

The Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) and the Israeli-Lebanese War

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Note: This publication was finalized in February 2026 and does not reflect the renewed conflict escalation in March 2026.

Founded in 1989, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies is an independently managed, non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental think tank whose mission is to produce and advocate for policies that improve governance in Lebanon and the Arab region. LCPS's current research agenda focuses on: enhancing governance, informing the process of economic growth and sustainable development, promoting inclusive and effective social policies, and informing the development of policies for a sustainable environment. Four themes cut across the above areas of focus, including gender, youth, conflict resolution, and technology.

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Introduction

The Lebanon Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) was launched following the August 4, 2020, Port of Beirut blast. The explosion caused widespread destruction to homes, businesses, and infrastructure. Simultaneously, it compounded Lebanon's ongoing economic, financial, and political crises. In response to this, the 3RF was created through a joint effort of the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Government of Lebanon, and civil society. Its goal was to organize and guide reform, recovery, and reconstruction efforts while adopting a people-centered approach that emphasizes accountability and transparency.

The 3RF's scope aimed to go beyond provide short-term to the Beirut area. Indeed, it sought to balance urgent needs with structural reforms. Key among these reforms was rebuilding critical infrastructure to support long-term recovery. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) published a 'baseline report' in 2023, Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction after the Port of Beirut Blast, which provides more details on the 3RF's structure and approach.

However, more recently, Lebanon's recovery has been complicated by renewed regional conflict. The escalation of the Israeli-Lebanese war in October 2023, and its continuation until today, has resulted in widespread casualties, destruction, and displacement. Reports from United Nations agencies indicate more than 4,000 deaths and around one million internally displaced people associated with this war. Furthermore, public services and infrastructure, including hundreds of schools and healthcare facilities, have been severely affected. This puts additional strain on an already fragile economy. Even after the ceasefire of November 27, 2024, ongoing violations continue to impede reconstruction efforts. The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates recovery and reconstruction needs at \$11 billion.

The following 'endline report' will examine Lebanese public and civil society perceptions of the war and its effects on recovery and reform. It draws on a nationwide survey of 1,200 respondents and 18 focus groups with 138 CSOs across Lebanon's nine governorates. The findings highlight the priorities, challenges, and opportunities for recovery within the broader framework of the 3RF.

Building on the 2023 baseline report, this endline report does not assess change over time but considers how the 3RF's coordination structures and lessons can inform post-war recovery. Insights from this report aim to support localized, conflict-sensitive, and accountable

approaches that strengthen public trust and promote sustainable reconstruction in Lebanon.

I Methodology

Similar to its predecessor, this report follows a mixed research methodology. The previous report consisted of a 1,200-respondent nationwide quantitative survey and focus groups with 111 CSO representatives across Lebanon. The current report includes a 1,200-respondent nationwide quantitative survey and focus groups with 138 CSO representatives across Lebanon. While similar methods were used to examine sentiments and perceptions across both distinct contexts, the findings should not be read as a direct comparison between them or as evidence of causality, effectiveness, or change over time.

LCPS designed the nationwide survey, which was implemented in a face-to-face format by Information International, a Lebanese polling company, in addition to two discussion group guides—one for CSOs within the Consultative and Working Groups of the 3RF and another for CSOs in the governorates, which may or may not be part of the 3RF. The focus group discussions were conducted in a face-to-face format by ARA Research & Consultancy, the same Lebanese polling company that had conducted the nationwide survey and focus group discussions for the baseline report.

Nationwide Survey

Both the 2022 and 2025 nationwide surveys captured public perceptions of Lebanon's reform and recovery process and the relevance of the 3RF, with the former focusing on the aftermath of the Beirut port blast and the latter being situated within the still ongoing Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Additionally, both surveys further explored public trust in diverse state and non-state actors, particularly in terms of leading reconstruction. Likewise, they evaluated awareness and alignment with the 3RF and examined the public's views regarding reforms, governance, regional disparities, and people-centered recovery.

In the endline survey, the 1,200 questionnaires were distributed proportionally to a number of residents across Lebanon's nine governorates, based on the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health Statistical Bulletin for 2020. Each governorate was divided into districts, with 26 districts in total. The capital of each district was selected to administer the survey. The distribution of questionnaires by confession in each area was based on the confessional distribution of the registered number of voters according to the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities' official statistics for 2022.

The sampling methodology ensured that the sample was a representation of the Lebanese population in terms of age, gender, geographical, and confessional distributions. The research focused on Lebanese nationals who permanently reside in the country.

Focus Groups

The focus groups in 2023 and 2025 collected in-depth qualitative insights from civil society organizations that are both part of the 3RF and outside of it. They aimed to identify these CSOs' perceptions of the 3RF and to critically examine its challenges, successes, and opportunities for the future. In other words, these focus groups contextualize the interpretation of the survey findings and deepen it, instead of confirming or validating quantitative trends.

A total of 18 focus groups were conducted, with two focus groups in each of Lebanon's nine governorates between September and October 2025. This is consistent with the 2022 methodology, with the 18 focus groups having been held between January and February 2023.

The focus groups tackled CSOs' awareness and participation in the 3RF, their experience with the 3RF, policy reform priorities, CSOs' role and capacities, priority areas for reform, recovery, and reconstruction, CSOs and emergency response, and ended with recommendations.

II Results: Nationwide Survey

The Economic Crisis and Its Implications

Household Monthly Income

Six years since its beginning, the financial and economic crisis continues to loom over Lebanon. In 2023, the survey showed that 70% of respondents earned less than 6 million Lebanese pounds per household per month, equivalent to 140 USD at the time. In 2025, 18.1% of respondents earned up to 12,460,000 LBP, which is the current equivalent to 140 USD. 24.3% of respondents indicated earning between 20,737,000 LBP (233 USD) and 41,385,000 LBP (465 USD), with another 24.8% earning between 41,385,000 LBP (465 USD) and 82,770,000 LBP (930 USD). Nevertheless, one must keep the rise in inflation and dollarization of the economy in mind; in other words, purchasing power has decreased since 2023.

Multidimensional Poverty and Reduced Quality of Life

60.3% of respondent households reported that they reduced their consumption of lighting, heat, and water. 53.1% and 51.1% of respondents stated that they


reduced social outings and gatherings, as well as visits to family and friends. 46.6% stopped or postponed buying necessary clothing, 41.8% postponed or skipped doctor visits after falling ill, 37% reduced food consumption, 34.1% reduced or postponed buying regular medicines, 30.5% cancelled health insurance, and 28% skipped meals and bought food and basic supplies on credit. 24.8% postponed, withdrew, or reduced expenditures on education and training, 18.3% sold household assets or exchanged them for food, clothing, or medicine, and 14.4% dropped out of school or university to work and provide for their families.

This is consistent with the results of the 2023 survey and highlights the widespread use of coping strategies such as reduced consumption of lighting, heat, and water. It also reflects persistent difficult living conditions, continued multidimensional poverty, deteriorating quality of life, and the serious risk of long-term educational setbacks due to an elevated school dropout rate.

Top 3 Most Important Economic Problems

According to our 2022 survey results, the depreciation of the currency ranked as the top economic problem (67%), followed by corruption (61%), and the banking crisis (41%). In 2025, respondents ranked corruption as the leading economic problem (20.5%), followed by the depreciation of the currency (19.5%), and poor services (16.9%).

Top 3 Most Important Economic Problems Facing the Lebanese Today (2025 Survey Results)




Base: Total Sample, 1200

In 2022, when asked about the economic issues that they wanted the government to prioritize, 69% of respondents cited basic services such as electricity, water, and trash collection, followed by currency

devaluation (63%) and accountability for the economic collapse (51%). In comparison, in 2025, 50.7% of respondents ranked corruption first, including the return of funds that were illegally transferred out of Lebanon, followed by poor services such as electricity, water, and trash collection (48.1%) and rising unemployment (47.2%).

**Economic Issues that the Lebanese Want the Government to Prioritize this Year
(2025 Survey Results)**




Base: Total Sample, 1200

Across sectors, healthcare retained its priority ranking across the baseline and endline surveys. However, the education sector and the banking sector, which ranked as the second and third priorities in 2022, shifted to fourth and fifth priorities in 2025, with the services sector and security sector/army ranking as second and third priorities, respectively.

Respondents in 2022 believed that the reform of the power sector, including the establishment of a regulatory authority, would make a fundamental difference in their lives. In 2025, the reform of the power sector came in third, with the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy ranking first.

From a gender perspective, views of male and female respondents were very close, with females wanting the focus to be first and foremost on services such as electricity, water, and trash collection, followed by corruption, rising unemployment, the depreciation of the currency, and the lack of accountability (in this order).

Reforms that Would Make a Difference in Citizens' Lives (2025 Survey Results)




Base: Total Sample, 1200

Perceptions about the Future

Compared to the 2022 survey results, which pointed to 50% of respondents expressing pessimism toward the future, the 2025 survey results reflect a somewhat more optimistic outlook. This may reflect adaptation through coping strategies or lowered expectations rather than signifying a clear improvement in conditions. Only 19.2% of respondents expressed pessimism, with the largest percentage (35.2%) expressing being somewhat optimistic about the future.

Compared to male respondents, female respondents were slightly more 'somewhat optimistic' in their outlook toward the future. Additionally, their 'pessimistic' or 'somewhat pessimistic' sentiments were slightly lower compared to those of males. At the same time, they reported feeling slightly less 'optimistic' and 'very optimistic' compared to their male counterparts.

Perceptions about the Future (2025 Survey Results)



Base: Total Sample, 1200

Perceptions about Permanent Emigration


Compared to 52% of respondents who wanted to permanently emigrate in 2022 due to combined economic and political reasons, solely economic reasons, and solely political reasons, only 36% of respondents expressed wanting to permanently emigrate in 2025, citing economic reasons, security reasons, and political reasons. This decline, however, captures reported intent instead of commitment or actual ability.

In other words, 47% of respondents were not thinking about permanent emigration in 2022, and an even higher percentage of respondents, 64%, were not thinking about permanently emigrating in 2025.

Looking at the results through a gender lens, a slightly smaller proportion of females indicated that they were not considering permanent emigration compared to males. Female respondents expressed slightly more concern about the security situation, while male respondents were slightly more focused on economic and political conditions.

When asking respondents who had indicated that they wanted to permanently emigrate about governmental measures or reforms that would make them stay in Lebanon, economic reforms ranked first, security reforms ranked second, and banking and financial reforms ranked third in both the baseline and endline survey results. The ranking was the same between males and females, although female respondents were slightly more focused on reforms to security, political parties, elections, and the civil code.

What Governmental Measures or Reforms Would Make You Prefer to Stay in Lebanon? (2025 Survey Results)



Base: 432

Reflecting on Lebanon's Recovery

Confidence in the Government to Resolve Key Crises

2025 survey respondents were asked about their degree of confidence in the current government's ability to resolve the 2023-2024 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, the economic crisis, and the Syrian refugee crisis. Here is what the results showed:

Close to 64% of respondents reported not being confident at all (36.8%) or feeling somewhat not confident (27.1%) in the current government's ability to resolve the 2023-2024 Israeli-Lebanese conflict. 67% of respondents reported not being confident at all (37.7%) or feeling somewhat not confident (29.3%) in the current government's ability to resolve the economic crisis. Close to 63% of respondents reported not being confident at all (34%) or feeling somewhat not confident (28.8%) in the current government's ability to resolve the Syrian refugee crisis. These percentages are reflective of a low confidence in the government and its institutions and the way it has handled these crises, or similar variations in the case of the Israeli-Lebanese war, in recent years.


International Organizations and Lebanon's Recovery

In 2022, 59% of respondents expressed not being confident (45%) and being somewhat not confident (14%) in international organizations playing a constructive role in Lebanon's recovery.

In 2025, this percentage dropped to 52.7%, with 30.5% of respondents expressing that they were not confident at all in international organizations playing a constructive role in Lebanon's recovery and 22.2% of respondents stating that they felt somewhat not confident.

The 2025 survey took a step further by asking respondents to qualitatively express the negative and positive reasons for their degree of confidence in international organizations playing a constructive role in Lebanon's recovery. On the negative side, out of the 632 respondents who had no confidence at all or somewhat no confidence in international organizations playing a constructive role in Lebanon's recovery, 33.7% tied this to feeling that international organizations have political agendas and interests, 22.6% linked it to the absence of international organizations or the inadequacy of tangible support, and 20.6% said that they did not know or had no answer to this question.


Negative Reasons for the Lack of Confidence in International Organizations Playing a Constructive Role in Lebanon's Recovery



Base: 632

On the positive side, out of the 454 respondents who were somewhat confident, confident, or very confident in international organizations playing a constructive role in Lebanon's recovery, 56.6% expressed that international organizations provided aid and support, with smaller percentages lauding their expertise and institutional capacities (9%), their creation of change for the benefit of Lebanon (3.3%), and their ability to provide stability (1.5%). They also praised them for their success in reconstruction efforts (1.5%), transparency (1.3%), and role in conflict resolution (1.1%). A much smaller percentage of respondents, 3.7%, relayed not knowing or having no answer to this question.

Positive Reasons for this Degree of Confidence in International Organizations Playing a Constructive Role in Lebanon's Recovery




Base: 454

Key Indicators of a Successful Recovery

In 2022, the regular provision of public services, including, for example, 24/7 supply of electricity, economic growth and jobs, and an efficient judicial system were perceived as the top three key indicators of a successful recovery. In 2025, economic growth and jobs surpassed the regular provision of public services, including 24/7 supply of electricity, which now ranks second. An efficient judiciary was considered the fourth indicator in 2025, with the establishment of comprehensive and inclusive social protection systems being seen as a third key indicator of a successful recovery.

Key Indicators of a Successful Recovery (2025 Survey Results)



Base: Total Sample, 1200

Most Suitable Stakeholder or Entity to Respond to Lebanon's Problems

In 2022, respondents considered non-political civil society as the most suitable actor to respond to the problems facing Lebanon. It was followed by the international community and then the parties in power. In 2025, of respondents considered that the army was best placed to respond to Lebanon's problems, followed by a new authority or strong government, with the international community coming in third, parties in power in fourth, and non-political civil society in fifth. This suggests shifting perceptions of which stakeholders and entities are best positioned to respond, which may reflect their perceived capacity during wartime rather than trust alone, while also highlighting the impact of the war.

Leading Lebanon's Reconstruction Efforts

Respondents believed that the current government should lead reconstruction efforts. It was followed by the private sector, specifically composed of Lebanese companies and businesses, and by international organizations.

III The Israeli-Lebanese War


Sense of Safety

63% of respondents relayed being moderately affected (18.4%), very affected (25.5%), or extremely affected (19.1%) by the 2023-24 Israeli-Lebanese war.

Psychological and Physical Impacts

More than 60% of respondents reported that they have had distressing thoughts, were always on guard for danger, and are easily startled or frightened since the beginning and escalation of the Israeli-Lebanon war. Close to 46% relayed having trouble sleeping. More than 30% reported physical signs of stress and having recurring memories or dreams related to the war. Close to 30% said that they had trouble concentrating. 6.6% admitted to destructive behavior such as drinking too much or driving too fast.

Have You Experienced Any of the Following Since the 2023-2024 Israeli-Lebanese War?



Base: Total Sample, 1200

Changes in the Makeup of Neighborhoods

34.5% of respondents stated that they saw new people relocating to the neighborhood and 13% of respondents said that they saw neighbors permanently leaving the neighborhood

Assessment of War Damages and Assistance

87.4% of surveyed individuals shared that the government did not contact them to assess recent war-related damage. Smaller percentages indicated that municipality workers, other entities and individuals, the army, or the police had contacted them.

When specifically asked if the government provided them with any assistance, 97.4% of respondents said 'No,' with the remaining percentages stating that they received financial assistance, food assistance, shelter assistance, or other assistance. 94.4% of respondents had similarly not received assistance from civil society organizations (CSOs) except for little food assistance, financial assistance, or other assistance.

The same applies to political parties, with 87.3% of respondents stating that they had not received much assistance from political parties, except for limited little financial assistance, food assistance, shelter assistance, reconstruction assistance, and other assistance. It must be noted that these lack of assistance responses are self-reported and have not been independently verified.

IV Evaluating Political Responses and Public Confidence

National Government

34.5% of respondents felt that the government politically responded well or 'good' to the war since the signing of the ceasefire. However, the majority negatively perceived the government's political response, with 22.8% stating that it was 'not good at all' and 15.3% stating that it was 'not good.'

Respondents further expressed that the way the former government politically responded to the war reduced their trust in it. Close to 60% of respondents shared that they saw their trust significantly reduce (37.1%) or reduce (22.7%). 33.1% felt that their degree of trust did not change. In contrast, only close to 38% reported that the current government's political response to the war significantly reduced their trust (25.2%) or reduced their trust (12.4%), with 32.8% having reported increased trust in the current government following its political response to the war.

International Organizations

Respondents expressed mixed views vis-à-vis the response of international organizations to the war since the signing of the ceasefire. 26.1% of respondents felt that international organizations did not respond 'good at all,' with an additional 17.3% feeling that the response was 'not good.' On the flip side, 24.8% of respondents felt that international organizations responded well or in a 'good' way to the war since the signing of the ceasefire. Close to 36% of respondents relayed that this political response did not change their level of trust in international organizations, while a combined 43.8% expressed that their trust was significantly reduced (27.3%) or reduced (16.5%).

President of the Republic

28.8% of respondents felt that the president responded well or in a 'good' way to the war since the signing of the ceasefire, with an additional 21.2% believing his response was 'very good.' Similarly, 30.9% of respondents reported increased trust in the president.

Political Parties

29.8% of respondents felt neutral about political parties' political response to the war since the signing of the ceasefire. That said, the

majority expressed a negative evaluation of political parties' political response, with 25.1% saying that it was 'not good at all' and 18.4% saying that it was 'not good,' for a combined 43.5% negative evaluation. This translated into a significantly unchanged level of trust in political parties (45.8%) and a negative change in levels of trust, with respondents indicating significantly reduced trust (26.4%) and reduced trust (16.6%).

V Evaluating Approaches to Recovery and Reconstruction

28.3% of respondents felt that the government's approach to recovery and reconstruction during and after the ceasefire was 'not good at all.' A similar percentage echoed the same feeling regarding international organizations. Meanwhile, 30.2% of respondents were neutral toward political parties' approach to recovery and reconstruction during and after the ceasefire, with another 38.9% stating that political parties' approach was 'not good at all' or 'not good.' Relatedly, 26.8% of respondents were neutral toward CSO approach to recovery and reconstruction during and after the ceasefire, with 50% of respondents feeling that CSOs' approach was 'not good at all' or 'not good.'


When asked about their degree of trust and confidence in the Nawaf Salam government (the current government) based on its handling of the war, 31.1% of respondents reported that their degree of trust was unchanged, with an equal percentage of 26.1% stating that their trust 'increased' or was 'significantly reduced,' 11.9% having reduced trust, and 4.8% having significantly increased trust in the current government.

Familiarity with the 3RF

69.6% of respondents indicated not being familiar with the 3RF, with females (73.5%) being more unfamiliar with it compared to males (66.1%). A total of 15.1% of respondents stated that they were familiar with the 3RF (10.9% females and 18.9% males), and another 15.3% expressed wanting to learn more about it. Female respondents were slightly more interested in learning more about it compared to male respondents. Out of those who indicated familiarity with the 3RF, they believed that its main broader purpose was to support Lebanon in achieving sustainable development. They also cited that it promoted inclusive recovery, transparency, and accountability, helped with

reconstructing the Port of Beirut, coordinated international assistance and support, and addressed the needs of the victims of the Port of Beirut blast, as well as encouraged institutional reform.

Are You Familiar with the 3RF Process in Lebanon?



Base: 1200

If Yes, What Do You Believe Are the Broader Purposes of the 3RF?



Base: 181

VI Results: Focus Groups

In both 2023 and 2025, focus group discussions were designed to collect in-depth qualitative insights from civil society organizations that are both part of the 3RF and outside of it. They aimed to identify these CSOs' perceptions of the 3RF and to critically examine its challenges, successes, and opportunities for the future.

Awareness and Participation in the 3RF

CSOs that participated in the focus group discussions relayed that the awareness of the 3RF remains extremely low, even among well-established CSOs. Less than 15% of CSOs in governorate focus group

discussions reported knowing about the 3RF and even less were actively engaged in it. Out of these 15%, several cited first learning about the 3RF during the baseline focus group discussions that were held in 2023. Some participants were unsure if they had indirectly engaged in activities that fall within the framework of the 3RF.

When asked about the reasons for this lack of awareness and participation, CSOs attributed this to weak outreach to grassroots organizations, limited communication, and opaque selection criteria, which they believe favored larger and international NGOs. Smaller and local CSOs felt excluded from the 3RF even though they are active in their communities, mainly due to selection criteria that they felt were unrealistic. Additionally, CSOs cited often not knowing about calls for proposals, stressing the need for better promotion of these calls.

Some participants recognized the need to work on increasing their visibility and on being more active in policy reform. Others, however, felt disenchanted with the realistic possibility of achieving reforms. According to one CSO representative: 'Most NGOs are no longer engaged in advocacy because they have grown disillusioned, realizing that in this country, politicians will oppose any form of reform and development.'

There were increasing doubts among CSOs regarding the ability of the 3RF to help with reconstruction after the war escalated in 2024, with one organization stating that throughout their work in affected areas 'no one had heard of the 3RF, unless they were working through CSOs.'

Experience with the 3RF

Even CSOs who are part of the 3RF lacked interest in participating in this round of focus group discussions, particularly due to impact evaluation fatigue. They expressed interest in having a session reviewing the 3RF's achievements, the process of identification of policy reform priorities, and the way forward. They believed these were needed before having a meaningful discussion with, or among, CSOs.

Overall, several CSOs felt that the 3RF's effectiveness stalled. They additionally stated that they felt its engagement was fragmented and siloed, especially among the UN, EU, and the World Bank. They believed that it could have been more transparent and followed-up more effectively on recommendations and implementation of suggested reforms. What started as an extremely important initiative bringing different stakeholders together fell short of consolidating ideas and meaningfully engaging with the government.

They did, however, state that funding procedures and oversight had somewhat improved, but delays and the partial disbursement of funds persisted. Better continuity, planning, and transparency were needed, particularly between working groups. They had hoped that working group achievements and progress could have been highlighted further and that more collaboration could have taken place between active CSOs and ministries.

Participating CSOs also called for better communication among themselves and other stakeholders, particularly in light of the war and in areas impacted by it. They felt that there was still ambiguity surrounding the objectives of the 3RF and its future outlook. In the words of one CSO representative: 'What is the 3RF planning to do? What are its objectives? What are its capacities? What are its plans? They say they are closing the 3RF. It's dead. They have tried to revive it during the war, but it didn't work.' They further struggled with observing the 3RF's expanded implementation and its contribution to addressing the impact of the Israeli-Lebanese war.

Policy Reform Priorities

CSOs affirmed the importance of implementing 3RF policy reform priorities; however, they simultaneously criticized them for being broad, vague, impractical, and uncertain when it comes to implementation. Clearer objectives were needed, along with action plans.

They likewise felt a disconnect between the 3RF's priorities and local needs, with more focus being given to reform and not enough attention being given to recovery and reconstruction. The selection process of the priorities also requires more explanation, especially considering the Lebanese context and its many needs. One CSO representative remarked: 'When were these priorities set? Before or after the war? As nothing is related to reconstruction in the destroyed areas during the war.'

CSOs called for increased attention to post-war recovery and reconstruction, particularly in healthcare, education, political and administrative reform, and judicial independence.

CSO Roles and Capacities

CSOs perceived themselves as active actors in assessing local needs, implementing policies, and carrying out oversight and advocacy. They felt that they were filling gaps left by the government. Additionally, they highlighted their collaborative work with international actors, ministries, municipalities, and grassroots organizations.

Nonetheless, they shared persistent challenges that they face, including funding shortages, misalignment between donor project design and local priorities, corruption and political interference, lack of civic engagement, dependence of beneficiaries, and the lack of capacity-building opportunities.

Out of these challenges, they identified four key internal needs that they need to strengthen. These include assets, capacity-building, finance, and increasing their visibility to become more effective actors in recovery and reform initiatives.

They further called for their inclusion in setting the country's policies. As one CSO representative expressed: 'The President of the Republic, in his inaugural speech mentioned that among the political reforms he would involve civil society in all its categories in setting the country's policies. We have not seen any action yet. We certainly have a role to play in setting these policies.'

Lastly, they stressed the need for effectively adopting and enforcing already existing tools and mechanisms for the promotion of accountability, cooperation, and transparency. They shared more ideas on how to bring this about, including developing a unified public procurement framework among NGOs and a unified platform for civil society organizations to monitor political reforms and their impact. Additionally, they suggested including independent monitors within the managing body of the 3RF and engaging independent and private sector auditors in monitoring processes. They asked for increased on-the-ground engagement of donors with local NGOs, which would include creating an external monitoring committee.

Priority Areas for Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction

CSOs identified priority sectors that require immediate attention. These include health and mental health, education, employment and productivity, displacement and reconstruction, agriculture, public safety, water, energy, and social inclusion.

The healthcare sector in particular required intervention given the deterioration it experienced over the course of the conflict. This includes rising mental health issues due to the overlapping crises and the Israeli-Lebanese war. The increase in drug use was also concerning, with clear linkages to the mental health crisis, particularly trauma and the absence of effective policies and limits of rehabilitation centers and state-supported services.

The collapse of the education system was also concerning, with school dropouts on the rise and infrastructural challenges. They mentioned the need for urgent reforms, particularly in terms of better integrating students suffering from learning disabilities or physical disabilities.

Job creation is also necessary to foster sustainability and support individuals and families, particularly youth. Agriculture was highlighted as one of the key sectors that can serve as a cornerstone for job creation, while fostering food security. Relatedly, there is a need to develop a strategy to confront desertification and to combat environmental crimes, including waste management, pollution, extractive industries, and unsustainable practices.

CSOs further stressed the need to include persons with disabilities in the policy reform process and to foster greater gender equality and child protection, particularly for abused, homeless, and illiterate children. It is also important to increase the focus on protecting the elderly, especially in light of the lack of adequate welfare and protection systems, and to support Syrian refugees as part of the emergency response.

Housing, road maintenance, and heritage preservation are other key areas to protect citizens' lives and Lebanon's cultural identity. Digitalization needs further rank high on the list of priorities due to its unique role in combatting corruption, streamlining processes, and facilitating the connection between citizens and the state.

In the context of the war, displacement and reconstruction were seen as key challenges, requiring prioritization to rebuild bombed and destroyed areas.

CSOs and Emergency Response During the 2024 Israeli-Lebanese War

CSOs reported having to shift their priorities to focus on emergency and humanitarian relief efforts due to the Israeli-Lebanese war. Many of their projects were completely or temporarily halted, and they saw an expansion in their role and responsibilities. They felt strained and stretched in terms of human and material resources, time, and red lines related to aid provision.

The emergency plan that had been developed 18 months prior to the war's outbreak was not implemented, and CSOs found themselves having to step in to fill gaps that were left by the government and other stakeholders. They called for more inclusion in emergency planning and for receiving more support in planning and reform initiatives.

They considered solidarity among Lebanese to be the biggest success story to come out of the war. This extended to NGOs as well, which coordinated to deliver basic necessities.

VII Recommendations for Improvement

Balance Long-Term Reforms with Urgent Needs

Data from the survey and focus groups illustrate that Lebanese individuals and CSOs are navigating simultaneous urgent needs in light of the Israeli-Lebanese war: displacement, humanitarian response, and reconstruction on the one hand, and longer-term reform and recovery aspirations, on the other.

Therefore, reform efforts must integrate immediate recovery priorities with sectoral strategies. This includes the protection of vulnerable populations, which encompasses those affected by the war, but also children, women, the elderly, and persons with disabilities whose vulnerability increased due to the war. It also requires strengthening coordination with municipalities, local NGOs, and other relevant stakeholders, as well as further localizing the 3RF and other donor-supported interventions.

Strengthen Governance, Coordination, and Transparency

The current fragmentation and model of working in silos is unsustainable. Strengthening governance requires coordination among CSOs, donors, and public institutions, in addition to more robust accountability and transparency mechanisms.

The aforementioned can be achieved through streamlining processes and effectively implementing anti-corruption measures, as well as empowering the relevant authorities to do so. It is further necessary to protect whistleblowers and leverage automation to foster transparency. These measures are even more crucial in the war context to reduce or avoid duplication efforts and increase transparency in aid provision and reconstruction endeavors.

Engage and Support Grassroots Organizations

Grassroots organizations, particularly NGOs, have proven themselves as key actors in both the emergency response and reform process. Some have advanced expertise in key topics linked to policy reforms, while all of them are present within communities, therefore they both have

the ability to reflect these communities' needs and gain their trust in implementing projects and reforms.

It is likewise important to support smaller CSOs and NGOs, to engage them in planning and implementation processes, and to empower them with capacity-building and scaling up efforts. This is even more important in light of the current war context, where all organizations are stressed and stretched to their limits, and trying their best to meet the increasing needs of vulnerable populations.

Align Initiatives with the UN Sustainable Development Goals

Data findings highlight a tension between meeting urgent needs and planning for longer-term priorities in Lebanon. Aligning calls for proposals, projects, and initiatives with the UN Sustainable Development Goals can help bridge Lebanon's urgent challenges with structural reforms and long-term recovery.

Despite the destabilizing effects of the war, which discourage medium to long-term sustainability, it is essential to plan for sustainable recovery and positive peace.

Focus on Actionable Implementation

Policy reform aspirations should be tied to specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound goals and action plans with clear roles, budgets, and monitoring and evaluation processes.

This is particularly important in a fast-paced war context where multiple sectors require immediate relief and recovery planning.

Increase Visibility and Monitoring

The survey and focus group results point to a need for increased visibility efforts tied to the 3RF and to CSO endeavors. Enhanced and continuous multileveled monitoring and evaluation processes can help with increasing transparency and accountability as well as reducing duplication efforts, thereby improving long-term efficiency linked to recovery and reconstruction.

VIII Conclusion

The ongoing Israeli-Lebanese conflict has further increased the vulnerability and precariousness of Lebanese individuals and families, particularly those who were already vulnerable and marginalized.

Displacement, economic strain, and reconstruction needs require increased accountability, coordination, and transparency efforts.

Despite these challenges, the 3RF remains relevant in linking reform, recovery, and reconstruction to setting Lebanon on the path to sustainable development. The 3RF's effectiveness, however, depends on clearer implementation, more robust localization, and increased inclusion and visibility. It will be essential to ensure that reform priorities translate into context-sensitive actions that advance sustainable recovery.

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