 23% for youth aged 15-29 years old, versus 4% for adults aged 30-64 (LCSRHCL, 2018). Unemployment affects Syrian families even more, with 6% males and 19% females that were actively searching for and not finding a job (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among the most vulnerable, there are 14% of Lebanese families and 13% of Syrian families that have no single member employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). On average, there are 1.4 dependents for every Lebanese employed, and 3 for every Syrian employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). This ratio is more disadvantaged for Syrians given the larger family size and the number of children they have on average.

[53] Hallaj, O. A., H. Debs, G. Guandagnoli, and A. Ghalia. NA. 'Saida Urban Sustainable Development Strategy, Strategic Diagnosis Report, Local Economic Development.'
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Yaacoub, N. and L. Badre. 2011. 'The Labour Market in Lebanon.' Central Administration of Statistics. http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/pdfs/sif/cas_labour_market_in_lebanon_sif1.pdf
[60] Central Administration of Statistics and International Labour Organization. 2019. 'Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73718

Similarly, employment rates are low limiting the supply of labor in the local economy, with 58% of working-age Lebanese adults having a job (LCSRHCL, 2018).[61] This is driven by the particularly low participation of women in the labor market, perhaps due to early marriages, being stay-at-home mothers, and patriarchal social values (LCSRHCL, 2018).[62]

Among Syrians, only 41% of adults have a job, with only 9% of women being employed compared to 75% of men employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). The youth is another vulnerable group, as only 42% of those aged 15-29 are employed (LCSRHCL, 2018). While many are still enrolled in education, there is a sizable portion of Lebanese youth that are neither in education nor employed: 14% of males and 23% of females (LCSRHCL, 2018).

Figure 7: Employment and Unemployment Rates among Syrians and Lebanese in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Saida's labor market characteristics also include under-employment, informality and low labor earnings. Employed working-age individuals in Saida are often under-employed by working less than 40 hours a week; this is applicable to 12% of Lebanese and 25% of Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018). For instance, a Syrian respondent reported being underemployed, as he used to own factories in Syria, and is employed in a number of kitchen-manufacturing factories in Lebanon. Interviews revealed that Syrian refugees are employed as daily laborers without contracts or agreements, and for short durations, ranging from a few days to a few weeks or months.

Another characteristic is the high degree of informality among Lebanese and Syrians, a characteristic that echoes the presence of informality at the national level as well. Among Lebanese, informality is reflected as less than 20% of the employed Lebanese population has social security. Alongside the residency restrictions imposed in 2014-2015, Syrian employment also became constrained by the sponsorship system, i.e. the work permit

[61] The working-age population can be either employed, unemployed (not employed but actively searching for jobs) or inactive (not employed and not looking for jobs).
[62] Only 44% of female Lebanese aged 15 to 64 are employed compared to 73% of men.

Syrians need to secure via a Lebanese sponsor. In this context, 40% of Syrian workers have work permits, which is a much higher rate than in other municipalities, like Zahle (1%) or Halba, where Syrian refugees are not integrated in the local labor market (LCSRHCL, 2018). Interviews suggest that daily laborers are willing to do whatever is demanded of them and based on availability, and that the period of work is up to chance. Moreover, a Lebanese respondent reported: "The Lebanese are unemployed, but they don't do most of the things the Syrians do!"

In 2018, Lebanese male workers in the city had an average monthly salary of USD 1,061, which was similar to other cities like Zahle, and 40% higher than in Halba (LCSRHCL, 2018). On average, the gender pay gap for Lebanese women is 36%, i.e. women earn 36% less than men, namely USD 679 (LCSRCL, 2018). On the other hand, earning capacity for Syrian male adults is significantly lower than Lebanese (40% lower), given the high degree of informality, the limited occupational choices of low-skilled jobs and the limited number of hours worked. As a result, Syrian males earned USD 384, while Syrian females earned USD 291 (LCSRHCL, 2018). For Syrians, the gender pay gap is 24%. As for PRS, males earned USD 346 and females earned USD 207 (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The economy of Saida is diversified with the largest share of job opportunities in different sectors (figure 8). The sectors that provide a larger share of jobs for Lebanese men work are: sales (27%), construction (12%) and social services (11%), manufacturing (10%), transportation (10%), electricity and water supply (9%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). The sectoral concentration of jobs for female Lebanese is somewhat larger, with 36% working in education, 20% in sales, 15% in health, and 12% in social services (LCSRHCL, 2018). The high percentage of Lebanese working in social services may include those working in the public sector and the army, in addition to those working with INGOs and NGOs, as the LCSRHCL survey did not inquire about that specifically.

In 2015, the Ministry of Labor adopted decision number 1/197 that limited the sectors Syrians are permitted to work in, which became restricted to agriculture, construction and environmental services—meaning cleaning services.[63] Given the legal restrictions on work and the limited economic opportunities, Syrians mostly find jobs in the construction sector (36%) and sales (48%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). The legal restrictions and lack of adequate matching between the skills that Syrians have and what the labor market demands lead to a "skill waste" in the local economy. Although there is a high share of Syrians with jobs as laborers in construction, they have more chances to access jobs beyond low-skilled occupations in Saida compared to other cities like Zahle. There is also a lower sectoral switch compared to other municipalities, in particular those bordering Syria, which shows that more attraction to the city is based on what skills the labor market in the city demanded.

As for returns on education, the average increase in earnings for an additional year of schooling in Saida are low for Lebanese (6%) and only 2% for Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018). The

[63] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.' Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

minimal returns to schooling for Syrians are a consequence of the legal restrictions on higher-skilled jobs.

Figure 8: Sectors of Employment in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Overall, while the arrival of Syrian refugees since 2011 has increased the size of the working-age population in Saida by 13%, but the lower employment rates of this group has increased in the labor supply in terms of hours worked only to 9%, this rate is low compared to other areas in Lebanon (LCSRHCL, 2018). A sectoral analysis shows that Lebanese and Syrians tend to work in different sectors, so they are complementary rather than substitutes, which greatly nuances the negative impact of refugees on labor market outcomes vis-a-vis the local population. Perhaps the sector where there might be more competition is in sales. Refugees have also generated new employment opportunities within a large group of NGOs and international organizations that came to the locality to address their presence. Approximately one in eight Lebanese in Saida have jobs in the social services sector (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, other groups that have potentially benefitted from the refugee presence include landlords, employers, and business owners.

Income and Poverty

This section examines income and poverty among Lebanese and Syrians in Saida.

In 2018, the monthly income per capita among Lebanese residents in Saida was about USD 451 (LCSRHCL, 2018). With less earning opportunities for Syrians, Syrian families lived with less than one third of the income of Lebanese, with about USD 131 per month per household member, while PRS earned around USD 150 (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The main sources of income are labor earnings, although families also rely on other forms of revenues. Among Lebanese families, the three main sources of income are wages (70%), credit (19%), and remittances (8%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). For Syrians, labor income represents 83% of total income, followed by credit (9%), and humanitarian assistance (4%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). There are, thus, high levels of indebtedness among both groups. On the other hand, there is a marginal role of remittances as a source of income for 3% of Syrians and 2% of PRS.

Looking at household expenditures in 2018 (figure 9), Lebanese families in Saida spent an average of USD 414 per person in 2018, close to three times what Syrian and PRS families can afford to spend, which was around USD 155 and USD 169, respectively (LCSRHCL, 2018). By type of expenditure, Lebanese families spend the largest share on food, which is 24% of their total expenditure (LCSRHCL, 2018). Lebanese also spend a sizable share in rent and utilities (25%), transportation (11%), health (8%), and education (6%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian families have a less diversified range of spending given their limited income. On average, they spend 33% on food and 43% on housing and utilities (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, more than three fourths of their spending goes to just those two rubrics. In addition, Syrian families spend a lower share on transportation (5%), health (3%), and education (2%) (LCSRHCL, 2018). The limited spending in education in spite of having a larger number of school-age children is particularly salient, and is due to the higher dropout rates and the heavy reliance on public free schooling.

Figure 9: Monthly Spending in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

The most recent poverty study[64] on Lebanese in Lebanon was published in 2007 with data from the 2004/05 National Survey of Expenditures. This study established a lower poverty line of USD 2.40 per person per day and an upper poverty line of USD 4.00 per person per day for Lebanon. Updating those lines to account for inflation leads to a USD 3.75 per person per day, i.e. in extreme poverty, and USD 6 per person per day thresholds, i.e. in poverty.[65]

Poverty in 2018 was quite low among Lebanese residents in Saida (figure 10). According to the LCSRHCL (2018), 7% of Lebanese were poor, having less than USD 6 per person per day, and 1% were suffering from extreme poverty, i.e. below USD 3.75 per day per person. On the other hand, poverty among Syrian households is widespread, with 75% living under USD 6 per person per day, and 32% under USD 3.75 per person per day (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, PRS also have very large poverty rates, although lower than Syrian refugees, with 65% living in poverty and 22% in extreme poverty (LCSRHCL, 2018). This might be associated with a higher reception of humanitarian assistance.

Figure 10: Poverty Rates in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Contrary to the low poverty levels, close to two in three Lebanese families in Saida resort to coping mechanisms to adapt to insufficient income to secure food (LCSRHCL, 2018). Among the type of coping measures, 63% Lebanese households resorted to lowering the quality of food at least once in the week before the survey, 35% reduce the size of meals, 17% got indebted to pay for food, and 16% the number of meals (LCSRHCL, 2018). Therefore, while the monetary measure of poverty is not very high, residents of Saida report having a certain degree of food insecurity. Among Syrians, about 52% paid food on credit, 44% lowered the quality of food and about two thirds reduced the number (38%)

[64] United Nations Development Programme. 2007. 'Poverty, Growth & Inequality in Lebanon.' http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Poverty/Publications/Poverty,%20Growth%20and%20Inequality%20in%20Lebanon.pdf

[65] The lower poverty line (USD 3.75) is very similar to the one proposed by the World Bank in 2013 (USD 3.84), which is also used in the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASYR) Survey.

and size (47%) of meals. The intensity of these coping measures is large, averaging three times per week for both Lebanese and Syrians (LCSRHCL, 2018).

The incidence of poverty is heterogeneous across different urban and socio-economic characteristics. According to regression analysis, the share of households living in poverty varies by shelter type, disproportionately affecting families with lower housing tenure, in particular those living in non-permanent structures such as tents or garages (LCSRHCL, 2018). The probability of being extremely poor increases with the size of the household (LCSRHCL, 2018). This is mostly due to the higher dependency ratio, that is, the share of dependents over working-age members.

Fieldwork reported a perception that Syrian refugees living in makeshift shelters have a higher chance of receiving aid from international organizations.

The employment status and, in particular, the share of household members that are employed, drastically reduce the probability of being poor. Hence, the more household members are employed, the less their chances of drowning in poverty. Research points to the importance of livelihood opportunities in promoting self-reliance.[66] Although this means a higher household income, more household members working may be also linked to cases of child labor. A respondent reported: "The greatest concern is the lack of work, which causes psychological unease, in addition to a lack of money. My husband often gets worrying bills, especially with me and my son being sick. Also, dealing with children, who are too young to apprehend the situation, and having to refuse their requests is tiring."

Families with higher education levels have higher income capacity and are less likely to remain below the poverty line (LCSRHCL, 2018). Although LCSRHCL findings also pointed out that returns on education were high for Lebanese and low for Syrians, as discussed in the social services section.

Fieldwork also reported instances where Syrian refugees regretted getting married due to poverty and the inability to secure expenses, citing one interviewee: "In my mind, [I thought] it would be a short while and we would go back to Syria. Here, things are not going well and our living conditions are dire. I cannot afford doctors, and I need to borrow money every time I need to see a doctor or get medication. Living here is bad."

In addition, interviews with Syrian refugees reported the lack of leisure activities due to dire poverty, as they are unable to afford public transportation expenses to get to the corniche, often cited as the only leisure activity.

[66] El-Helou, Z., M. Khechen, and D. Mahdi. 2020. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.'

Mobility, Safety, and Conflict Resolution

This section is divided into two subsections. The first covers Syrian refugee and Lebanese access to transportation, mobility and safety perceptions. The second addresses social interactions, intergroup perceptions and conflict resolution between the two communities in Saida.

Access to Transportation, Mobility Restrictions, and Safety Perceptions

Access to mobility in Saida is different for Lebanese and Syrians (figure 11). Lebanese residents do not generally find difficulties accessing transportation, whether public or private, in order to move between places. About 98% report using transportation easily or very easily (LCSRHCL, 2018). Only 1% of the Lebanese population report they have a hard time securing the necessary transportation (LCSRHCL, 2018). Syrian households also report not having major problems securing transportation, with only 3% reporting difficulties (LCSRHCL, 2018).

While the vast majority of the Lebanese community in Saida report never facing mobility restrictions (figure 11), with 5% of households facing difficulties, at least sometimes (LCSRHCL, 2018). On the other hand, restrictions are more widespread across Syrian households, with 35% of families affected at least sometimes (LCSRHCL, 2018). The main barrier to mobility for Syrians is the harassment faced from Lebanese residents, as reported by 51% of the Syrian population that find it difficult to move (LCSRHCL, 2018). Other constraints, significant to close to 15% of Syrians, are the unofficial curfews in the community and official checkpoints, also reported by around 15% (LCSRHCL, 2018). This is due to difficulties pertaining to accessing and sustaining legal status in Lebanon. However, fieldwork confirmed the lack of municipal curfews throughout the city.

Self-imposed restrictions were reported during interviews with Syrian refugees in Saida. Respondents reported restricting their movement within the city and not going out of Saida, while one respondent reported not going further out of the south of Lebanon. Interviews also reported households who rarely leave their homes or the collective shelter, only to run urgent errands, such as going to the market. As a Syrian respondent explained: “We do not go out anywhere, but rather stay at home all the time. Going out is for people who have no worries and concerns.” Moreover, respondents also referred to the Corniche as the only available leisure activity, having “nowhere else to go,” while some also had family or friends to visit within the city.

Figure 11: Mobility Restrictions



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

There is a similar nationality divide in terms of how safe residents in Saida feel (figure 12). While 52% of Lebanese families feel very safe, only 35% of Syrians have similar perceptions (LCSRHCL, 2018). Moreover, 8% of Lebanese and 26% of Syrian respondents feel unsafe (LCSRHCL, 2018). The main reason behind the feeling of unsafety among the Syrian community is the overall environment. Although of a smaller order of magnitude, some Syrians also fear deportation and being evicted from their residences. Anecdotal references confirm Syrians feeling safe in Saida, as they report a lack of security threats, raids, and discrimination. Moreover, although Syrians residing in collective shelters reported feeling safe, interview respondents also reported that raids were not taking places, while others reported instances of raids conducted by security forces and the use of force and humiliating treatment.

Figure 12: Safety Perceptions among Lebanese and Syrians in Saida



Source: LCSRHCL, 2018

Legal, housing and mobility uncertainties affect the perceptions of safety of Syrian families. There is a clear association between mobility restrictions and safety perceptions in Saida, in particular for the Syrian community that is the one most severely affected. Families that face mobility restrictions report 35% lower safety levels, compared to families that do not report mobility restrictions (LCSRHCL, 2018). Safety is also shaped by the

vulnerability of the house tenure, as families that receive eviction threats, they report lower levels of safety. Finally, those registered with UNHCR or that have residency permits report higher levels of safety. Income and education levels of the population do not clearly correlate with safety of Syrians and only weakly with the safety of Lebanese.

Beyond safety perceptions, the type of crime that each community report as the more prevalent is also different, according to LCSRHCL findings. Syrian families mostly report incidents of harassment, but also physical aggressions and curfews. In turn, Lebanese report mostly facing shootings and harassment. Interviews with Lebanese residents reported perceptions of the uncontrolled presence of weapons and drugs in Saida that made them feel unsafe and fearful. Fieldwork with Syrian refugees reported instances of verbal and physical harassment.

Social Interactions, Intergroup Perceptions, and Conflict Resolution

Despite of the large presence of refugees in Saida, a sizable part of the population in each of the two communities, but particularly among Lebanese, report not interacting with each other (58% of Lebanese families, compared to 40% of Syrians) (LCSRHCL, 2018). The larger out-group exposure of Syrians compared to Lebanese is related to economic transactions, such as renting apartments and purchasing or selling goods, while those interactions are almost non-existent among Lebanese families. Social interactions, such as social visits and religious events, are similarly low for both groups. In general, those who have economic interactions with the other group are not more likely to socially interact with them.

Urban and socio-economic factors influence the likelihood of exposure and interaction between the two communities. Higher income and more educated Lebanese families engage less with the Syrian community, while the opposite is true for Syrians. It is thus the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese and the better-off Syrians that are more prone to have legal residency. While Saida spatially integrates Syrian refugees more than other cities in Lebanon, with an average distance to the closest Lebanese family is about 500 meters, those that live further away interact less with the other community. Beyond these differences, Syrian families who send their children to school are more likely to report interacting with Lebanese, highlighting the opportunity the education system provides for facilitating social networks.

In general, both Lebanese and Syrian families tend to report having good or neutral relations with each other (LCSRHCL, 2018). Importantly, families that interact with the other community have, on average, significantly better attitudes towards each other, in line with the contact theory that stipulates that inter-group contact potentially improve trust and a positive attitude between the two groups.[67] Social visits are associated with more positive feelings for both Lebanese and Syrians. However, not all types of interactions lead to more positive views. Economic interactions, such as engaging in purchases and

[67] Schmid, K., M. Hewstone, and A. Al Ramiah. 2015. 'Diversities, Trust, and Intergroup Attitudes: Underlying processes and mechanisms.' In Social Cohesion and Immigration in Europe and North America: Mechanisms.' Routeledge. https://books.google.fr/books?id=FEaLBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA143&lpg=PA143&dq=contact+theory+2007and+social+cohesion&source=bl&ots=3yQH7TGwFF&sig=ACfU3U2vPJhGCW16C9zfp4pBKXWIPDSLuQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjakaunjo7pAhXgA2MBHQdXD0wQ6AEwAXoECA0QAQ#v=onepage&q=contact%20theory&f=false

selling of goods or rent-based interactions, do not improve attitudes towards the out-group and, in certain cases, can even make them worse. Fieldwork mentioned minimal interaction and instances of avoiding interactions between Lebanese and Syrians. As one respondent elaborated: "If you don't cross anyone' path, no one crosses yours."

As for intergroup perceptions, the perception that Syrian refugees are targeted with humanitarian assistance while Lebanese residents do not receive anything was reported by a Lebanese interviewee who also acknowledged the increase in demand for products she was selling due to the presence of Syrians. As she explained: "We are selling more since they came here; if they go, we would not sell anything." Syrian and Lebanese respondents confirmed that sympathy and compassion towards Syrian displacement has diminished since the beginning of the war in Syria. Lebanese respondents relay the perception that Syrian refugees are comfortable in Saida, not experiencing discrimination and are provided with assistance, education and job opportunities. Moreover, a Syrian respondent confirmed "We have never been bothered for being Syrian in Saida."

With Saida hosting a large number of Palestinian refugees as well, fieldwork pointed towards sensitivities between Palestinians and Syrians. A Lebanese respondent explained that Palestinians were more affected by the presence of Syrians in Saida than Lebanese, as assistance to Palestinians decreased. In line with this, a Palestinian interviewee stated: "Things have greatly changed inside the camp. Syrians have taken over shops and houses, and they now rent, run and work in shops around the camp's market. The camp's market is all Syrians now! Palestinians have moved out of the camp to rent their apartments to Syrians and live in the surrounding regions. The camp's demography has changed, with Palestinians leaving and Syrians coming."

Within the Syrian community, interviews reported on a sense of solidarity, materialized through information sharing and financial assistance. Interviews pointed towards financial support, particularly when it comes to healthcare-related bills. Within collective shelters, Syrians reported good relationships with fellow resident dwellers. For instance, a Syrian respondent living in a collective shelter stated: "There is a community here in the compound. We work together and support each other. Everyone lends money to everyone. Sometimes, we collect money from everyone here to cover some things, such as people going to the hospital, and each person gives as much as they want to give."

The availability of dispute resolution mechanisms for both communities is an essential component for social cohesion. However, there is a strikingly low availability of formal and informal mechanisms to settle inter-communal tensions. Only 40% of Syrian and 16% of Lebanese households say they have proper mechanisms of dispute resolution (LCSRHCL, 2018). Surprisingly, the higher affirmative responses among Syrian households is due to a higher reported access to formal institutions, like the General Security Office and courts. Moreover, anecdotal evidence reports that Syrian households have been organized within the collective shelter by forming an elected committee of four members for every floor, whose responsibility is to address disputes.

Conclusion

This report has examined qualitative and quantitative findings across various themes, such as legal status, aid and coordination, housing and urban services, social services, employment and job opportunities, income and poverty, and mobility, safety and conflict resolution. It also brings together perspectives of local stakeholders regarding the local governance of Syrian refugees. Both LCSRHCL survey findings and qualitative interviews provide representative insights that can inform local policy challenges, assuming a clear breakdown of the local population's characteristics is provided.

The report unpacks local communities' interaction with stakeholders and access to services, as well as their coping mechanisms. It also highlights the plight of Syrian refugees under challenging conditions of governance and management, demonstrating the precarious situation of Syrian refugees with regard to their legal status by providing examples whereby legal status affects access to other services or mobility, for instance. Findings also examine the reasons behind Syrian refugees choosing to settle in a particular locality.

The report investigates the perspectives of local stakeholders, namely the municipality, public agencies, aid providers, and religious actors, vis-à-vis their role in the governance of service provision, as well as in coordination and aid. Lebanese resident and Syrian refugee perspectives on the performance of various institutions, such as the municipality, security agencies and aid providers, is also studied. The report additionally identifies and analyzes the challenges that local communities face with regard to access to housing and urban and social services.

The LCSRHCL survey estimates the unemployment rate, type of job opportunities and employment in the locality, as well as income and poverty faced by both communities in 2018. Research findings provide information about the experiences and challenges relating to mobility, perceptions of safety, inter- and intra-group interactions, and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Although Lebanon's political, economic, financial and social conditions have tremendously deteriorated since the data was collected in 2018, the report still provides a rich analysis of local governance of Syrian refugees' presence in the locality of Saida. The findings of this report can inform policy decisions and agendas of local stakeholders and international organizations in ways that will hopefully advance the integration of Syrians in Lebanese cities and towns.

Annex 1: List of Interviewees

Interviews were held with meso- and local-level actors in Saida between June and July 2017. Semi-structured interviews were held in Saida, Zahle, Halba and Hermel and were carried out in accordance with ethical research protocols. Interviewees confirmed their verbal consent in order to be mentioned and quoted in the research outputs. Interview findings reflect the accounts of interviewees based on their experiences, and do not reflect their affiliated institutions' official positions.

Meso-Level Interviews Active in Saida

	Interviewee	Institution	Type of Actor
1	Kamel Kuzbar	Saida Municipality	Local public institution
2	Mohamad Hijazi	Saida Municipality	Local public institution
3	Huwayda Al-Asadi	MoSA	Local public institution
4	Ali Aoun	Mercy Corps	INGO
5	Noha Fayyad	Caritas	INGO
6	Kevin	Soutien Belge Overseas	INGO
7	Mohamad	Soutien Belge Overseas	INGO
8	Tarek Al-Bizri	Al-Riaya Islamic Foundation	Religious Institution
9	Youssra Taleb	UNDP	UN Agency
10	Houssam Nisr	UNDP	UN Agency
11	Anonymous	Outreach and Leadership Academy	Local NGO

Local-Level Interviews with Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian Households Residing in Saida

	Nationality	Gender	Occupation
1	Lebanese	M	Laborer
2	Lebanese	F	Small Business Owner
3	Lebanese	M	Small Business Owner
4	Lebanese	F	Unemployed
5	Lebanese	F	Small Business Owner
6	Lebanese	F	Unemployed
7	Palestinian	F	Unemployed
8	Palestinian	M	Small Business Owner
9	Syrian	F	Unemployed
10	Syrian	M	Unemployed
11	Syrian	F	Unemployed
12	Syrian	F	Unemployed
13	Syrian	M	Unemployed
14	Syrian	M	Small Business Owner

15	Syrian	F	Unemployed
16	Syrian	M	Unemployed
17	Syrian	M	Unemployed
18	Syrian	M	Laborer
19	Syrian	M	Bus Driver
20	Syrian	F	Unemployed
21	Syrian	M	Laborer
22	Syrian	M	Unemployed
23	Syrian	M	Laborer

Annex 2: Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon Survey

The scope of the survey was limited in order to cover a representative sample of the population in each municipality and provide meaningful results at the local level, thus prioritizing depth at the expense of breadth. The three selected municipalities host a large number of refugees, while having different characteristics in terms of location, level of development, religious composition, institutional structure and stance vis-à-vis refugees.

Geographical Distribution of Saida Sample

Figure 1: Heat map

Figure 2: Pointed map

Figure 3: Household Sample Size



Figure 4: Population Size by Nationality



Figure 5: Saida's Age structure



Figure 6: Gender structure



Figure 7: Marital status



Figure 8: Confessional Breakdown



Annex 3: Distribution of UNHCR Registered Syrian Refugees in Saida as of 30 September 2020



Source: UNHCR. 2020. 'Syria Refugee Response Lebanon, South and El Nabatieh Governorates, Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82689

Annex 4: List of UNHCR's Implementing Partners Actively Providing Assistance in Saida District

Sector	Implementing Partners
Basic Assistance	International Committee of the Red Cross, Save the Children International (SCI), UNHCR, Union of Relief and Development Associations (URDA), World Food Program[68]
Education	Alpha, Amel, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), Caritas Lebanon, Humanity & Inclusion, Mouvement Social, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), SBOverseas (SBO), UNHCR, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UNRWA[69]
Energy	Not Applicable[70]
Food Security & Agriculture	ABAAD, AVSI, Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative, Food and Agriculture Organization, ICU, International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Islamic Relief (IR), Kayany-AUB, LOST, MoSA, SCI, Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI), Service Civil International (SCI), Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development (SHEILD) [71]
Health	ANERA, Caritas Lebanon, International Medical Corps (IMC), IOCC Lebanon, PU-AMI, SIDC[72]
Livelihoods	Al Majmouaa, CESVI, HWA, Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement, IR, Mercy Corps, UNDP, United Nations Industrial Development Organization[73]
Protection	ABAAD, ACTED, AMEL, CARE, Caritas Lebanon, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Danish Red Cross/Lebanese Red Cross, Handicap International, Himaya, IMC, International Organization for Migration, IR, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Intersos, Mercy Corps, Mouvement Social, Naba'a, NRC, PU-AMI, Right to Play International, SBO, SCI, SHIELD, Terre des Hommes (TdH) Italy, TdH Lebanon, L'Union pour la

[68] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Basic Assistance 2020 Quarter 3 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83431
[69] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Education 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71755
[70] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Energy 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71756
[71] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Food Security and Agriculture Jan-Dec 2018 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68330
[72] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Health Q3 2020 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82880
[73] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Livelihoods Q3 2020 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83521

	Protection de l'Enfance au Liban, UNRWA, Université Saint-Joseph, World Rehabilitation Fund, Welfare Association[74]
Shelter	Comitato Internazionale per los Sviluppo dei Popoli, NRC, PU-AMI, UNHCR[75]
Social Stability	Acted, UNDP[76]
Water	Development for People and Nature Association, Lebanese Red Cross, Mercy Corps, NRC, PU-AMI, UNICEF, UNRWA[77]

[74] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Protection (including SGBV and Child Protection) Q3 2020 Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83454
[75] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2020. 'Shelter 2020 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/83271
[76] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Social Stability 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71575
[77] Inter-Agency Coordination. 2019. 'Water 2019 Mid-Year Dashboard.' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71576